Foreign Broadcast Information Service

50 ANNIVERSARY 1941 - 1991

Daily Report

Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-91-093
Tuesday
14 May 1991

Daily Report
Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-91-093 CONTENTS *14 May 1991*

NOTICE TO READERS: On 6 May 1991, the DAILY REPORT will begin phasing in new radio and television sourcelines that reflect how a station identifies itself. This change eliminates the "Domestic Service" and "Television Service" designations in favor of the station identification as broadcast. The presence of a new sourceline reflects this charge in policy, rather than the establishment of a new station or network.

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

United States & Canada

Baltic Leaders' U.S. Visit Meets 'Disappointment' *[IZVESTIYA 11 May]* 1
Press Views Webster Resignation, Successor 2
IZVESTIYA Report *[11 May]* 2
PRAVDA Report *[13 May]* 3
U.S. Switches Position on 'Topaz' Reactor *[IZVESTIYA 11 May]* 3
PRAVDA Interviews Moiseyev on Canada Accord *[12 May]* 4

China

Jiang Zemin Visit Accorded 'State Visit' Status *[AFP]* 4
PRC Envoy Comments on Sino-Soviet Ties *[Moscow International]* 5
Commentator Optimistic About Jiang Zemin Visit *[Moscow International]* 6
'Roundtable' Reviews Sino-Soviet Relations *[Moscow Radio]* 6
Delegation Member Assesses Yazov's PRC Talks *[Moscow International]* 9

Northeast Asia

South Korean National Assembly Delegation Arrives *[TASS]* 9
Meets With President Gorbachev *[PRAVDA 14 May]* 9
Confers With Lukyanov *[TASS]* 10
1991 Trade Agreement Viewed *[Moscow Radio]* 10

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Nguyen Van Linh Meets With Politburo Members *[PRAVDA 13 May]* 11
Concludes Moscow Visit 13 May *[Hanoi Radio]* 11
UN Role in Cambodian Peace Initiative Urged *[Moscow International]* 11

Near East & South Asia

Bessmertnykh, Baker Meet With Mubarak *[TASS]* 12
News Conference Held *[TASS]* 12
Bessmertnykh Meets With Saudi Officials in Riyadh *[TASS]* 12
TASS Roundup of Visit 13
Bessmertnykh Departs Kingdom *[TASS]* 13
Bessmertnykh To Meet 'Arafat in Geneva *[TASS]* 13
Bessmertnykh on 'Peace Conference' Compromise *[Berlin ADN]* 13
IZVESTIYA Views Mideast Conference *[14 May]* 14
Primakov Sees No Alternative To 'Arafat in PLO *[Rome LA REPUBBLICA 10 May]* 14
Nishanov Delegation Meets Jallud in Libya *[TASS]* 15
Radio Program Analyzes Middle East Issues *[Moscow International]* 16

East Europe

East Europe's Interethnic Problems Pondered *[IZVESTIYA 12 May]* 17
Bulgarian Newspaper Interviews Shevardnadze *[Sofia ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME 1 May]* 20
BSP Leader Lilov on Need for 'Pluralism' *[PRAVDA 11 May]* 20
Bulgaria Denies Report on Popov Statement *[IZVESTIYA 12 May]* 22
Afanasyev Calls Charter 77 Model for Opposition *[Prague LIDOVE NOVINY 7 May]* 22

West Europe

Gorbachev's Sweden Visit Rescheduled for 6 June *[Belgrade TANJUG]* 22
FRG Cites Gorbachev on 'Obdurate' Honecker *[Hamburg DPA]* 23
Negative Assessment Denied *[Berlin ADN]* 23
Fears of Renewed Threat From Germany Rebutted *[IZVESTIYA 11 May]* 23
Genscher Cited on Call To Back USSR Reforms *[PRAVDA 12 May]* 24
Primakov Meets Italy's Andreotti, Cossiga in Rome *[TASS]* 24

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Supreme Soviet

Supreme Soviet Session Continues 13 May *[Moscow TV]* 25
Session Split Over Emigration Law *[Moscow Radio]* 25
Sitaryan on Emigration Treatment Problems *[Moscow Radio]* 26
Law on Travel Abroad Not Adopted *[TASS]* 26
State Security Organs Law Passed *[Moscow Radio]* 27
Ministerial Appointments Approved *[Moscow Radio]* 27
Text of Ruling on Armenia, Azerbaijan *[IZVESTIYA 13 May]* 27

Political & Social

Gorbachev Decree on More Compensation Measures *[PRAVDA 14 May]* 27
Air Traffic Controllers Plan Strike 21 May *[Radio Rossii]* 28
Air Traffic Chief Makes Appeal *[IZVESTIYA 14 May]* 28
TASS Reviews Soviet Central Press for 14 May 29
Prospects for 'Vzglyad' Program Examined *[Radio Rossii]* 30
Autonomies' Status in New Union Considered *[IZVESTIYA 14 May]* 31
Deputies Cited on Election of Union Organs *[PRAVDA 11 May]* 32
Shakhnazarov on Union-Russia Relationship *[IZVESTIYA 13 May]* 34
Democratic Conference Fails To Set Up Party *[Moscow Radio]* 38
Ligachev Cautions Against Collapse of Communism *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 12 May]* 39
Yakovlev Interviewed on 'New Thinking' *[Moscow TV]* 39
Pugo Addresses Conference on Drug Trafficking *[TASS]* 40
Soyuz Aims Tantamount to 'Coup d'Etat' *[IZVESTIYA 12 May]* 40
Figures for Newspaper Sales Reported *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 5 May]* 44

Economic

Cabinet Discusses Market Transition *[TASS]* 44
Kuzbass Coal Mines Returning to Normal *[TASS]* 45
Miners Strike Results in R4 Billion in Losses *[Moscow International]* 45
Ligachev Views Aftermath of Mine Strikes *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 12 May]* 45

Military

Navy Chief on Manpower, Service Reforms *[PRAVDA 14 May]* 47

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Baltic Republics

Baltic Finance Ministers Discuss Policies *[Riga International]* 49
Estonian-Latvian Border Talks Considered *[Riga Radio]* 49
Latvian, Estonian Leaders on Need for Independence *[Riga Radio]* 49
Treaty Prepared for Trade Between Latvia, CSFR *[Riga Radio]* 49
'Many' Latvians 'Far From Happy' About Housing *[TASS]* 49
Latvian Democrats Oppose Town Council Communists *[Riga Radio]* 50
Latvia Servicemen's Union Assigns Tasks *[TASS]* 50
Lithuania Assails Destabilization Moves *[Vilnius Radio]* 50
Six Lithuanian Legislative Factions Registered *[IZVESTIYA 13 May]* 50
Pro-Moscow Lithuanian TV, Radio Registered *[IZVESTIYA 12 May]* 51

RSFSR

First Russian TV Station Begins Coverage 52
Yeltsin Hails Event *[Moscow TV]* 52
Silayev Toasts Opening *[Moscow TV]* 54
Director Views News Service *[Moscow TV]* 54
Gorbachev, Yeltsin Meet Autonomous Leaders *[Moscow Radio]* 55
Tatarstan To Not Agree to Union Treaty *[TASS]* 55
Yeltsin Says He, Gorbachev 'Can Work Together' *[IZVESTIYA 13 May]* 56
Yeltsin Holds News Conference in Prague *[TASS]* 56
Further on Status of Presidential Election 57
Soyuz Supports Ryzhkov *[Moscow Radio]* 57
Sokolov Backs Ryzhkov Candidacy *[TASS]* 57
Gen Makashov Announces Candidacy *[TASS]* 57
Zhirinovskiy Registers *[TASS]* 58
Candidate Outlines Platform *[TASS]* 58
Election Postponement Urged *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 12 May]* 58
Silayev Presents Economic Program to Presidium *[Moscow Radio]* 59
Silayev Comments on Anticrisis Program *[Moscow TV]* 59
Russian Communist Party Plenum Previewed *[TASS]* 59

Western Republics

Belorussian Government, TU's Sign Agreement *[TASS]* 60
Belorussian Parties, Movements Urge 'Roundtable' *[IZVESTIYA 11 May]* 60
Ukraine Cabinet of Ministers Structure Approved *[Moscow Radio]* 61
Ukrainian Strike Association Congress Slated *[IZVESTIYA 13 May]* 61
Ukrainian Leaders, Veterans Mark VE Day *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 11 May]* 61
Ukrainians in Romania Threaten Exodus *[TASS]* 61
Lvov Chairman on Local Problems, Prospects *[TRUD 6 May]* 62

Caucasus

Armenian Party Chief, Politburo Member Resigns *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 14 May]* 64
Supreme Soviet Official Fired on in Armenia *[Radio Rossii]* 64
Ter-Petrosyan, Mutalibov Interviewed on NKAO *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 18]* 64
Armenia-Azerbaijan Fighting at 'Usual' Level *[IZVESTIYA 13 May]* 67
Armenian Attacks on Azerbaijani Towns Reported *[Baku Radio]* 68
Efforts To Disarm NKAO Guerrillas Described *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 11 May]* 68
Bombing of Baku Office Blamed on Armenians *[PRAVDA 12 May]* 69
Azerbaijan Official Urges Armenia To Negotiate *[TASS]* 70
Airlift of Armenians From Getashen Continues *[IZVESTIYA 12 May]* 70
Armenian Supreme Soviet, Cabinet Issue Condolences *[Yerevan Radio]* 70

Armenian Minister Favors Executive Presidency *[TASS]* 71
Armenian Youths in Moscow Demonstration *[TASS]* 71
'Vremya' Notes Armenian Death Toll Since 1 May *[Moscow TV]* 71
Reporter Witnesses 'Absurdity' of NKAO *[PRAVDA 12 May]* 71
Journalists Unable To Reach Troubled Border *[IZVESTIYA 12 May]* 73

Central Asia

Kyrgyzstan Government, TU Reach Accord for 1991 *[Moscow Radio]* 75
Kyrgyz 'Amnesty': Step Toward Market Relations *[IZVESTIYA 13 May]* 75
General Staff, Uzbekistan on Draft Exemptions *[IZVESTIYA 9 May]* 75

United States & Canada

Baltic Leaders' U.S. Visit Meets 'Disappointment'

PM1305095791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 May 91 Union Edition p 4

[IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Nadein report: "They Didn't Come for Smiles; Results of Baltic Leaders' U.S. Visit"]

[Text] Washington—"I wouldn't like to see any rupture in our relations (with the Soviet Union), which are very strong and afforded us an extremely important service during the recent war," U.S. President George Bush said. He also stressed that M.S. Gorbachev still "has my respect" for the leading role he has played in the democratic transformations in East Europe and the Soviet Union itself.

Commentators here reckon that these words, uttered shortly before the leaders of the three Baltic republics visited the White House, were what Lithuania's V. Landsbergis, Estonia's E. Savisaar, and Latvia's I. Godmanis least expected.

The results of this visit may be perceived as a surprise for the Union Soviet Government and also for the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian leaders.

It proved rather a pleasant surprise for the Union government. After a short period of uncertainty, which some observers saw as indicating the intention to review its guidelines as regards Moscow, the White House has once again confirmed its support for President Gorbachev's policy.

The Baltic guests were obviously expecting more vigorous support for their plans to acquire state independence.

The delegations' stay began with a hearing at the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This commission comprises a number of U.S. senators and representatives. The chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet and the heads of the Latvian and Estonian Governments were given the role of witnesses. They all sat together at a short rectangular table facing away from the hall.

There were few members of the Commission on Security present. However, its members were ensconced at a vast elevated semicircular table facing the hall. For this reason they appeared not only morally but also numerically superior.

Which could not be said of the guests. The president and the two prime ministers gave their testimony facing one senator, four congressmen, several dozen journalists and an audience of no more than 50 people. They embodied the supreme authorities of three states that have proclaimed their independence pro forma. Respect for the U.S. Congress notwithstanding, it could hardly have expected the presidents or prime ministers of such small states as Iceland, Luxembourg, and Costa Rica, say, to appear at the same time in such circumstances.

As the three leaders put it, their tasks was to prompt the U.S. Administration and the U.S. Congress to put as much pressure as possible on the Soviet Union to persuade it to recognize the republics' state independence as rapidly as possible. The flood of arguments in favor of this was divided into two main groups.

First, the fact that the Union government is compromised on all fronts and in a variety of ways. V. Landsbergis took on the bulk of the arguments. Appealing predominantly to his audience's sentiments, the chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet used words and expressions rarely seen in political debate.

Here is a typical example from his testimony: "From our own experience, we can advise the U.S. Congress and Administration: Don't trust a government of thieves that deceives everyone. Put the top Soviet leadership to the test by asking it the following questions: Why don't you return the buildings that you have stolen (reference to the television and radio stations and the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] school—V.N.) to the Lithuanian government and people who work there? Why do you still hold stolen goods and why are you allowing your army to continue looting? The Lithuanian people have a good saying: A liar is also a thief. The entire Soviet system is based on a lie and is, consequently, based on theft."

Ivars Godmanis devoted his main attention to economic problems. He claimed that the Soviet Union's industrial and financial collapse is inevitable at any rate. In contrast with the confused empire that has lost its way, the "Baltic peoples have a clear understanding of what they want and what has to be done to achieve it."

In the opinion of the Latvian Government leader, chaos in the USSR is quite inevitable, but "radical changes can be controlled and directed far more easily" as far as the small Baltic states are concerned. Western aid directly to the republics, I. Godmanis said, can be effective, whereas aid to the "center" only fosters the shadowy military-industrial complex and prolongs a system that is beyond salvation.

As for Chairman E. Savisaar, he stressed in his testimony the impossibility of holding productive dialogue with the Soviet Union, which "constantly refuses to hold serious talks with Estonia." He said that economic sanctions imposed by the USSR could have serious consequences for his republic, but only if Soviet "control over Estonia's borders, customs service, defense, police forces, and Estonia's economy" persists.

The second group of problems—as the Baltic leaders saw them—focused on their concerted endeavor to internationalize the Baltic republics' conflict with the Union center as far as possible. "I am sure that only strong Western pressure on the Soviet Union can persuade the Soviet Government to begin serious talks," E. Savisaar

said. "It is quite clear that there can be only one solution here: The losses and the current struggle to restore Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian independence have created an international crisis," his Latvian colleague I. Godmanis backed him.

Political pressure, the granting of loans and credits on satisfactory terms for the three republics, and—this is the main thing—the inclusion of the Baltic issue on the agenda at the coming Berlin CSCE were the aims voiced by the leaders visiting Washington.

There is no doubt that the U.S. public sincerely sympathizes with the three Baltic states. It is well-known that the United States does not pro forma recognize their incorporation into the Soviet Union. Both the White House and the State Department have frequently stated their firm support for the Baltic independence movement. The leaders of the three republics have frequently heard the same thing from Western visitors. They also heard plenty of warm words of approval during their stay in the United States.

No one reproaches the representatives of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia with a lack of effort. With all the emotional fervor they could muster they condensed for their U.S. audience the arguments in their favor and their recriminations against the West, which, you may realize, is sacrificing the Balts for geopolitical aims.

In short, everything was said. However, attentive analysis of what a number of congressmen and, particularly, the President himself said shows most clearly a U.S. reluctance to run the risk of linking U.S.-Soviet relations tightly to the development of events in the Baltic.

The visitors had difficulty concealing their disappointment following their meeting at the White House. According to I. Godmanis, the U.S. President told them that "when he next meets Gorbachev, he will tell him the same as he has always told him" about the benefits of friendship with neighbors. Godmanis added that Secretary of State J. Baker, who was present during the conversation, "asked us to find some mechanism for obtaining independence, a mechanism for implementing this process that would also allow the Soviet Union to 'save face.'"

E. Savisaar said that the conversation "could possibly enable a foundation to be laid for an improvement, (for) good relations between the Baltics and the United States." Stressing this same word, V. Landsbergis said that "this meeting could possibly have been symbolic."

Pointing out the Baltic guests' obvious disappointment, newspapers here report that President Bush left no doubts as to his refusal—at least at present—to interfere in the negotiating process between Moscow and the three republics.

Press Views Webster Resignation, Successor

IZVESTIYA Report

PM1305151991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 May 91 Union Edition p 4

[Correspondent A. Blinov report: "CIA Director Resigns"]

[Text] Washington—CIA Director William Webster has resigned as head of the U.S. "intelligence community," a post he has held for the last four years.

U.S. President G. Bush, who appeared before journalists with Webster, announced the CIA director's resignation at a White House ceremony. In a brief speech the President noted that Webster had done "splendid work" of gathering intelligence information without, at the same time, attempting to influence policy-making. Both men—Bush and Webster—claimed that they did not want this resignation.

Despite the emphatically warm leave-taking ceremony for the CIA leader, the U.S. press claims that the resignation was long overdue. Webster, who joined the CIA leadership at the height of the notorious "Irangate" political scandal, managed to shield U.S. intelligence from criticism and appreciably improved his department's relations with Congress. However, his "rating" within the administration itself was not high.

Webster was not one of the "eight" persons who took part in adopting the most important political decisions. So, he was not present during the most important conference where the plan of action as regards Iran was formulated. The press announced that CIA "output" did not always suit the administration leadership.

The CIA director has been reproached for the fact that U.S. intelligence was unable to make timely predictions of Iraq's intentions to occupy Kuwait and was "late" in providing analytical computations to bolster its idea that political and economic sanctions were not enough to get Iraqi troops to pull out of this country. Webster was also blamed for the CIA's failing to provide timely support for the attempt to overthrow Panama's leader General M. Noriega.

In connection with Webster's resignation, the U.S. press notes that the CIA's problems are directly linked with the thrust of its main activity. "We set up the intelligence community in the forties for a specific purpose—keeping an eye on the military and political challenge from the Soviet Union," a U.S. intelligence leader told a NEW YORK TIMES correspondent. "When we planned our actions against this challenge, we proceeded from the premise that it would take the form of war. But that did not happen. It took the form of peace. And we were fundamentally unprepared for that."

Commenting on the above words uttered by a high-ranking intelligence officer, THE NEW YORK TIMES said that, with the end of the "cold war," the CIA is

seeking a new role for itself or, at least, a "cleaner image." The U.S. mass media reckon that U.S. intelligence is not only not curtailing its work but will, on the contrary, obviously operate "more aggressively."

It is predicted that in the new international atmosphere the CIA will have to tackle to a greater extent "regional challenges" and even the problem of combating trade and economic competitors. W. Webster supposedly tried to channel some intelligence resources into combating foreign competitors' attempts to seize U.S. economic strategic secrets and technical secrets, at the level of both governments and private firms, but has not had very much success in this, encountering inertia in his own subordinates' approaches.

There has as yet been no announcement as to who will become the new CIA director. The potential candidates include B. Scowcroft, the President's national security adviser; J. Lilley, U.S. ambassador to the PRC; and a number of others. Robert Gates, Scowcroft's first deputy, is at present considered the most likely figure—G. Bush himself declared him "worthy" of this post.

It is well-known that Robert Gates trained as a "Sovietologist." He worked for a long time in CIA analysis services and in the NSA apparatus. Gates' latest intelligence posting was as CIA first deputy director. It is still not known how Congress would regard Gates' candidacy—he was nominated for this post in 1987, but did not make it. It has come to light that Gates compiled a by no means full report on the CIA's involvement in U.S actions on Iran and Nicaragua ("Irangate"). Observers predict that if Gates does not take the Congress' fancy this time, G. Bush may nominate an as yet unknown candidate.

PRAVDA Report

PM1305154791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 May 91 Second Edition p 6

[V. Gan report: "CIA: New Boss in the Offing"]

[Text] Washington—Big changes are in store for staffers of the Central Intelligence Agency. A new boss is in the offing. After four years in the post, CIA Director William Webster has resigned, and his resignation has been accepted by President G. Bush.

Webster's decision came as a surprise to everyone. Initially no one could offer an explanation as to its motives or causes. Webster, a former federal judge—he is still addressed as "judge"—and former director of the FBI, on the whole created a good impression on the public. Having been placed by Reagan at the head of the espionage agency at the height of the "Iran-Contra" scandal, he managed to some extent to clean up the CIA's reputation.

No matter what the U.S. press may claim now, Webster did not, of course, change the agency's nature, methods, or objectives. However, even the local liberals reckon that he "discontinued" the CIA's illegal secret operations and abided by the agency's accountability to Congress.

Now, analyzing the circumstances of his resignation, specialists are expressing the opinion that Webster has become an "unofficial victim" of the war in the Persian Gulf. After the Administration had already decided to take military action against Iraq, the CIA director asserted in public that the economic santions were sufficiently effective. Despite this, on the eve of the vote in Congress on the resolution sanctioning the use of military force by the United States against Baghdad, Webster changed his position, thus losing prestige in the eyes of the lawmakers, who described him as a "pawn" of the White House.

Announcing Webster's resignation, Bush himself said nothing about his successor. But, giving rise to suspicion, he sang the praises of Robert Gates, the President's deputy assistant for national security affairs, a former CIA deputy director who switched to the White House apparatus. Gates is quite a well-known figure. He was nominated for the post of CIA director in 1987, but was forced to withdraw his candidacy because of very strong opposition in the Senate, where it was believed that Gates had been involved in the illegal arms deliveries to the Nicaraguan "Contras."

Incidentally, Gates is famous mainly for something else—his absolute rejection of anything connected with the Soviet Union. A Soviet affairs specialist, he categorically rejects all compromises and any political rapprochement and collaboration with us. Gates is a man of the most hardline anti-Soviet views, and nothing will change his convictions. In recent months, when the word "pause" started cropping up in the press in connection with Soviet-U.S. relations, Gates' name inevitably featured alongside in the capacity of one of the President's advisers advocating a "revision" of the U.S. approach to the USSR.

People close to Gates are saying that his appointment is a foregone conclusion. This is not yet reality. But if Gates nonetheless becomes CIA director, then the course which he will steer will not be in question. It is worth mentioning here that the CIA director is also director of Central Intelligence, that is, he is in charge of all the U.S. intelligence services, coordinating their operations.

According to the admissions of former CIA staffers, the agency is still guided by a single objective: defeat of the "arch-enemy" of the United States—the Soviet Union and its allies in the "Third World." We may be confident that under the new "boss" this objective will only be reinforced.

U.S. Switches Position on 'Topaz' Reactor

PM1305104391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 May 91 Union Edition p 2

[S. Leskov report: "Soviet Reactor 'Released'"]

[Text] IZVESTIYA reported the "arrest" of the Soviet nuclear installation "Topaz-2," which was banned from being brought back from the United States after being displayed at an international exhibition in Albuquerque. Here is the latest report: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has reviewed its decision and allowed the reactor, which is installed on space apparatuses, to return to the USSR.

It is hard to tell why the decision was revised. Either because U.S. specialists voiced concerted indignation at their bureaucrats' actions, or because of talks that the commission's representatives had during a recent visit to Moscow, or maybe because of Academician N. Ponomarev-Stepnyy's direct appeal to U.S. President G. Bush.

"Topaz-2" can come home. But it is quite possible that it will extend its stay across the ocean—now of its own free will. While the White House is preparing the official documentation, the Americans have suggested that Soviet scientists exhibit the reactor at the world's largest museum, the Smithsonian in Washington.

PRAVDA Interviews Moiseyev on Canada Accord

PM1305135791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 91 Second Edition p 5

[Report by PRAVDA correspondent including interview with General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, in Ottawa, date not given: "Continuation of Contacts"]

[Text] Ottawa, 11 May—Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, is in Canada on an official visit. This is the first visit made here by a leader of our General Staff.

General John de Chastelain, Canadian National Defense chief of staff, visited the USSR last year. And now we have a new meeting and a continuation of talks between the military chiefs of both countries. The signing of an intergovernmental agreement on averting dangerous military activity was an important event during the present visit.

Speaking at a news conference, the head of the Soviet military delegation highly appraised this document, which opens a new chapter in relations between the USSR and Canada and their armed forces. The main aim of the document is to create a reliable mechanism to prevent dangerous military actions and reduce the possibility of incidents between the armed forces when they carry out routine functions in each other's vicinity.

M.A. Moiseyev answered questions put to him by PRAVDA's correspondent.

[PRAVDA] Canada is an active member of NATO and it is a country that participated in the creation of this organization. How do you assess the prospects of cooperation with such a partner in the military sphere?

[Moiseyev] Today we can state that we have embarked on the wide road of cooperation with Canada and its armed forces within the framework of bilateral agreements on a military level.

[PRAVDA] Canada has a wealth of experience, including in participation in international peace-keeping forces in the world's "hotspots". The country's politicians and military men are very proud of this. Is it the case that we also consider such experience valuable?

[Moiseyev] Yes. I think that Canada's experience in this sphere deserves attention. During my meeting with the Canadian defense ministers, I stressed the stability of the Canadian armed forces' participation in UN operations and noted the responsible way in which they carried out the tasks assigned to them. I said that a detachment of our officers is taking part in a similar mission within the UN framework in the Persian Gulf region today.

China

Jiang Zemin Visit Accorded 'State Visit' Status

AU1405104991 Paris AFP in English 1022 GMT 14 May 91

[Excerpt] Moscow, May 14 (AFP)—Moscow is giving the visit here by Chinese Communist Party boss Jiang Zemin summit status, stressing that his talks with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev will be those between state rather than party leaders. Mr. Jiang is due to arrive Wednesday and will leave Sunday.

His visit "is viewed as a summit, not a meeting between party leaders," said Andrey Denisov, a senior staffer of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee, quoted by the INTERFAX news agency. Mr. Denisov, who works in the Central Committee's International Department, added that the meeting between Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Jiang would be that of two chief executives from neighbouring countries, rather than that of leaders of two long-time rival communist parties.

Mr. Jiang's visit—the first by a Chinese party chief since that of Mao Zedong in 1957—will allow for a general review of bilateral ties since Mr. Gorbachev's groundbreaking visit to China in May 1989, which officially ended a 30-year ideological rift. Talks will cover the whole range of bilateral relations, including cooperation in the military field, Mr. Denisov said. But he stressed it was unlikely the talks would lead to an agreement on military supplies.

It was also unlikely the visit would result in any economic agreements, even though such cooperation would be discussed, notably during Mr. Jiang's talks with Soviet Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, Mr. Denisov added. The visit was expected to lead to the signing of a joint communique on the model of that concluded by Mr. Gorbachev during his trip to Beijing two years ago, the Central Committee staffer added.

In Beijing, a reliable source predicted that the visit might lend itself to the announcement of an accord on a longstanding border dispute between the two countries. Following a visit to Beijing by Soviet Defence Minister Dmitriy Yazov earlier this month, the Soviet Embassy in China issued a statement saying that the two countries no longer posed a threat to each other.

Lieutenant-General Valery Manilov, head of the Soviet Defence Ministry's Information Department, for his part confirmed that progress had been made in the talks on a border settlement. The countries share a 7,300 kilometer (4,400 mile) border. [passage omitted]

PRC Envoy Comments on Sino-Soviet Ties

OW1105142991 Moscow Radio Moscow in Mandarin 2200 GMT 9 May 91

[Report on interview with Yu Hongliang, PRC ambassador to the Soviet Union, by station correspondent Marchuk; place and date not given—Yu Hongliang remarks recorded]

[Text] Friends, at the invitation of President Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee and chairman of the Military Commission of the People's Republic of China, will make an official friendly visit to the Soviet Union starting 15 May.

[Marchuk] Comrade Jiang Zemin's visit to the Soviet Union is timed to coincide exactly with the second anniversary of the USSR- PRC summit in Beijing. The results of that meeting have promoted the beginning of the full normalization of relations between the two countries. What do you think about the development of relations between the Soviet Union and China over the past two years?

[Yu Hongliang] Since President Gorbachev visited China two years ago, relations between our two countries have developed to a great extent in a very satisfactory manner. We have made excellent progress in developing relations in all fields, including political, economic, cultural, and other areas as well.

First of all, we have maintained contacts at many levels, from the highest on down. There have been numerous mutual visits. Premier Li Peng visited the Soviet Union last year. The vice premiers of our two countries, parliamentary members, and leading comrades of military departments have all exchanged visits. Discussions between our foreign ministers have been even more frequent. There has also been frequent contact between foreign ministers and vice foreign ministers. Our two countries have constantly exchanged opinions on many major state affairs. We have coordinated with each other on international affairs. We have often exchanged opinions on developing bilateral relations. It can be said that our cooperation is quite good.

According to Soviet figures, Sino-Soviet trade last year reached roughly more than U.S. $5 billion, a 26-percent increase over 1989. Overall, the Soviet Union's overall foreign trade decreased last year, but Sino-Soviet trade increased. To us, this calls for rejoicing.

As you comrades all know, Chinese and Soviet people have a traditional friendship. In the past, when the Chinese people had difficulties, the Soviet people helped. Now, under the present circumstances, the Soviet Union has temporary difficulties. The Chinese have also provided some assistance to the Soviet people to the best of their ability. For example, in the last two years, we will [as heard] provide preferential commodity loans with a total amount of 1.5 billion Swiss francs or, in other words, nearly U.S. $1 billion preferential commodity loans to the Soviet Union. Local trade cooperation between our countries has also progressed. According to Soviet statistics, our figures are not as precise. Local trade, namely border trade, reached approximately U.S. $1.2 billion. This figures also reveals that local trade has developed quite rapidly.

Concerning border talks between our two countries, we have also made some achievements. Not long ago, government delegations from our two countries drafted an agreement on the eastern part of Sino-Soviet borders in Moscow. The talks on disarmament in border areas and the question of mutual trust were also held in a smooth manner and achieved progress.

Relations between our two parties have also developed. High-level delegations mutually visited each other. Not long ago, Ivashko, deputy general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee had visited China.

[Marchuk] Now both sides are convinced that the potential of such cooperation is far from being fully developed. In your opinion, what obstacles exist?

[Yu Hongliang] I think that the development of relations between our two countries is in accord with the common wishes and interests of our peoples. Based on this premise, we can say that development of cooperation between our two countries has only potential and will meet with no obstacles. For our part, we do not see any obstacles to the development of bilateral cooperation; for the Soviets' part, there are also no obstacles, and such obstacles should not exist. Soviet comrades whom I have met all want to develop cooperation with China.

The problem is that the two sides should enhance mutual understanding and strive together to find ways and areas of cooperation. We are different countries after all, and so we may not both understand all things. Based on this general premise, economic cooperation between our two countries is very complementary. We have some things which are lacking in the Soviet Union; the Soviet Union has some things we do not have. This complementarity is the best foundation for developing cooperation between our two countries. Therefore, I think that as long as we make concerted efforts to cooperate, we can truly develop our cooperation potential.

Some comrades have noted that since the basis of our trade has been changed to spot exchange transactions, meaning the use of foreign exchange, this year we will see if the new system will affect our economic cooperation. I think that initially it may affect our economic cooperation to a certain extent. I am convinced, however, that in developing cooperation we should be flexible. What they are talking about refers to trade using foreign currency. Some things that we have are severely lacking in the Soviet Union and vice versa. The Soviet Union lacks foreign exchange; we lack foreign exchange. Under such circumstances, we should also do some barter trading. The calculation of its value can be based on international market prices and foreign currency rates. This way, we can develop several aspects of cooperation.

[Marchuk] Both the Soviet Union and China are involved in reform programs, which are similar in many aspects. What kinds of reform experiences can be mutually beneficial?

[Yu Hongliang] Of course, our two countries are implementing reform. In regarding socialism as a science, the general direction we must follow is to constantly create new things in development. We should, according to our different national situations, perfect our socialist systems. I think we agree on this point. Reform is different in different countries. Therefore, we must adopt specific measures based on the situation in each country. Only in this way can each government obtain popular support and stir up the people's enthusiasm.

For example, the purpose of farming is producing from the land; but different kinds of land, because of varying soil, water, weather, and other conditions, must be used in different ways. We have to decide on plants and crops to be planted, such as fruit, grain, rice, or corn. We must adopt different methods according to different conditions in order to increase the land's yield. Therefore, the two countries should also decide and adopt different methods in carrying out reform according to their own national situation.

Of course, our two countries maintain friendly and good-neighborly relations. We can constantly and continuously conduct exchanges. We can draw lessons from each other's experiences. It is impossible, however, to exactly copy the other side's methods. Indiscriminate copying of others' experiences might not work.

Next week, General Secretary Jiang Zemin will pay an official visit to the Soviet Union. This will be a return visit for President Gorbachev's visit to China two years ago. I think that this visit and highest-level meetings between the two countries will greatly promote further development of relations between our countries; they will be of great significance.

Commentator Optimistic About Jiang Zemin Visit

OW1305122091 Moscow Radio Moscow in Mandarin 1300 GMT 12 May 91

[Kondratsyev commentary]

[Text] Dear listeners, an important event in Sino-Soviet relations will take place next week. Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission of China, will make an official visit to the Soviet Union on 15 May. What can we expect of the forthcoming summit meeting? Our station commentator Kondratyev has the following remarks on this question.

Our wishes must be realistic, not abstractly optimistic. Two years ago, after many years of estrangement, there was a breakthrough in Sino-Soviet relations. This was the result of a summit meeting between the two countries in Beijing in May 1989, when the two countries took the difficult first step toward better relations. Time has proven that the Beijing summit withstood the test and was not an empty name. In the last two years, contacts have increased between the two countries in all fields and between their departments at various levels. In particular, contacts between high-level leaders of the two countries have been restored, leading the peoples of both countries onto a road of mutual trust. The relations between the CPSU and the CPC have also been restored, and relations between both parties play an important role in promoting cooperation between the Soviet Union and China. The two sides have begun talks on questions left over from the past regarding boundary lines, mutual disarmament, and confidence-building measures in border areas. The Soviet defense minister's visit to China not long ago eased the situation in the border areas. Progress has also been made in economic cooperation and trade—the trade volume has reached 3 billion rubles.

In my view, the main achievement made by the two countries under their new policies is that they have put an end to the confrontation between them in the international arena. I like to point out with satisfaction that in the international arena, the Soviet Union and China are no longer treated as playing cards, and they are regarded as stabilizing factors instead. In short, the above-mentioned achievements in the relations between the two sides give people sufficient reasons to be optimistic about the forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union by the Chinese supreme leader.

'Roundtable' Reviews Sino-Soviet Relations

LD1005171991 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network 1230 GMT 10 May 91

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Vsevolod Ivanovich Sovva, deputy head of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate; Doctor of History Yevgeniy Petrovich Bazhanov, international affairs journalist; and Vladimir Georgiyevich Pasko, All-Union Radio Foreign Policy commentator]

[Excerpts] [Pasko] Hello, comrades! The subject of today's conversation is China and Soviet-Chinese relations. There is a very good reason for this. On 15 May the official visit by Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the

CPC Central Commission and chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission, to the USSR begins. In the conduct of international relations, including our relations with the outside world, summit meetings are a regular thing. In many cases such meetings are already of a working nature. One cannot yet say this about Soviet-Chinese summit meetings. An interval of nearly three and one-half decades stands between the last and the next visit to Moscow by the top figure of the Chinese state. And it is precisely this which gives Jiang Zemin's visit an air of exclusivity. At the same time, it must be pointed out that the first Soviet-Chinese summit meeting, which laid the foundations for a normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations, was held in may 1989 during Comrade Gorbachev's visit to Beijing. It was precisely then when the party and state leaders of the two countries agreed to strike a line under the 30-year period of alienation and the sides agreed the basis of bilateral relations at a new stage of their development. Proceeding from this, Jiang Zemin's visit should, clearly, be assessed from the point of view of what has happened in Soviet-Chinese relations precisely during this period, by which I mean the past two years.

[Tsolvo] Yes, Vladimir Georgiyevich, you have described the position perfectly clearly, and I would just like to add one detail. Here, two years ago, there were certain indirect signs of an improvement in our relations, a rapprochement, if you like, between our countries. I myself made this remark when the seventh correspondent of the bureau of the XINHUA agency appeared in Moscow. Translated into information language this means that a world agency has switched over to 24-hour operation. If one could enumerate everything that has happened in two years in every aspect of our relations, this would take up a great deal of time. But since we are speaking spontaneously to our listeners for whom the words Moscow-Beijing are not just an echo of an old song—I am now addressing listeners in the Blagoveshchensk area, and in many other regions situated along the USSR border with China which is 7,500 km long—then the rapprochement between the peoples which has begun, between great masses of the population near the border where there has been a mutual reduction in armed forces, where a strengthening of trust has occurred, is of exceptionally important significance.

I recall just the following. When Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's summit visit took place, immediately afterward traffic opened on the new air routes Khabarovsk to Harbin and Alma-Ata to Urumchi. Later there would be the Moscow to Shanghai route. But this, as they say, is just a small exchange between our countries. Ahead lies the opening of communications along the shortest railway line from the USSR to the PRC via the Kazakh SSR, and so on. Some tens of thousands of Chinese workers are already working in Maritime Kray, the Amur and Chita oblasts. It seems to me that the most outstanding result of the rapprochement in our time is when the populations of both great countries feel changes for the better.

[Pasko] In rejecting ideological confrontations, both countries are actively erecting the framework of a new building of cooperation. And here I would like, if I may, to refer first and foremost to the economic aspect. Just look, in the first place, over the past two years long-term programs of economic and scientific-technical interaction have been signed, a document which is just the framework but a very important one; a new trade agreement which envisages the two countries switching over to free convertible currency in their dealings. The significance of this clearly needs no further elaboration since everything is developing quite well at the moment in the economy at this juncture.

At the same time the obstructions of the past are being cleared away. By this I mean the work on reaching agreement on the border, which was signed last year, to the document on the principles of a reduction in the armed forces and confidence-building in the military sphere in the border area. [passage omitted]

[Pasko] All this is very interesting, and not just from the cognitive point of view, but also in te context of understanding China's foreign policy today. China is now clearly burdened down by diverting funds for defense and is striving to use any opportunity for switching to civilian channels.

The Chinese were the first to take advantage of the new situation in international life when, at the end of the eighties, it carried out a unilateral reduction in its armed forces by one million men: that's quite a lot. Curiously, in order to understand the approaches of the Chinese to the problem of reduction one has to assess the principles which were agreed upon with us on a reduction in armed forces in the frontier area. In the report of the Political Committee of the All-China Assembly of People's Representatives, the government, the essence of this principle is particularly emphasized: he who has greater advantages, reduces more. In other words, it was clearly given to understand, and to the Chinese themselves, that reduction for them is irreversible. And one must suppose that reduction is interpreted in China just as it is everywhere itself. However, the government has no intention of diverting from this path. In this same report is stressed the significance of the agreement on principles. The fact that it is the first agreement in the Asia-Pacific region on an arms reduction, and that it not only helps to increase trust between China and the Soviet Union, but also has important significance for strengthening peace in the Far East and in the Asia-Pacific region. They see a greater threat to the existing system in what you have already pointed out, and that is the infiltration of an alien ideology.

Nevertheless, this does not prevent Beijing from constantly stating that it is striving for normal business relations with the West, including the United States. Just prior to Jiang Zemin's visit to Moscow this position was once again to be heard in statements by the Chinese leadership. At the same time, the Chinese are emphasizing all the time that in the field of foreign policy China

adheres to an independent line and that, as before, it has no intention of establishing allied or strategic links with any of the superpowers. China proposes to build relations with all on the five principles of peaceful coexistence. It sees on this basis, incidentally, a new political and economic order in the world.

A primary role is given to state interests. Hence the balanced nature of China's foreign policy today. In my view, one of the clearest manifestations of this balanced nature has been the interaction between the Soviet Union and China in international affairs. This, I think, is of fundamental importance in understanding Soviet-Chinese relations. Up to 1989, from which time we are reviewing the present stage in Soviet-Chnese relations, such interaction did not happen. At best, both states acted on parallel courses, and on a number of problems there was, I would say, even confrontation. [passage omitted]

[Pasko] The Soviet Union and China are now united by a similarity on many issues, but in speaking about this it would not be right for me to ignore the differences which exist in the two countries' approaches to this or that problem.

[Bazhanov] Of course, there are certain differences in foreign policy concepts. In 1989 China—we have already spoken about this—came up against, as this was described in Beijing, a counterrevolutionary revolt, and the Chinese leadership was certain that behind this revolt was the West which was interested in destroying socialism in China, as in the other socialist countries, because this was an ideology which was alien to the West and because in the West they know perfectly well, as they say in China, that democracy will never come to China or to Eastern Europe, but the destruction of socialism would lead to a weakening of these countries, and make them toys in the hands of the West. That is why China is fighting against bourgeois liberalism, and that is why China is wary about relations with the west.

But, as I believe to be true—and I agree with what Vsevolod Ivanovich said, and you said this, too—China, despite this struggle against bourgeois liberalization, is clearly adhering to a line of cooperation with the West on practical issues, and a line whereby the basis of relations with all countries, including the West, would still be the five principles of peaceful coexistence. And in this instance, I would say, the Chinese are pragmatically wiser than we are. We are not struggling with bourgeois liberalization, but as soon as some kind of deal is concluded which is not of advantage to us—whether it is the Filschin affair or the ANT affair—there is a hullaballoo that we must suspend links with the West altogether and that they are our enemies who want to destroy us.

The Chinese are struggling against bourgeois liberalization, but they are not backing away one inch in their practical affairs from cooperation with the West. There are differences in domestic affairs—they are in favor of the Communist Party managing society in all aspects whereas we have moved over to pluralism and abolition of Article 6, and so on, and so forth. But I want to emphasize that all this not only is not hindering our normal bilateral relations, is not only not alienating China from us, but China is one of those countries which is interested—sincerely interested—in our overcoming our difficulties, and in that the policy of our centre, of our president, is crowned with success. And on this point they are saying in China that if socialism is destroyed in the soviet Union, then, at the end of the day, it may be destroyed in the Soviet Union, then, at the end of the day, it may be destroyed in China. That is why China is in favor of those forces in the Soviet Union who are in favor of socialism, and, first and foremost the president of the Communist Party.

Furthermore, if there is general chaos in the Soviet Union, then this chaos will, sooner or later, spread to China. Therefore China is interested in there not being chaos in the Soviet Union, and that the policy of the centre should be pursued.

And, finally, third, it is believed in China that if the USSR gets weaker and ceases to be a great power, then control, in the world will reign on the part of the United States, this will not be a democratic world but a world with one leader. China is opposed to this, therefore China is interested in a strong Soviet Union, and in the policy which is being pursued by the president of the Soviet Union on strengthening the USSR. China has given us big trade credit, important credit, and as has been emphasized more than once in China, this is a symbol of China's desire to help the Soviet Union. The Chinese leaders say that there was a time when you helped us a lot; now you are having a difficult time and we want to help you. We cannot offer you great assistance, we have our own difficulties, but this is a symbol of our support for you in the Soviet Union. [passage omitted]

[Pasko] Our conversation cannot, unfortunately, cover all aspects of Soviet-Chinese relations about which we would like to talk, and which would help our discussion. The present stage of the development of Soviet-Chinese relations is distinctive for the fact that both countries are learning to live in conditions of mutual understanding. And in this sense I would say that they are now characterized by the tendencies which are typical of international relations as a whole. This enables one to say that the forthcoming Soviet-Chinese summit meeting is undoubtedly an important landmark both in Soviet-Chinese relations and in for international relations as a whole.

At this point, comrades, permit me to wind up our meeting today. All the best.

Delegation Member Assesses Yazov's PRC Talks

LD1305151691 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 13 May 91

[Text] During the first 10 days of this month there was an official visit to the People's Republic of China by the Soviet defense minister, Dmitriy Yazov. Details about the outcome of the visit is contributed by a member of the Soviet delegation Lieutenant General Valeriy Manuilov:

The main aim of the visit was to promote understanding and friendship, to restore and boost relations between the two countries in the military field to the level that's worthy of the two neighboring countries. The Chinese Army is being modernized. The Soviet armed forces too are carrying out a profound military reform. The exchange of views on these issues was of considerable mutual interest. There were many things to discuss with the Chinese comrades. It was said at the talks that the development of contacts in the military field would cover the entire range of two-way relations, and this applies too to contacts at (?the) level of the two countries' military leadership and at all other levels of military structures.

The Chinese side showed a keen interest in the experience of (?training) Soviet military personnel and how to use this experience constructively in China's own practice.

The Soviet defense minister's visit has given a highly powerful stimulus to the development of ties along military lines. The proposals made during the visit are being studied and are included in the (?plans) of joint activities.

The member of the Soviet delegation, General Manuilov noted that regardless of the [words indistinct] no talks were held during the visit on supplies of arms and what's more no accords were signed on the score.

General Manuilov disclosed that the issue of the Soviet-Chinese border was also discussed. Both sides were satisfied with the progress at the third round of talks on border problems. They expressed confidence that all the issues on the agenda could be solved quickly. It was underlined especially that the talks are going on successfully. But this doesn't mean that there are no outstanding problems. And there was an exchange of views, as a result a desire was voiced to reach mutually acceptable solutions.

The meetings with senior statesmen and military leaders of the People's Republic of China, the visits to military bases and industrial facilities, added General Manuilov, convinced the members of the official delegation that a prospect is quite realistic when the level of Soviet-Chinese relations will rise not only to the highest point that existed in 1956 but will surpass it.

In the new conditions of international relations cooperation and good neighborliness between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are really turning into an ever more influential factor of world politics. And this will help to apply that model of national and regional security that stems from the new political thinking which has been dominant in Soviet foreign policies in the past few years.

Northeast Asia

South Korean National Assembly Delegation Arrives

LD1205145591 Moscow TASS in English 1436 GMT 12 May 91

[By TASS correspondents Oleg Polovko and Vasiliy Titov]

[Text] Moscow May 12 TASS—A delegation from South Korea's National Assembly led by speaker Pak Chun-kyu arrived here today at the invitation of the Soviet legislature.

"Our visit is a direct follow-up on the recent Soviet-South Korean summit," Pak told TASS at Moscow's Sheremetyevo-2 Airport. "it is highly important to our fast developing relationship."

During their three-day visit the delegation are expected to be received by President Mikhail Gorbachev.

Their programme of stay includes a meeting with parliament speaker Anatoliy Lukyanov and talks at several parliamentary committees as well as in the Foreign Ministry.

The delegation then intend to go on to Leningrad.

Meets With President Gorbachev

PM1305214791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 May 91 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report: "USSR President Receives ROK Legislators"]

[Text] M.S. Gorbachev received 13 May a ROK National Assembly delegation headed by its speaker Pak Chun-kyu. The delegation comprised the leaders of legislative factions and prominent politicians.

Pak Chun-kyu conveyed to M.S. Gorbachev a personal message from President No Tae-u. It was perceived by the USSR president as yet another step in the development of the summit-level Soviet-South Korean political dialogue.

Welcoming the legislators' mission, M.S. Gorbachev said that he views it in the context of the rapidly accelerating relations between the Soviet Union and the ROK. These relations are mutually beneficial and have good prospects in all areas.

The speaker of the National Assembly emphasized the ROK's profound interest in building up wide-ranging

cooperation with the Soviet Union. Such cooperation is in line with the interests of both countries' peoples and of peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

Supporting this idea, M.S. Gorbachev advocated that Soviet-South Korean relations should become an organic part of the overall situation taking shape in the vast and complex Asia-Pacific region, where new principles of relations are being formed. These are based on mutual respect, equal security, and a balance of the interests of all the region's states.

The talks stressed the great importance of contacts between the USSR Supreme Soviet and the ROK National Assembly.

M.S. Gorbachev asked the head of the delegation to convey greetings to President No Tae-u, and wished the legislators an interesting and useful stay in the Soviet Union.

A.S. Dzasokhov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee, took part in the meeting.

Confers With Lukyanov

LD1305213991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1525 GMT 13 May 91

[Text] Moscow, 13 May (TASS)—USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov today met with a delegation of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, headed by its speaker, Pak Chun-kyu, which arrived in the Soviet Union on an official visit at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

During the course of a substantive and frank conversation, Anatoliy Lukyanov and Pak Chun-kyu exchanged information on the domestic situations in the USSR and in the Republic of Korea, and the work of the legislators of the two countries. The great role of the legislators in the development of broad and mutually advantageous coooperation between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Korea, which is of mutual interest, was emphasized. An accord was reached on the implementation of Soviet-South Korean interparliamentary ties on a permanent basis, and a program of priority contacts was mapped out.

The legislative leaders discussed topical international questions of interest to both sides. A coincidence of consonance of points of view was revealed, which could serve as a precondition for establishing effective cooperation between the USSR and the Republic of Korea in the international arena, including cooperation in solving problems of the Far East and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

1991 Trade Agreement Viewed

SK1405101691 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean 1430 GMT 13 May 91

[Interview with Aleksandr Kachanov, first deputy minister of foreign economic relations, by Konstantin Belov in Pyongyang; date not given; from the "Various Aspects of Cooperation" program—recorded]

[Text] As we already reported, a trade and economic cooperation agreement for 1991 was signed between the governments of the Soviet Union and the DPRK in Pyonyang, the capital of the DPRK, some time ago. The agreement was respectively signed on the Soviet side by Aleksandr Kachanov, first deputy minister of foreign economic relations, and on the Korean side by Kim Chu-song, vice chairman of external economic committee.

The talks held prior to the signing ceremony were very tense. This was because of discussion of the transition to mutual calculations and of payments in convertible currency. However, the constructive attitude of the delegations on both sides, mutual concessions, and a conciliatory approach to settlement guaranteed success in the talks.

Our station correspondent in Pyongyang, Konstantin Belov, met the head of the Soviet delegation Aleksandr Kachanov, first deputy minister of foreign economic relations of the USSR, and asked him to explain in what way the agreement that has just been signed differs from the past annual protocols on trade turnover.

[Kachanov] The basic difference is that we would deal with one another in new conditions of cooperation. Everything that will take place in our relations from now on will be based on calculations in convertible currency. We have come out with a list of obligatory deliveries of goods, and this will serve as a guideline in mutual deliveries. Great attention has been paid to the questions relating to the cancellation of debts that the DPRK owes to the Soviet Union. We have agreed on the list of commodities that the DPRK will deliver to our country in return for the cancellation of those debts. Strict mutual inspection is expected over the deliveries of the commodities.

[Belov] What goods will the DPRK and the Soviet Union supply to one another?

[Kachanov] Various daily necessities badly needed in the Soviet consumer market are included. Raw materials needed by us such as barites, magnesia clinker, and zinc will also be supplied. On the part of the Soviet Union, we will supply coke and petroleum goods, ferrous and non-ferrous metal sheets, and various industrial facilities needed for the economic development of Korea.

[Belov] This is the last question. Will the Soviet Union continue to cooperate for the construction of plants in the DPRK?

[Kachanov] We think that the cooperation, which has a long history, should continue. In this connection, we have signed a protocol on granting loans and facilities to the DPRK. This is for the construction of the East Pyongyang Thermal Power Plant.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Nguyen Van Linh Meets With Politburo Members

PM1305143591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 May 91 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report: "Official Announcement"]

[Text] Nguyen Van Linh, general secretary of the Vietnam Communist Party [VCP] Central Committee, who is in the Soviet Union, is continuing his acquaintance with our country. On 10-12 May he visited a number of cultural institutions in the capital and an agricultural enterprise in the neighborhood.

The Vietnamese guest had meetings with V.A. Ivashko, deputy general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, with CPSU Central Committee Politburo members A.S. Dzasokhov, M.S. Surkov, and O.S. Shenin, and with CPSU Central Committee secretary V.M. Falin.. During the meetings and conversations, which took place in an atmosphere of goodwill and friendship there was a discussion of a wide range of questions of bilateral relations and of the internal life and foreign policy of the two parties and countries.

Concludes Moscow Visit 13 May

BK1305152491 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 13 May 91

[Text] According to a VIETNAM NEWS AGENCY correspondent in the Soviet Union, this morning, 13 May 1991, Comrade Nguyen Van Linh, general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam [CPV] Central Committee, met and exchanged views on the politico-ideological work between the two parties with Comrade Dzasokhov, member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

On the same day, Comrade Nguyen Van Linh left Moscow for home, successfully ending his working visit to the Soviet Union, which began on 8 May 1991.

Seeing Comrade Nguyen Van Linh off at the airport were Comrade Dzasokhov, member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and many other high-ranking comrade cadres of the CPSU.

Soviet Ambassador to Vietnam Mr. Khamidulin was also present at the seeing-off ceremony.

On the Vietnamese side were Comrade Nguyen Manh Cam, member of the party Central Committee and our country's ambassador to the Soviet Union, and many cadres of our embassy.

Also present at the seeing-off ceremony were Borasy, Cambodian ambassador to the Soviet Union, and (Usinapon), LPDR [Lao People's Democratic Republic] charge d'affaires.

UN Role in Cambodian Peace Initiative Urged

BK1305055991 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1200 GMT 11 May 91

[Aleksey Kondratyev commentary]

[Text] The United Nations has just advanced another peace initiative concerning the Cambodian solution. A special UN mission will be staying in Cambodia from 11 to 17 May to monitor the cease-fire observance in the period from the beginning of this month. This truce has been announced between the warring factions. Our commentator, Comrade Aleksey Kondratsyev, has the following comments:

It is imperative to clearly elaborate that the initiative for the dispatch of the representatives of neutral states to Cambodia to monitor the cease-fire in Cambodia has been proposed by Cambodian Prime Minister Comrade Hun Sen. His proposal has been supported by UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar and the Paris International Conference on Cambodia [PICC] co-chairmen—French and Indonesian foreign ministers. Comrade Hun Sen's proposal for the United Nations to send an observation team to monitor the truce has reflected the United Nations' prominent prestige and role to untie the Cambodian knot.

It is imperative for us to recall that during the past year, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council [UNSC] had worked arduously to seek ways to settle the Cambodian conflict. Although it was quite difficult for them to reach a harmonious stance, in November last year, they worked out a so-called UN plan for Cambodia.

The United Nations has also been working hard to seek a formula for compromise among the warring Cambodian factions since otherwise the UN plan would not work. Thus, it is very reasonable to seek UN assistance in monitoring the truce and avoiding the renewal of gunfire in Cambodia. Otherwise, the Cambodian factions will not be able to go to Jakarta to attend the meeting of the Supreme National Council as planned.

In my opinion, a primary condition for fulfilling the UN plan is to ensure that the truce is respected.

Another important factor for reaching the Cambodian solution is the cessation of arms aid to the warring factions. There have been favorable conditions for this factor. That is, Moscow and Washington have already announced a general ban on the dispatch of any arms to the war zone. Support for this initiative has been voiced from nearly all capital cities concerned with the Cambodian solution.

In my opinion, the United Nations should be entrusted with the task of monitoring the observance of this ban. Particularly, Vietnam has already stated its readiness for an international monitoring mission along its border. Hanoi has also proposed similar mission in Lao and Thai territories.

Will the United Nations be able to fulfill its role in monitoring the truce in Cambodia and the respect for the ban on the dispatch of arms there? In my opinion, it will. This is because it has such experiences from seeking the solution for Namibia, our observer Comrade Aleksey Kondratsyev concluded.

Near East & South Asia

Bessmertnykh, Baker Meet With Mubarak

LD1305160991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1515 GMT 13 May 91

[Text] Cairo, 13 May (TASS)—A second conversation has taken place here between USSR Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker.

They continued discussing the problems of a Near Eastern settlement and ways of resolving issues essential to convening and holding a peace conference. The post-crisis situation in the Persian Gulf was touched upon. Certain regional issues were also examined, such as the situation in Central America, Angola, and Afghanistan.

The ministers exchanged views on the further development of Soviet-U.S. relations in light of the recent telephone conversation between the presidents of the USSR and the United States. With a view to constructive progress, there was discussion of outstanding issues in connection with the conventional weapons in Europe treaty and the state of affairs at the talks on cutting strategic offensive weapons and on chemical disarmament. Specific aspects of Soviet-American economic cooperation were touched upon.

A meeting was held between Egyptian President Husni Mubarak, USSR Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. There was discussion of cooperation between the USSR and the United States in launching the process of setting the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the role of other states in this extremely important matter, with due consideration of the fact that the Near East now has a unique chance of beginning the transition from tension fraught with crisis to lasting peace and stability.

News Conference Held

LD1305152191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1442 GMT 13 May 91

[By TASS correspondents Viktor Lysechko and Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Cairo, 13 May (TASS)—"The possibilities of holding a peace conference on the Near East are growing while the number of problems dividing the sides is shrinking," stated USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Bessmertnykh, at a press conference here today at the end of the second round of talks with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. The main thing is that the settlement process has not stopped and movement is continuing. As the Soviet Minister stressed, the USSR and the United States will be in close contact in order to coordinate future steps in the Near East.

For his part, the U.S. secretary of state pointed out that despite the rapprochement in the viewpoints of the sides on certain issues concerning convening a peace conference, there are still certain disagreements. In particular, he explained, there is a difference in the approach of Syria and Israel on whether or not "the United Nations should play a role of some sort" in this conference and also on its form. In this connection, Baker confirmed that further attempts to bring viewpoints closer together on this score are planned.

"On the whole," stressed the head of U.S. diplomacy answering a question from a TASS correspondent, "agreement has been reached on most of the problems."

Regarding the holding of a Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, the U.S. secretary of state stated that work on organizing it will be continued, but the timetable for holding it will depend on progress at arms control talks.

The sides stated that a useful exchange of views took place on Soviet-U.S. economic relations. There was also discussion of issues relating to arms control, in particular cutting conventional weapons in Europe and banning chemical weapons.

At the talks, attention was also devoted to regional problems, including the situation in El Salvador, Afghanistan, and Angola. There was discussion of rendering humanitarian aid to Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq and of the role which might be played in this matter by the United Nations.

Bessmertnykh Meets With Saudi Officials in Riyadh

LD1305190191 Moscow TASS in English 1850 GMT 13 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Georgiy Shmelyov]

[Text] Riyadh May 13 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh went into the first round of talks with his Saudi counterpart Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal al-Sa'ud immediately after arriving in Riyadh on a brief working visit.

Greeting him, prince Sa'ud al-Faysal said that he regarded the visit, the first-ever by a Soviet foreign minister to Saudi Arabia, as historic.

He added that his country thought highly of Soviet efforts to settle the Middle East conflict, especially now

that there were right conditions for progress towards peace and stability in the region.

While noting that there had been ups and downs in the history of Soviet-Saudi relations, Bessmertnykh said they had now entered a special period following the full restoration of diplomatic ties.

He said that "much has to be discussed and decided" during his talks here, singling out a Middle East settlement, the situation in the Gulf and bilateral relations as the top items on the agenda.

Bessmertnykh was later received by King Fahd Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz, who said his country would never forget that the Soviet Union had been the first nation to recognise the Saudi Kingdom.

King Fahd added that Bessmertnykh's visit marked a starting point for the improvement of the long-standing bilateral relationship.

Fahd said that he planned to follow in the footsteps of Crown Prince Abdallah Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz, who has twice visited the USSR.

The second round of Soviet-Saudi talks is to take place on Tuesday morning.

TASS Roundup of Visit

LD1305220791 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2130 GMT 13 May 91

[Text] Riyadh, 14 May (TASS)—A.A. Bessmertnykh, USSR minister of foreign affairs, paid a working visit to Saudi Arabia on 13 May. This first visit in the history of the two countries was devoted to an in-depth exchange of opinions on a wide range of international problems and issues of Soviet-Saudi relations.

The Soviet minister had a lengthy and meaningful meeting with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. Talks were held with Sa'ud al-Faysal, the Saudi minister of foreign affairs.

The attention of the sides was concentrated on the subject of a Near East settlement which has become the object of special interest and diplomatic contacts in the last few days. The Saudi side welcomed the role of the USSR in this process and expressed the hope that its efforts in cooperation with the United States will be successful.

An exchange of opinions was held on the situation in the Persian Gulf area which is emerging slowly and with difficulty from the crisis that has shaken it.

The conviction was expressed by both sides that the recent resumption of Soviet-Saudi relations is opening up extensive prospects for many-sided ties between the USSR and Saudi Arabia in all spheres. It was agreed that the sides will maintain and develop mutual contacts at different levels, including the highest level, for the purpose of strengthening the relations of friendship and trust that are becoming characteristic of the two countries.

Bessmertnykh Departs Kingdom

LD1405081591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0713 GMT 14 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Riyadh, 14 May (TASS)—USSR Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh today departed from Riyadh at the conclusion of his working visit to Saudi Arabia. He was received by King Fahd and had talks with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal. A wide range of problems concerning a Near East settlement, the situation in the Persian Gulf area, and bilateral relations was discussed.

The Soviet minister today took part in the formal opening ceremony of the USSR Embassy in Riyadh.

Bessmertnykh To Meet 'Arafat in Geneva

LD1305175891 Moscow TASS in English 1747 GMT 13 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Boris Shabayev]

[Text] Geneva May 13 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh will arrive in Geneva on Tuesday afternoon for a meeting with Palestine Liberation Organisation leader Yasir 'Arafat.

They will discuss a Middle Eastern settlement and ways to solve issues that need to be tackled before a peace conference is convened.

Bessmertnykh will leave for home the same day.

Bessmertnykh on 'Peace Conference' Compromise

LD1305180791 Berlin ADN in German 1653 GMT 13 May 91

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The USSR intends to drive forward the Middle East peace process in agreement with the United States and play an influential part as the patron of a conference. USSR Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh stated this after his Middle East trip in an interview with the BERLINER ZEITUNG (tomorrow's edition). To find a starting point despite the positions, which still differ greatly, Bessmertnykh proposes a "peace conference" as a compromise between the maximum variant of a Middle East peace conference and the minimum variant of a regional conference. Not all the points should be on the agenda of this forum, but it should also not restrict itself to discussing bilateral problems. The politician announced that diplomatic relations would soon be taken up with Israel. (The interview was prereleased in an edited version)

IZVESTIYA Views Mideast Conference

PM1405090391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 May 91 Union Edition p 4

[Correspondent D. Velikiy report: "Peace Conference To Be Held? At the Soviet-U.S. Meeting in Cairo"]

[Text] Cairo—The U.S. and Egyptian security services have taken extraordinary security measures along the approaches to Cairo's "Semiramis" Hotel and inside the hotel itself, where U.S. Secretary of State James Baker stayed during his fourth Near East tour in the last few months.

"Today I met my Soviet colleague, Minister Bessmertnykh, in order to discuss possibilities for the peace process, and specifically the prospects for holding a peace conference," Baker told journalists. The United States and the USSR, the U.S. secretary of state reported, have reached a common understanding of what holding such a conference necessitates and what must be done in this connection by means of talks between Israel and the Arab states on the one hand, and talks between Israel and the Palestinians on the other hand.

Yes indeed, Bessmertnykh told journalists in his turn, as cochairmen of the possible conference on the Near East, we reached great mutual understanding on many questions associated with achieving progress in the Near East settlement. Without giving details, he stated that all these questions will be considered in greater depth and detail at the next meeting with the U.S. secretary of state Monday.

Contrary to many commentators' pessimistic forecasts, at the last press conference the U.S. secretary of state firmly stated that more points of contact and understanding than zones of rejection can now be seen between the interested parties in all planes of the Near East peace process. And this finding is the most optimistic of all those Baker has made in the course of his trips to the region.

The basis of the understanding between the many sides regarding the approach to the proposed conference is the implementation of the world community's Resolutions No. 242 and 338 on the Near East, Baker developed his thought. It is another matter that the sides interpret these resolutions differently. Israel has its version, while certain Arab countries have a completely different one; so the aim of the talks is both to amplify and to work out in detail what is written down, in Resolution 242 in particular. Illustrating the U.S. approach to the forms which the peace conference could take, the secretary of state turned to the experience of Camp David, where direct talks between Egypt and Israel were held under U.S. political mediation and ended in a peace treaty. An extended variant of this model is proposed for the conference that is being prepared.

Primakov Sees No Alternative To 'Arafat in PLO

PM1405085491 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 10 May 91 p 16

[Interview with USSR Security Council member Yevgeniy Primakov by Enrico Franceschini in Moscow; date not given]

[Excerpt] Moscow—[passage omitted] [Franceschini] Is the main argument in your book [*Mission to Baghdad*] that the Gulf war could have been averted?

[Primakov] I maintain that it was an absolutely necessity to obtain an unconditional and immediate Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, but that full use was not made of all the political means to reach this goal. Economic sanctions, Iraq's complete international isolation, and the mere threat of military actions could have created the conditions for a political solution of the crisis.

[Franceschini] Who was in a hurry to start the war?

[Primakov] Saddam Husayn was more mistaken than anyone else. If he had immediately taken up the signals that were sent to him, if he had not been slow to respond, he would have caused problems for those who decided from the outset to proceed to military action.

But until the last moment Saddam did not believe that he would suffer an attack. Even the meeting between American Secretary of State Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister 'Aziz in Geneva a few days before the start of the conflict misled the Iraqi leader: The very fact that the United States attended the meeting led him to believe mistakenly that there was still time to avert a war.

[Franceschini] Why did Saddam Husayn not use chemical weapons, as many feared he would?

[Primakov] I believe he was afraid. Not of revenge by the Israelis or the coalition, but afraid that all links between his country and the rest of the world would break and that there would no longer be any chance of salvation for Iraq.

[Franceschini] Now many people—even in America—are saying that the war caused more problems than it resolved. Do you agree?

[Primakov] To some extent, yes. I do not want to appear like a prophet, an oracle, but I believe that if a greater effort had been made to seek a solution through political, diplomatic means, we would now have fewer problems throughout the region. For one thing, the victims of the war would have been spared: Some say that the conflict claimed fewer losses than expected, but Iraq lost at least 100,000 men, which is a lot. Then there are all the other consequences of the war: the Kurdish problem, the damage, the ecological disaster, the 700 blazing oil wells...

[Franceschini] A problem that the coalition forces have pledged to resolve first in the "postwar period" is the Palestinian question. How do you judge the idea of an

international peace conference, which has been discussed recently by the Americans and you Soviets, too?

[Primakov] There is no doubt that this is the first problem to tackle. In some respects, the peace conference seems to me a good idea. But I would rather there were first bilateral negotiations between the sides involved, and only subsequently a permanent peace conference. And this conference, which must be held under UN auspices, must involve Europe, which must play a very active role.

[Franceschini] Your foreign minister is visiting the Middle East and will also be making a brief, historic stopover in Israel. Do you believe that the USSR can help to resolve one of the crucial issues in the negotiations—the choice of the Palestinian delegation to the peace conference?

[Primakov] Bessmertnykh's visit is definitely very helpful, but I do not believe that it will be the USSR that resolves the problem of Palestinian representation at the negotiations. Be that as it may, we hope in the common sense of all those involved. The Americans negotiated with North Vietnam at the time of the war in Indochina, and they certainly hated the North Vietnamese no less than the Israelis hate the PLO. As for our relations with Israel, the issue of a restoration of diplomatic relations between our two countries must be included within the general context of the Middle East peace process.

[Franceschini] Is there a confederation with Jordan in the Palestinians' distant future?

[Primakov] I will answer you with a remark that one of them made to me. For us Palestinians, he said, it is enough to be an independent nation for half an hour; we could even form a federation with Jordan. I am not saying that all Palestinian leaders see things this way, but there is scope for such maneuvers.

[Franceschini] Do you see any alternatives to 'Arafat at the head of the PLO?

[Primakov] Irrespective of my opinion of 'Arafat, it seems to me that there is no alternative, and there will be none.

[Franceschini] Another problem left unresolved by the war is the future of Iraq, of Saddam Husayn, and of the Kurds. You are perhaps better acquainted than any other foreign expert with the situation in Baghdad, and you have known the Iraqi leader for many years. Do you believe that he will remain in power?

[Primakov] I believe that Saddam Husayn is by now a fact of life. This is shown by the events of recent months. The most significant fact is not so much that masses of Iraqis are thronging to wish him well but, rather, that within the army there are no organized movements opposed to the president. In any case, he is in power and seems capable of controlling the situation.

As for the Kurds, our position is that they are entitled to establish an autonomous region, while remaining part of Iraq. It seems to us that a dismemberment of Iraq between the Kurds in the North and the Shiites in the South would introduce a further element of instability into the region.

Nishanov Delegation Meets Jallud in Libya

LD1305101391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2002 GMT 12 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Anchikov]

[Text] Tripoli, 12 May (TASS)—The Soviet parliamentary delegation led by R.N. Nishanov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet met 'Abd al-Salam Jallud, member of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah revolutionary leadership, on the final day of its stay in the Libyan Jamahiriyah.

During a long and detailed conversation which was frank and friendly in character a wide range of problems of bilateral relations was touched upon and the situation in the Near East region was examined. Special attention was paid to processes unfolding in the Soviet Union.

A.S. Jallud stressed that Libya is attaching great significance to the Soviet Union's role in the settlement of the Near East problem and noted that the Arab world connects the success and progress of perestroyka in the USSR with the development of events in the region and in the world. Having confirmed Libya's commitment to the expansion and deepening of multilateral links with the Soviet Union, he said that Libya wishes to see the USSR continue as a strong, single state. In Tripoli, he pointed out, the efforts applied in this connection by USSR President M.S. Gorbachev are evaluated highly.

The head of the Soviet delegation spoke about the steps taken by the Soviet Union aimed at achieving a Near East settlement and a just resolution of the Palestinian problem. Speaking about the situation in the USSR, he informed 'A.S. Jallud in detail about the measures taken by the Soviet leadership to overcome the crisis situation, to resolve interethnic conflicts, and to stabilize sociopolitical life in the country.

A number of issues of mutual interest were also touched upon during the conversation.

On behalf of the leadership of the Libyan Jamahiriyah, 'A.S. Jallud expressed satisfaction in connection with the arrival in Libya of the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation and stressed that the visit to Tripoli by a leader of one of the chambers of the Soviet parliament will serve the further development of links between the General People's Congress of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah and the USSR Supreme Soviet as well as the strengthening of Soviet-Libyan friendship.

In accordance with the program for its stay in Libya, the delegation made a trip to the municipality of Zawiyah

were it visited a number of agricultural facilities and met the leadership of the municipality and members of the people's committee. It also visited the center for the study of the history of the battle of the Libyan people against the Italian colonizers and the ancient town of Sabratah, situated 80 kilometers to the west of Tripoli.

In the evening the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation left Libya. Before his departure for Egypt, R.N. Nishanov made the following statement:

The stay of the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation on hospitable Libyan soil is coming to an end. It was short but extremely full in content. Leaving this splendid country, we take with us unforgettable impressions of our contacts and conversations with the representatives of the Libyan people and our acquaintance with the impressive achievements accomplished during the years of the revolution. We have been clearly convinced that Libya has an extremely sympathetic attitude toward the Soviet Union and the Soviet people and is following the processes of perestroyka in our country with great attention.

(?I would like to stress) that these feelings are mutual. The business part of the visit is a source of profound satisfaction. It was rich and fruitful. Meetings with the leadership of the General People's Congress were extremely useful. They confirmed the mutual aspiration of the sides to strengthen ties between the legislative bodies of the USSR and Libya. The meeting between our delegation and 'A.S. Jallud, a member of the Libyan leadership, was an indication of the high level of Soviet-Libyan relations. We conveyed warm greetings to M. al-Qadhdhafi, leader of the Libyan revolution, from M.S. Gorbachev. 'A.S. Jallud in turn asked us to convey M. al-Qadhdhafi's best wishes to the Soviet leader. The desire of the leadership of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah further to develop friendship and large scale cooperation with the Soviet Union on many levels was confirmed. Our conversations in Tripoli demonstrated the similarity of the approaches of the two states on a wide range of international and regional problems.

We are convinced that our visit to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah will serve dynamically developing Soviet-Libyan relations and the interests of the peoples of both countries.

Radio Program Analyzes Middle East Issues

LD1305170391 Moscow Radio Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 12 May 91

["Top Priority" program hosted by Irina Tkachenko, with Aleksandr Pogodin, "journalist and specialist in international relations," and Andrey Kortunov, "of the Institute for U.S. and Canada Studies"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Tkachenko] The international conference on the Middle East these days looks more real than perhaps ever before. The Soviet foreign minister, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, is currently on a tour of the Middle East to negotiate the convocation of the international conference, and he is planned to meet James Baker, U.S. secretary of state, and Egyptian Prime Minister Husni Mubarak on Monday to try and draw up a detailed plan of this conference. The Soviet Union and the United States are acting as the two sponsors of the conference. [passage omitted]

[Tkachenko] Is it also, do you think, a question of a continuous arms sales from the Soviet Union to the Arab states, after all the Middle East has a concentration of quite a few consumers of Soviet weapons in this area, and right now arms sales is about the only major source of hard currency income for the Soviet Union, with the drop in oil production and other...

[Kortunov, interrupting] Well, you know, I think that it might be questioned how profitable this arms sales is for the Soviet Union, and some people claim that even the oil-producing countries are not able to pay their debt to the Soviet Union right now, and the main clients of the Soviet Union in the region as far as the arms transfers are concerned, like Syria and Iraq, have a lot of debts to the Soviet Union, which they are unable to pay.

On the other hand, I think that the war, the conflict in the Gulf, showed once again that something has to be done with arms transfers, something has to be done at multilateral scale, because if we have another outbreak of war in the Middle East, the missiles that another Saddam Husayn can use in future will not be loaded with conventional warheads.

[Tkachenko] Aleksandr, do you think the situation is more favorable at this point for the convocation of the Middle East conference?

[Pogodin] I'm convinced that there's no doubt that the changes that have occured during the past few weeks are favorable for the convocation of such a conference. I would, though, like to indicate that the Persian Gulf war has proven maybe for the first time ever in such clarity that this is not the method to solve international problems, because, after all, we now have Secretary of State Baker making his fourth, and as some claim, the last mission of peace to the Middle East because of the fact that even after such an impressive victory over Iraq they have not—I mean the Americans—they have not succeded in achieving the ultimate goal of the war.

On the other hand, the conditions of the Middle East are (?ripe) for doing something in a positive way, especially now that the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, has obviously changed its attitudes toward Israel, with which we have cut our diplomatic relations some 24 years ago.

[Tkachenko] Let's look at this issue a bit more specifically: The Soviet Union does not see the way Israel sees the restoration of full diplomatic ties between the two countries as a precondition for the Soviet Union taking any role in the settlement of the Middle East conflict.

Israel, however, insists that this is the prime condition for any Soviet participation in the conference.

The United States would certainly dearly love to see the Soviet Union restore its official ties with Israel, yet Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, who has completed his visit to Israel, said that this is a separate issue, that there is no linkage between the two issues, and that that relationship will come when conditions, again, when conditions are right for that. What are the pros and cons for the Soviet Union to restore full diplomatic relations with Israel, and do you think, should conditions indeed be right, at what cost to the Soviet Union might this step be taken?

[Pogodin] I think Israel is a good political player—they are using all their cards that they have in their possession to make the Soviet Union change its position. On the other hand, I would hope to add to those conditions that you have indicated, one more, which is the settlement of Soviet emigres from the USSR to Israel in the occupied lands. As you know, and this is the position which many people in the United States also support, there's an understanding that those lands should not be inhabited by immigrants to Israel from other countries. This is just one obstacle to the full restoration of diplomatic relations.

[Tkachenko] Andrey, how badly does the Soviet Union need the restoration of full diplomatic ties with Israel?

[Kortunov] Well, first of all I think it's a highly unnatural situation for the Soviet Union not to have diplomatic relations with Israel, and I considered it a serious mistake to break these diplomatic relations. On the other hand, I guess I can understand the motivations of our government not to be in a hurry in reestablishing the diplomatic relations, because in the Arab world we already see a lot of reservations about the Soviet position and [words indistinct] change in Soviet position in the region, and it turned out that some of our traditional allies or partners in the region, like, let us say, Libya, or PLO, or Yemen, supported directly or indirectly, but supported Saddam Husayn in this conflict, and naturally they were frustrated with the position taken by the Soviet leadership supporting the coalition. So I think for the Soviet leadership right now it's important to show to the quote unquote traditional clients of the country that the position is not changing completely, that our support of the coalition was limited to this specific situation, and therefore we are not changing our relations with Israel altogether.

How wise the strategy is, is a question, from my point of view. The question of pride that Israel has to pay for the restoration of the diplomatic relations, from my point of view, is irrelevant, because we also need to have these diplomatic relations in order to exercise some influence on the situation in the region. Especially if you take into account the growing number of Soviet emigres coming to Israel. [passage omitted]

Something has to be done, and I think that people in Israel understand that, and then they understand that the situation that exists here in the region for 40 years is a no-win game for them because they will never be able to secure the State of Israel to provide their national security just by preserving some military balance with their neighboring Arab states, because geographic strategic position of Israel will be very vulnerable. Nobody can guarantee that in 10 years we will see no Saddam Husayn trying to attack Israel with chemical or even nuclear weapons.

[Tkachenko] Some people also say that Israel is only talking. They charge that Israel is really paying lip service to the cause of arms control of the issue of ending the construciton of Jewish settlements on the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Do you think that Israel might in fact be prepared to make these concessions and possibly trade the issue of Jewish settlements on the occupied Arab territories for something else? How intransigent do you think it will be?

[Pogodin] [Words indistinct] speculate on whether they will trade it, or make it a bargaining chip in the negotiations with the Soviet Union, but the mere logic of the political process indicate that they should obey first of all the international law because, after all, it's not strictly the Soviet-Israeli bilateral relations, it's something which concerns the international law. So, for the Soviet Union to allow our citizens, whether they are former citizens or still citizens of the USSR to settle down there would mean to somehow to comply with the aggressor in achieving their aim to legitimize that situation.

[Tkachenko] There have been, so far, no official signs of any change in Israel's flat rejection of the idea of UN participation in the conference, of the participation of the PLO. Are you personally afraid that the negotiations on the Middle East conflict might be deadlocked over specifically these issues?

[Pogodin] There are many stumbling blocks as a matter of fact. It is also interesting to indicate that there is a growing interest of the European nations, of the western Europe, specifically the European Communities to lay a specific and a separate (?hole) in that process. They are now demanding their separate participation in the peace conference, even despite the fact that some people in Washington don't like it at all. [passage omitted]

East Europe

East Europe's Interethnic Problems Pondered

PM1305123591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 May 91 Union Edition p 4

["Political Observer's Opinion" by Aleksandr Bovin: "The Crisis of Socialism and the Nationalities Question"]

[Text] The crisis of socialism, which has engulfed all European countries that deemed themselves "socialist",

has also brought about a sharp destabilization of interethnic relations, an exacerbation of old conflicts, and the emergence of new ones on nationality or ethnic grounds. These conflicts—different in scale, social importance, "age", and intensity—have the same "ultimate" nature. They are deeply rooted in infringement of the rights of some ethnic group, in infringement of justice and equality in interethnic relations. Consequently, the purpose of these conflicts is to restore infringed rights, to restore equality and justice in the nationalities sphere.

This is the theory. Beyond the theory we come up against life which, as we know only too well now, abounds with screaming crowds of fanatics, the cynicism of politicians, the murder of innocents, and the sorrow and despair of persecuted and insulted people.

In the Soviet Union there are 76 spots where interethnic tension is above the "norm." Outbursts of ethnic enmity have already cost hundreds of people their lives. There were 782 people killed and 3,617 injured in 1990 alone. Losses by the forces of law and order amounted to 77 killed and 548 injured; and think of the number of homes that have been destroyed, burned, or plundered. People in their hundreds of thousands have fled from their native homelands in fear.

The "war of sovereignties" goes on. The Baltic republics, Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova still refuse to recognize the validity of all-Union acts on their territories and maintain a course of secession from the USSR. There is a great inherent danger in the clashes between the Kremlin and the "White House on the Embankment", between the leaderships of the USSR and the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic].

As conceived, the new Union treaty should overcome the crisis of Soviet federalism and allow the USSR to take a "second breath." We have seen too many futile and sterile ideas in the past, and it is difficult to remain optimistic....

Another socialist federation—Yugoslavia—is experiencing a most acute crisis in interethnic relations. This crisis was exacerbated as a result of the disintegration of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY], which provided the framework within which the main mechanisms of political consolidation used to function. The LCY's former republic organizations swiftly changed not only their name but also their policies.

Under the pretext of protection from Great Serbian chauvinism, the ruling circles of the most developed republics—Slovenia and Croatia—have in fact taken a course aimed at Yugoslavia's disintegration and its transformation into (at best!) a "soft confederation." The problem of Kosovo—the country's most backward region, populated mainly by Albanians—remains chronic and deadlocked. Separatism is swelling in Macedonia, in Bosnia and Hercegovina. The republics' unwillingness to implement the center's instructions blocked and doomed the anticrisis program of A. Markovic's government.

Threats, and at times even shots, can be heard with growing frequency in the process of sorting out relations in the country. In early 1991 the SFRY Presidency was forced to promulgate a resolution on the disarming and disbandment of all military formations which have been illegally formed in the republics. It was certainly not heeded by everyone.

In early May the country was brought to the brink of civil war as a result of armed clashes between Serbs living permanently in Croatia and the Croatian militia. "In reply," Serbian extremists in Belgrade are threatening to destroy the Tito Memorial Center (Tito was a Croat).

A noisy campaign is being waged in Romania around the "Bessarabian question." Here, for example, is an extract from the weekly ZIG-ZAG: "Conceited and confused, today we are watching the sufferings of 4 million Romanians locked up in Gorbachev's Gulag and are doing nothing. The government is timidly silent, the Gagauz are rending Bessarabia apart, the Russians are stepping up the terror and sending Bessarabian soldiers home in coffins." The Soviet-Romanian Treaty of Cooperation, Good Neighborliness, and Friendship, which was signed in Moscow 5 April 1991 and contains a renunciation of territorial claims, was sharply criticized by the Romanian opposition press.

The policy of assimilation of Transylvanian Hungarians was de facto legalized under Ceausescu. The anti-Hungarian tones are muted now. Nonetheless, an overtly anti-Hungarian organization—the "Romanian Hearth" [Vatra Romaneasca]—has been created and is flourishing. Its leader Senator Radu Ceontea deems it unnecessary to conceal his views: "My father taught me from childhood not to trust the Hungarians. 'Each Magyar carries in his pocket a garrote to strangle Romanians,'" the father instructed the son. "Therefore, I have never trusted the Hungarians all through my life, although I have maintained proper relations with them. The Hungarians want Transylvania back, and have not achieved their goal only thanks to the 'Romanian Hearth'."

Elements of tension, disruption, and mutual mistrust have reemerged in relations between Czechs and Slovaks in Czechoslovakia. Autonomist moods have surfaced in Moravia and Silesia. Voices can be heard calling for a return of Subcarpathian Ruthenia (the Carpathian region) [now in the USSR]: Republican Party Chairman M. Sladek even raised the Czechoslovak flag in Mukachevo.

An outburst of Great Bulgarian chauvinist moods was provoked in Bulgaria by the post-Zhivkov authorities' attempt to abandon the policy of forced assimilation and Bulgarization of the Turkish-speaking Muslim population and to give the Turks equal rights with Bulgarians. Matters went as far as a series of population centers proclaiming their "sovereign rights" and resolving not to

abandon the old policy. An "Association of Free Bulgarian Cities" (Kurdzhali, Shumen, Silistra, Razgrad, and others) was created, refusing to implement Sofia's "anti-Bulgarian" directives.

Let us ask ourselves now: Why is it that the crisis of socialism and the review of firmly established concepts of socialism have brought to life an exacerbation of the nationalities question and have revived conflicts and collisions which seemed to have been forgotten a long time ago? In each specific case, a decisive role is played by specific circumstances peculiar to each case. Individual originality is inevitably affected by common causes and signs.

First, national dissension, national enmity, and national mistrust are the inevitable reaction to errors and miscalculations in nationalities policy which have built up over years and decades. The mythological awareness typical of totalitarian "socialist" societies created an artificial world dominated by "friendship of peoples," "flourishing of nations," and "socialist internationalism" with no room for any serious discussion of the real problems of interethnic relations. These problems did exist. Major and minor grievances built up. Gestating and spreading underground, they created the preconditions for future quarrels and clashes.

Glasnost brought the future to the present. Democracy freed itself from the duty to lie and the fear of telling the truth. Patience ran out, and the truth was spoken. The Potemkin villages of show-off "socialist" prosperity collapsed. Instead of substitutes, people demanded genuine equality, genuine justice, genuine right to self-determination.

Second, the sense of dissatisfaction with the nature of interethnic relations, the desire for changes, and the striving for self-assertion are exacerbated by the socioeconomic backwardness of the society we are looking at. The following auto-suggested formula emerged: Had there been no interference from "outside", no interference by "foreigners", and no interference by the "center", had all the decisions been made in an autonomous, independent, and sovereign fashion, everything would have been different and life would have been better, more prosperous, and happier for everyone. This conclusion is by no means indisputable at a time when integrational processes are gathering pace. Disputes and arguments are pointless when national passions are aflame. The decision is made by emotions, which do not unite but disunite.

Third, the quest for "culprits", the quest for "scapegoats" to be held responsible for disorganization, for the impoverishment of life, and for our misfortunes and anxieties, often revive the nationalist "classicism" and bring to the surface feudal and prefeudal prejudices, which are altogether obsolete. The persecution of gypsies is beginning afresh. The smoldering embers of anti-Semitism are being fanned again and again, to consume primarily the propriety and dignity of people who have succumbed to hateful propaganda. We have yet to determine the damage that will be caused to the Soviet Union by the mass exodus of Jews who have been literally driven out of the country by the authorities and the inhabitants.

Let my cite N. Berdyayev, who is now fashionable: "Anti-Semitism," he wrote, "is based on lack of talent. There is only one way to combat the fact that Jews play a major role in science and philosophy: Make your own inventions... It is degrading to think that freedom always works for the Jews and against the non-Jews." This is truly so.

Fourth, when working out the common causes of the exacerbation of interethnic relations that accompanies the crisis of socialism, it is impossible to overlook the overall worldwide, global background. The downfall of colonialism and the establishment of dozens of new states have left an indelible mark on the entire second half of the century. More acute national self-awareness and intolerance toward even the slightest violations and infringement of national equality and national dignity permeate the spiritual and ideological atmosphere of our times. It is no accident that, during the second half of the century, the nationality question emerged in places where it seemed to have been resolved a long time ago (Quebec in Canada, Scotland and Wales in Britain, Corsica in France, the Basques in Spain, and so on). Of course, these trends and peculiarities have also had a direct or indirect effect on the situation in the countries of "real socialism", intensifying the desire to preserve national originality and helping to give national overtones to political struggle.

Although subject to reservations, the following statement can be made: The collapse of totalitarianism and the public and open discussion of the nationalities question have somehow driven us back to the 19th century, when the idea of national self-assertion and national states was dominant. This is the ideological context of ethnic disturbances in the USSR and East Europe. They may stretch over different periods of time and may have different outcomes. Each country is specific. Solutions will also be specific, but there is also the common denominator of democracy. The solution of the nationalities question can only be democratic. Otherwise there will be no solution.

On the international plane, the readjustment of interethnic relations in a given country could produce additional irregularities, difficulties, and disruptions in interstate relations. In the wake of the totalitarian "order", the transition to democracy is often perceived as a return to chaos and strategic disorder. Indeed, the old equilibrium has gone, a new one has yet to be established. There is the possibility of Eastern Europe's "Balkanization". There is also another possibility: The formation of regional alliances (a Balkan Group, for example, or a Danube-Adriatic Group, or a Central Community, or a League of Central and East European Countries).

The Soviet Union wants stability along its eastern [as published] borders. It is not against regional formations. The only important point is that they be enshrined in the general concept of building the "European home", that they consolidate detente and promote equal cooperation between all states. For its part, the Soviet Union is prepared, proceeding from commonly recognized norms of international law, to review and modernize the system of bilateral treaty relations linking it with its neighbors.

For the time being—for the time being events are at their height. It is somewhat frightening that the elements overshadow the "concept". Evidently history-making cannot take any other form. Yet again—for the time being....

Bulgarian Newspaper Interviews Shevardnadze

AU1005202591 Sofia ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME in Bulgarian 1 May 91 p 1

[Interview with Eduard Shevardnadze, president of the Foreign Policy Association, by Rayna Stoyanova; place and date not given: "We Shall Maintain the Course of Action, Brought About by the Changes in Eastern Europe"]

[Text] Interest remains unusually high in the political activities of Eduard Shevardnadze as president of the Foreign Policy Association in the USSR. Journalists wait a long time for their turn in his busy schedule of meetings with experts, businessmen, ambassadors, and diplomats from all over the world. Within the next few days, Mr. Shevardnadze begins a one-month visit to the United States in response to several invitations from universities, companies, and institutions. Especially for ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME readers, Mr. Shevardnadze, in an unexpected, fortunate "time out", kindly agreed to share his thoughts with us:

[Stoyanova] Tell us briefly about your association. Is it possible for you to work on foreign policy independent of the government, the center, and the Kremlin?

[Shevardnadze] In theory, I believe that is only possible in states based on the rule of law. During recent years, we have tried to lay down a new foundation in the USSR, and it is not easy to do. We are a self-supporting, independent association not allied to any government or party. We shall be working out solutions to problems to do with the new political way of thinking and acting when the political scene abroad has dropped the image of "the enemy." We want to uphold, maintain and develop the theory and practice of this political course of action, whose efficacy has been proved by the changes in Central and Eastern Europe. Our independent teams will prepare expert assessments, as are done on global questions, on, for example, ecology, human rights, interethnic conflicts as well as on specific questions connected with our bilateral relations.

[Stoyanova] In connection with this, allow me to ask you how you see Bulgarian-Soviet relations developing. Serious preparations are being made on a new bilateral agreement. Is it still being said that the former socialist countries were a good "buffer" zone for the Soviet Union's security?

[Shevardnadze] I have never recognized any "buffer" zones. The phrase "buffer" zone itself demeans the people and the governments. In my role, I have put a great deal of effort into making this doctrine apparent. There have been many occasions, in previous times and under former regimes, when I have had to talk about Soviet-Bulgarian relations as brotherly relations. This now sounds old-fashioned and out of date; however, I still look upon them in this way today. We have received a great legacy from the previous generations. Together we maintained the freedom and independence of the Slavonic people. We do not have the right to be rapaciously contemptuous of those riches. They are in the heart of the people. On these foundations we must build normal, good-neighborly, egalitarian relations devoid of any trace of nationalistic expansionism.

[Stoyanova] If you will allow us to return to the subject of internal politics, in your opinion, what are the most difficult Soviet problems to solve? Are they in the field of economics, ideology, or interethnic conflicts? Does a peaceful way out of your troubles still exist for the Soviet Union?

[Shevardnadze] In the sphere of Soviet problems, the economy, which is barely limping along, the general social tension, the interethnic unrest and a furious, often unprincipled, political struggle are all intertwined. That is our tragedy. Our political expertise is still insufficient and lacking in the elementary habits and discipline of democracy; however, I hope that we have not missed all our chances. There are untried, peaceful possibilities for a resolution to the crisis provided that we act even more decisively and bravely within the frame work of the democratic process.

I turned my tape recorder off and asked Mr. Shevardnadze whether it was possible to have a dialogue with the Communists around the "round table" in the USSR. He answered that there still were a ot of Communists in the USSR with whom it was impossible to have a dialogue. in the interests of objective truth, however, he tactfully recalled the fact that if honest Soviet Communists had not begun the process of perestroyka then possibly events within the country, and in Eastern Europe, would have developed in a different, far more arduous way for the people.

BSP Leader Lilov on Need for 'Pluralism'

PM1305101991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 May 91 Second Edition p 5

[Report on interview with Aleksandur Lilov, chairman of the Bulgarian Socialist Party Supreme Council, by

correspondent L. Kuznetsov under the "Guest of 'Dialogue'" rubric; place and date not given: "Where Bulgaria Is Going"; first paragraph is PRAVDA inrtoduction]

[Text] Aleksandur Lilov, chairman of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] Supreme Council, has been visiting the Soviet Union. Before leaving for home, he received PRAVDA's correspondent. The conversation took as its starting point a statement by A. Lilov during a discussion of the issue of the files of former Internal Affairs Ministry informers who are members of the legislature, in which he urged BSP deputies in the Grand National Assembly to be self-confident and pointed to the need to preserve the legislature and thereby ensure the fulfillment of its chief function at the present time—that of adopting a new constitution.

"The situation in the Grand National Assembly really has been inflamed to the limit," my interlocutor pointed out. Extreme right-wing forces are seeking to use the 'files issue' to destroy the legislature. This cannot be permitted. The Grand National Assembly was elected in strict compliance with democracy and legality, as was borne out by 21,000 observers from various countries and international organizations."

[Kuznetsov] PRAVDA readers are asking today: Where is Eastern Europe going and, in particular, where is Bulgaria going?

"This question is of interest to our people too," A. Lilov said. "A comprehensive analysis is needed to give an exhaustive reply. Profound, historic processes are taking place now. Bulgaria is not isolated from them and is moving in the same direction as the rest of Europe and the world as a whole. New realities and new problems have emerged. The situation is changing rapidly. It is necessary to adapt to all this. We must keep in step with the world. Of course, there is much that is unclear and contradictory—which, of course, cannot fail to frighten people and put them on their guard. Measures are sometimes taken that are none too democratic. It should also be remembered here that those who talk most of all about democracy are not always democrats. At the same time, alongside the general problems there are also specific ones—economic, moral, and ecological—which must be resolved today along with implementing democratic reforms. The resolution of short-term, medium-term, and long-term tasks must promote democratic transformations and, in the final analysis, ensure people's prosperity."

[Kuznetsov] Of course, in our conversation we could not fail to touch on the question of the fate of communists in certain Eastern European countries and their persecution and victimization.

[Lilov] Yes, such a phenomenon does exist, and this certainly does not attest to the adherence of certain forces to the principles of democracy. It is a throwback, a survival of the old thinking. Can the persecution of communists really attest to anything else? You sometimes hear this slogan in our country too: "Outlaw the BSP!" What kind of democracy is that? I cannot imagine society without pluralism. There must be an opposition, but slogans like the one I have mentioned mark a return to totalitarianism. The forces behind it lack a historical perspective; however, they could lead to very grave consequences, confrontation, and growing tension.

[Kuznetsov] In connection with the aforesaid, I would like to hear about the attitude of Bulgarian citizens to the processes taking place in their country.

"Of course," my interlocutor pointed out, "Bulgarians are sincerely pleased with the positive changes. They hope that they will be strengthened and developed. At the same time many are tired of the political struggle. Sometimes this tiredness leads to bitterness, which in turn prevents urgent problems from being resolved. At the same time Bulgarian citizens support those forces which channel their energy into creation and the implementation of real reforms. I believe that just such sentiments will be displayed during the elections to local bodies of power."

Our conversation was drawing to a close, and I asked a question about Soviet-Bulgarian relations. Comrade Lilov said:

"The attitude of the majority of Bulgarians to the Russian people—their liberator from the Ottoman yoke—and to the other peoples of the USSR has not changed. They continue to have fraternal feelings for Soviet people. This is a reality that must be taken into account and which will not be changed. I mean by those circles which would like to change the attitude to the USSR. But they will not succeed in doing so, particularly as Soviet-Bulgarian relations, which have deep historical roots and rich traditions, do not run counter to the integration processes in Europe. On the contrary, they supplement them and promote successful progress."

[Kuznetsov] We have in front of us the newspaper reports of M.S. Gorbachev's meeting with A. Lilov. What impressions did not go down in the record of the proceedings?

"I found Mikhail Sergeyevich cheerful, vigorous, and confident," A. Lilov replied. He is incontestably an outstanding politician. He already holds a prominent place in history. M.S. Gorbachev has made a huge contribution to the world's renewal. During our meeting he made an indepth analysis of the state of affairs both in the USSR and in Europe and the world. At a high intellectual level. The meeting will undoubtedly make a further contribution to the development of Bulgarian-Soviet ties. I am very content with my conversation with Mikhail Sergeyevich."

Bulgaria Denies Report on Popov Statement

PM1305091791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 May 91 Union Edition p 4

[Correspondent A. Kapralov report: "Treatment of a Refutation"]

[Text] Sofia—An official spokesman of Bulgaria's Council of Ministers has responded to a news report entitled "Will Bulgaria Sign the Treaty?" and carried in IZVESTIYA issue No. 104.

The brief item, based on a REUTER report datelined Brussels, 30 April, said that "during a conversation with journalists following his visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels, Bulgaria's Prime Minister Dimitur Popov let it be understood that his country would be unwilling to sign a new friendship treaty with Moscow, since such a step would make it more difficult for Bulgaria to join organizations like NATO."

The official spokesman in Sofia declared that the chairman of the Council of Ministers "has never made any such statements on any occasion." This refutation was carried on television and published in all Sofia newspapers.

Without overdramatizing the event, I cannot fail to mention the really arbitrary treatment of IZVESTIYA's 11-line report by DEMOKRATSIYA, the newspaper of the Union of Democratic Forces. It deemed it possible to publish the official spokesman's refutation under the headline "IZVESTIYA's Provocation in Our Relations With the USSR." Let this treatment rest upon the newspaper's conscience....

Afanasyev Calls Charter 77 Model for Opposition

AU1305200691

[Editorial Report] Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on 7 May on page 3 carries a 1,300-word article by Jaromir Stetina, LIDOVE NOVINY Moscow correspondent, entitled "Russian Charter 91." The article discusses the history and the structure of the Democratic Russia Movement (DR) and contains an interview with historian Yuriy Afanasyev, a leading DR representative, on its "recently published political program, entitled 'Russian Charter 91'."

Stetina, whose article is based on his visit to the DR's headquarters in Moscow, describes the movement as an "all-Russian anti-totalitarian coalition associating democratic parties, groups, and citizens." It was founded in October 1990 and comprises about 40 "collective members," such as the Interregional Group of deputies in the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Democratic Party of Russia, the Republican Party of Russia, the Social Democratic Party of Russia, the Russian Christian Democratic Movement, the Memorial society, or the Shield military organization. The DR is headed by a Coordinating Center and has six cochairmen—Yuriy Afanasyev, Gavriil Popov, Arkadiy Murashev, Viktor Dmitriyev, Lev Ponomerev, and Gleb Yakunin. Stetina estimates the DR's total membership at "between 300,000 and 400,000."

According to Stetina, "a few days ago" the DR published its political program, entitled "Russian Charter 91." Its "most important principle" is the "demand for a round-table as a mechanism for handing over power to democratically elected institutions." Other important points are said to include a ban on the use of armed forces in settling political conflicts, the nationalization of CPSU assets, guarantees for private ownership, and the waiving of special presidential powers.

The article includes the following replies which DR Chairman Yuriy Afanasyev gave to two LIDOVE NOVINY questions. The place and date of the interview are not given:

"[Stetina] Why is the program called a Charter?

"[Afanasyev] We modeled ourselves on Charter 77, which was one of the greatest acts in the democratic renewal of Czechoslovakia. In some respects, democratic movements follow the same basic patterns. Czechoslovakia's path has become fateful for many of our democrats. It seems to me that this concurrence is not confined to the name but that it also pertains to the contents. It is not coincidental.

"[Stetina] Do Czechoslovak democrats support your movement?

"[Afanasyev] I feel that support from Czechoslovak democratic forces is not what it could be. Russian democrats are in a very difficult situation. A powerful propaganda campaign is being waged against us aimed at discrediting leading DR representatives and, if possible, at eliminating their influence in municipal structures, enterprises, and the like. The Communists have united and have left their trenches. They use all means to discredit Yeltsin as a person, the Russian Government, and the Supreme Soviet. They make use of the whole power of the KGB to achieve this. Given the general conditions of misinformation, the position of democrats in Czechoslovakia could be more active. Of course, we will take care of ourselves. But your support would be very, very useful. You have experience, you have already traveled the path that is still ahead of us."

West Europe

Gorbachev's Sweden Visit Rescheduled for 6 June

LD1405103991 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0954 GMT 14 May 91

[Text] Stockholm, May 14 (TANJUG)—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev will visit Stockholm in early June, the Swedish news agency has quoted reliable sources as saying.

The report sets out that Gorbachev should arrive in Sweden on June 6, after a two-day visit to Oslo as a guest of the Norwegian Government and the Nobel Prize Committee, which last year awarded him the Peace Prize.

Gorbachev was invited to visit Sweden by Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson last fall.

The Soviet president was scheduled to visit Stockholm on December 11 last year after the traditional Nobel Prize Committee ceremony in Oslo, but he called off the trip.

FRG Cites Gorbachev on 'Obdurate' Honecker

LD1205173491 Hamburg DPA in German 1655 GMT 12 May 91

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—"He did not want any perestroyka, no reforms, and no progress. The development of Comrade Honecker is a great personal drama." Thus thought the Soviet state and party leader Mikhail Gorbachev of GDR state and party leader Erich Honecker in his final years in office. This is revealed in the Monday edition of BILD-ZEITUNG, which quotes from the secret document ZK 02/648 of the GDR Politburo. According to this information, Gorbachev spoke of Honecker with critical distance in his talks with the new GDR Government leader Egon Krenz on 1 November 1989, following Honecker's forced resignation on 18 October 1989. "I have noted certain changes in him over the last few years. Even in 1986 or 1987 he might still have had the chance to introduce fundamental adjustments, but Comrade Honecker had stopped listening to anyone. He apparently thought he was number one in the socialist world, if not number one in the whole world. He no longer really saw what was actually happening." According to BILD, Gorbachev was also annoyed about Honecker's preaching tone. "It was difficult to take. He kept on telling us in insistent terms about alleged successes of the GDR." Even at the last talk between Honecker as GDR head of government and Gorbachev on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the GDR on 7 October 1989, he had simply been "obdurate." "I had the impression during this conversation that I had been wasting my breath," said Gorbachev.

Negative Assessment Denied

LD1305085491 Berlin ADN in German 0811 GMT 13 May 91

[Excerpt] Moscow (ADN)—Vitaliy Ignatenko, spokesman for the Soviet state president, has rejected a report in the Hamburg-based BILD paper about Gorbachev's allegedly negative assessment of Honecker. Ignatenko, who for years was deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee's Information Department, told ADN: "Gorbachev has never made statements of this kind about Honecker which could therefore never have been documented. The BILD report is pure invention." [passage omitted]

Fears of Renewed Threat From Germany Rebutted

PM1305155591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 May 91 Union Edition p 5

["Viewpoint" by Professor D. Proektor: "En Route With Germany—Past and Present"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] One can hardly doubt that the end of the cold war, German unification, and the coming integration of Western Europe render the European area of our policy one of the most important.

In conjunction with all Europe and in close cooperation with Germany the Helsinki process must gradually be transformed into an all-embracing system of security encompassing the entire Soviet Union, all Europe, the United States, and Canada. Even if this is not the work of today or tomorrow, but a process leading into the future with many obstacles in the way. Nevertheless it is this that must be a strategic goal.

For this reason relations with Germany may be a top priority in the foreseeable future. Without embellishing the past, we must nonetheless see before us a new Germany that has undergone profound changes since 1945 and that may be a good partner and even friend to us.

It must not be forgotten that in the postwar years, particularly over the last 20 years, Germany has restructured its policy in depth. The following have become typical of it:

First, a desire to occupy a new place in a changing Europe. German policy has recognized that a new phase in European history has opened up, where confrontation must give way to cooperation with everyone.

Second, the formulation of new fundamentals of security policy. NATO membershp is seen as strengthening universal stability. This goes hand in hand with consideration for the USSR's interests.

The new approach includes a reduction in military potential, a two-fifths' reduction over the next few years in the Bundeswehr with a cut in the duration of military service. It is also a question of changing the "strategy of defending forward borders" between the North Sea and the Alps in connection with German unification, the Soviet troop withdrawal from Central Europe, and the nonextension of the NATO zone to the eastern part of Germany.

Third, relations with the United States and the USSR hold a special place in the new German security policy. The United States is still regarded as the main guarantor of European security within the NATO framework, above all in the context of nuclear security. But with the successful development of the Helsinki process West Europeans will increasingly assume concern for their security and NATO will gradually develop into an alliance between the United States and the European Community. At the same time the Soviet Union's paramount

importance, despite its current internal difficulties, is considered a most important factor in German, European, and global security.

Do we have reason to fear these new German approaches in the foreseeable future? Analyzing the countless threats that may arise in the world in the nineties, I think that they will be absolutely minimal from the West, including Germany. Our internal development will be crucial from the viewpoint of international security policy. If perestroyka and the reforms gain a second wind and we really begin to integrate into the world community, we will have no reason to fear the Western world, including Germany.

It is hard to agree with people who criticize our German policy. You may sometimes hear: We have "surrendered" the GDR along with Eastern Europe and "lost friends." We have lost "contact" with an "enemy." Is a German threat arising again? No, we have not lost friends with German unification. Real friends have remained just that. With our far-sighted noble policy enabling Germany to become united, we acquired immeasurably more new and genuine friends among the majority of the German people. That counts for a great deal.

People are saying that "we have lost contact with the enemy." But who is the enemy? Is it time—at least for Europe—to renounce this terminology? Does anyone really think that the Europeans—and they are not the only ones—have not long since drawn all the requisite conclusions as to the absolute untenability of any military solutions for Europe? This means either failing to see the new European realities or deliberately misleading people.

What should we expect of Germany in the foreseeable future? It will vigorously integrate with Western Europe, forming one of the main foundations of the future united Europe—the "Common Market." Possibly its economic and technological center. It will be willing to cooperate with us.

In the new European conditions Germany will not be our political or military adversary and will not want to forcibly violate anyone's borders. It will hardly want a return to the cold war on its own initiative. There will be no repetition of "22 June" [date of start of German war against USSR in 1941]: Most Germans have drawn enough conclusions from the tragedies in their own history. Their 40-year restructuring has proved successful. That is an important condition for continuing our new policy regarding Europe and Germany, the foundations of which have been laid over the last few years.

Genscher Cited on Call To Back USSR Reforms

PM1305091391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 91 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report under the rubric "The World and Politics": "Support for Reforms"]

[Text] Bonn, 11 May—FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has advocated the need for energetic and active support for the processes of reform in the Soviet Union.

The Federal Republic of Germany is making use of all its authority, which has increased since unification, he stated in an interview with NORDSEE ZEITUNG published today, to promote in every possible way the success of the transformations taking place in the USSR.

The policy of the new thinking, which is the historic achievement of President Gorbachev, the minister continued, has made possible cooperation with the West aimed at preserving stability in the world. This policy did not only assist in the liberation of Kuwait but enabled the United Nations to finally play the role that its creators intended this organization to play: to use its influence where international stability and peace are threatened.

Germany's foreign policy will aim to promote in every possible way the United Nations' progress along this path. This will not only promote peaceful solutions to conflicts but will also make an important contribution to the process of forming a new world order. The Federal Republic, Genscher stressed, intends to continue taking the side of those who fight for human rights, including the right of peoples to autonomously determine their future.

Primakov Meets Italy's Andreotti, Cossiga in Rome

LD1305193491 Moscow TASS in English 1911 GMT 13 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Nikolay Teterin]

[Text] Rome May 13 TASS—Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti today received visiting Academician Yevgeniy Primakov, a member of the Soviet National Security Council.

They discussed bilateral relations, noting with satisfaction their dynamic development, especially in economic fields.

Stress was made at the same time on the need to work out a coordinated Western policy to support reforms in the USSR. The forthcoming G-7 summit in London can be important in this respect.

When international problems were discussed, special attention was given to the Middle East.

Also today, Primakov was received by Italian President Francesco Cossiga. Their lively and lengthy discussion covered a wide range of bilateral and international issues.

Supreme Soviet

Supreme Soviet Session Continues 13 May

LD1305210191

[Editorial Report] Moscow Central Television Second Program Network in Russian at 1847 GMT on 13 May carries a one-hour program of recorded highlights of proceedings at the 13 May USSR Supreme Soviet session held in the Kremlin in Moscow. The announcer opens the program by saying that that USSR Supreme Soviet first discussed the USSR exit and entry bill.

Stepan Sitaryan, chairman of the State Foreign Economic Commission, speaks about work on the bill, comparing the previous draft with the revized version.

Supreme Soviet Chairman Lukyanov then asks if there are any questions. Deputy (Voloshkina) asks about pensions for those working abroad. Sitaryan says that the experience of foreign countries will be considered and the matter is being investigated.

An unidentified deputy asks about the problem of providing transportation for people emigrating from the country. Sitaryan agrees that there is a problem with finding the resources to provide such transportation. He says that he is unable to say specifically what measures will be taken. This was followed by a question by Deputy Prikhodko about the financial effect on local authorities.

Next, an unidentified deputy asks Sitaryan why the adoption of the bill should depend on financial resources. Sitaryan denies that this is the case but asserts the importance of finding sufficient resources.

Continuing the discussion, Deputy (Bashmakov) asks what period is expected in the bill. Sitaryan says expenditure has been calculated over a five-year period. He explains the thinking behind such calculations. (Bashmakov) says that the sources of financing the law have not been clarified. Sitaryan reiterates that the civil aviation and railways ministers will be two main sources.

Deputy (Badalbayeva) then asks whether this law can be adopted without the USSR having signed international conventions. Sitaryan says energetic measures will be taken in this area, and he speculates further on possible sources of funds.

The announcer says that deputies increasingly feel more work is required. The Soviet of the Union adopted the bill as a whole, but the Soviet of Nationalities rejected it, and passed it to the commissions. The announcer then says that a calm debate began on the bill on state security. A report was given by Sharin, member of the Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security.

Sharin notes some of the bodies and deputies who called for this bill to be urgently debated. He describes work by the Committee for Defense and State Security on the bill, along with other bodies and specialists. It was decided that the bill needs to be revized to guarantee social protection of the individual. Other committees have made suggestions. At this point video shows KGB Chairman Kryuchkov at the session. Sharin draws deputies' attention to clauses of the bill setting forth the responsibility and accountability of KGB employees and opportunities for complaints by the public about violations of their rights and freedoms. Links between the KGB and local authorities were discussed. He states that although KGB bodies are subordinate to the top republican authorities, such authorities would not have the right to instruct KGB bodies how to conduct counterintelligence work or whom to employ. Sharin says that during work on the bill, it was sent to the republics for their views. All proposals were taken into account. On a proposal to restrict the KGB's activity to counterintelligence and intelligence, Sharin says that this is not within the Supreme Soviet's powers. Sharin believes the KGB should retain its name. Some suggestions, he notes, expanded the sphere of KGB activity to areas outside its competence and could not therefore be accepted. Sharin then calls for the bill to be adopted.

After this, the announcer says that the session went on to appoint further ministers. The Supreme Soviet will work in committees and commissions on Tuesday and Wednesday, and will meet in joint session on Thursday, the announcer says in conclusion.

The report then ends

Session Split Over Emigration Law

LD1305110491 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1000 GMT 13 May 91

[Report by correspondent Vladimir Perfilyev from the USSR Supreme Soviet]

[Text] Today at a joint sitting of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, chaired by Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov, the members of the Supreme Soviet continued their work on the bill on procedure for leaving and entering the USSR by citizens of our country. The deputies were addressed by Sitaryan, deputy prime minister of the Cabinet of Ministers. He presented an analysis of the situation, a forecast, so to speak, for prospects in the event the law is adopted. It is necessary to assess the emigration flow, how many people will leave the country, and the assessments here are quite varied. The figure of 400,000 was mentioned. Other estimates speak of 1.5 million people who would want to leave to work abroad. So Comrade Sitaryan replied to deputies' questions for an hour.

Then a debate got under way, followed by a proposal to adopt the law in its entirety. The voting has taken place. The Soviet of the Union voted for adopting the law. Consequently the law was adopted by one of the chambers. The Soviet of Nationalities voted against—that is, there were not enough votes in favor. Five other—mutually excluding—proposals were presented. All of these were also put to a vote but were rejected, and now

a conciliation commission is being set up which should find a common denominator for the decision on adopting this law.

That is all in my report from the Kremlin.

Sitaryan on Emigration Treatment Problems

LD1305194491 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1630 GMT 13 May 91

["Excerpt" from report delivered by Stepan Sitaryan, chairman of the State Foreign Economic Commission to the USSR Supreme Soviet in Moscow on 13 May; recorded—from the "USSR Supreme Soviet Diary" program]

[Text] Implementation of this project [bill on entry to and exit from USSR] will require the creation of quite an intricate and well-prepared infrastructure appropriate for such a rising stream of entry and exit. The most complex issues here, it seems to me, concern three spheres. The first is insuring transport services. You know about the state of affairs here in the national economy, that even today our existing transport resources—I have in mind the resources of the Ministry of Civil Aviation and the Ministry of Railways—do not even provide normal services to the stream existing today. You know very well that the wait for, say, tickets for certain routes runs to six months and even longer. Undoubtedly the problem of providing material resources to the aviation sphere seems to me to be one of the major problems.

The second task, of no less importance, is of course the Ministry of Railways. The problems of the Ministry of Railways are aggravated by the fact that, unfortunately, we are not producing passenger cars, and in effect, we buy all our passenger cars for hard currency. Moreover, the cost of these purchases has recently gone up, and certain difficulties have arisen because of the fact that the bulk of these purchases came from the GDR. If prior to this year we bought these in transferrable rubles, then today, as you know, because these transactions are made in freely convertible currency, this certainly complicates the overall currency situation.

Regarding the essential expenditure connected with providing facilities for our customs service, the situation here is most unenviable, especially this service's technical provision, even irrespective of a possible growth in emigration traffic, and certain outlays will undoubtedly be required here.

So we are taking as our point of departure that, as a result of adopting the law, and to provide the essential but best possible normal conditions for its functioning, we will once again have to carefully consider all of our material resources, and in this way create the essential material prerequisites for insuring the operation of this law. Of course, this will be implemented in stages, as resources are found. New possibilities will also be studied, and for example, even those figures which we have cited in the material circulated to you are already being updated, in particular, for example, the system for exchanging currency has now been transferred to a totally different regime. Other solutions might be found, a more active involvement of the emigrants themselves in covering the impending expenditure. In any case, we have a clear idea that these outlays are inevitable, they are necessary for the law to function, and the government, together with the appropriate interested organizations, will take the necessary measures to implement the tasks facing it.

Law on Travel Abroad Not Adopted

LD1305193891 Moscow TASS in English 1805 GMT 13 May 91

[By TASS legislative correspondent Vladimir Isachenkov]

[Text] Moscow May 13 TASS—The Soviet parliament today failed to adopt a law guaranteeing the right to travel abroad for most Soviet citizens. A heated debate revealed that the costs involved were too high for the ailing Soviet economy and critics of the bill prevailed.

The bill was, however, endorsed by one of the Soviet parliament's two houses - the Council of the Union, but failed to muster sufficient support in the other chamber - the Council of Nationalities. As a result a conciliation commission is to be set up to formulate a compromise solution.

Stepan Sitaryan, chairman of the state foreign economic commission, failed to convince critics of the bill that the government will have solved all financial and organizational problems by July 1, 1992, the date on which the bill was expected to go into effect.

Some speakers called for a more thorough preparation by the Cabinet of Ministers of the mechanism for enforcing the new law.

The adoption of this law will call for the purchase of special office equipment for the visa and registration department and additional costs involved in upgrading consular and customs services. These costs are estimated at 160-240 million roubles and 110 million-roubles worth of hard currency for the next five years. In addition, the promulgation of the law will involve multi-billion additional indirect spending on additional trains and planes and other necessities. The vote showed that the supporters of the law, who insisted that the influx of hard currency from migrants would cover the costs involved many times over, failed to convince a majority.

Nevertheless, only 37 deputies voted against the law in the Council of Nationalities, with 121 voting in favour and 21 abstaining.

The results of the vote give sufficient ground for a go-ahead on Thursday, when the two chambers are expected to meet in a joint session to vote on a compromise formula.

Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy told a news conference here today that he was satisfied with the results of deliberations and stressed that critical remarks were not levelled against the bill as such but were exclusively concerned with the mechanism for enacting the new law.

State Security Organs Law Passed

LD1305125991 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1200 GMT 13 May 91

[Excerpts] From the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, over to the correspondent's point in the Kremlin. At the microphone is Gennadiy Kolenov.

[Kolenov] As expected, the country's legislature this morning once again returned to the draft law on the procedure for leaving the USSR and entry into the USSR by citizens of our country, which is already in the second reading. [passage omitted]

The Supreme Soviet then set about examining no less important a draft law, also in its second reading, on the state security bodies in the USSR.

Leonid Dmitriyevich Sharin, chairman of the Defense and State Security Committee, delivered a report on that question and said that over 600 proposals and remarks had been taken into account in the work. He focused in detail on the law and replied to questions, after which the law on USSR state security bodies was adopted in principle [V Tselom]. [passage omitted]

Article-by-article discussion of that draft law will begin after the break. I will end my report from the Kremlin on that.

Ministerial Appointments Approved

LD1305145391 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1400 GMT 13 May 91

[Report by correspondent Vladimir Perfiliyev from the USSR Supreme Soviet]

[Excerpt] At the evening joint session of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of the Nationalities, the members of the USSR Supreme Soviet gave their assent to the president of the country approving Nikolay Isaakovich Kotlyar as minister of the fisheries industry and Mikhail Lukich Timoshishin as chairman of the USSR State Committee for Agricultural and Food Policy.

The legislators are now discussing the draft law in the second reading on bodies of state security in the USSR. [passage omitted]

Text of Ruling on Armenia, Azerbaijan

PM1305110191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 May 91 Union Edition p 2

[USSR Supreme Soviet resolution signed by Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Lukyanov dated 7 May: "On the Appeals of the Republic of Armenia Supreme Soviet and the Azerbaijan Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium"]

[Text] The Kremlin, Moscow—In its decree of 25 April 1991 the Republic of Armenia Supreme Soviet raised with the USSR Supreme Soviet the question of convening an extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies to discuss the situation that has taken shape in Nagorno-Karabakh and the zone bordering Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijan Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium considers this act gross interference in Azerbaijan's internal affairs and objects to the convening of an extraordinary Congress.

The USSR Supreme Soviet points out that problems connected with the Azerbaijan Republic's Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast have been examined repeatedly at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet and corresponding decisions have been adopted on them. The efforts of Union organizations, however, have not met with support in the republics or yielded the proper results.

Mindful of this, the USSR Supreme Soviet resolves that:

1. The convening of an extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies is to be considered inexpedient, and the Republic of Armenia Supreme Soviet is to be recommended to withdraw its appeal.

2. The measures being taken by the USSR president to fulfill the USSR Supreme Soviet decisions on normalizing the situation in the region, disarming illegal combat formations on both sides, and protecting citizens' rights and legitimate interests are to be supported.

3. The USSR general prosecutor is to check without delay the reports of violations of the law set forth in the Republic of Armenia Supreme Soviet and Azerbaijan Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium resolutions and, where necessary, take corresponding measures and inform the USSR Supreme Soviet of the results.

[signed] A. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Political & Social

Gorbachev Decree on More Compensation Measures

CM1405101991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 May 91 Second Edition p 1

["USSR Presidential Decree on Additional Measures to Compensate the Population for Losses in Connection With the Retail Price Rise" signed by USSR President Mikhail S. Gorbachev in Moscow on 13 May]

[Text] To create additional guarantees for the social protection of families with children and for young people undergoing courses of education in connection with a one-time increase in retail prices for schoolchildren's and other children's clothing, and guided by the joint

declaration on urgent measures to stabilize the situation in the country and overcome the crisis, I resolve:

1. To accept a proposal of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers concerning the introduction—along with compensation payments given as applicable to the conditions provided for in the USSR president's decree of 19 March on the reform of retail prices and social protection of the population (VEDOMOSTI SYEZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV SSSR I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSR, 1991, No. 13, page 367)—of specific purpose annual payments for acquiring complete sets of school or other children's clothing of the following order:

200 rubles for pre-school age children and for those who are at school and whose age is 13 or below;

250 rubles for those who are at school and whose age is over 13, and also for those who study at vocational and technical educational establishments which, in accordance with the USSR Government's decisions, are not provided with uniforms or food.

2. To recommend to the governments of republics and the executive and management bodies of the local soviets of people's deputies to define, having taken the natural and climatic conditions into account, the standard sets of clothing for children of pre-school age, for those who are at day schools and also for those who are in vocational and technical educational establishments.

[Signed] USSR President M. Gorbachev.

The Kremlin, Moscow, 13 May 1991.

Air Traffic Controllers Plan Strike 21 May

LD1305155291 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1230 GMT 13 May 91

[Excerpts] [Announcer] This short news bulletin I would like to devote to the coming strike of USSR air traffic controllers on 21 May. Vladimir Kanusenko, president of the federation of trade unions of the country's air traffic controllers, is with me in the studio. Vladimir, what made you decide to go on strike?

[Kanusenko] Official medical bodies in the sphere of work safety have come to a clear conclusion that air traffic controllers should retire on pension at age 50. An air traffic controller must not work more than 36 hours a week and must have an annual holiday of at least 48 working days; whereas the state forces us to work flat out. As a result of this we hanmper the safety of innocent passengers and crews, and we cripple the lives of our families.

One and a half years of the work of the Supreme Soviets have come to nothing. Air traffic controllers of the country do not wish to be hostages of this system.

[Announcer] You mean of the Union Supreme Soviet?

[Kanusenko] The USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Announcer] Vladimir, are you going to stage wildcat strike, or have you informed the Ministry of Civil Aviation of the coming strike? What has caused you to go on strike?

[Kanusenko] We have not only informed the Ministry of Civil Aviation but also the USSR Supreme Soviet, USSR President Gorbachev, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. We have, in particular, also appealed to the minister of civil aviation in a letter that states: We demand that all airports in the USSR and abroad be informed that as from 0000 on 21 May 1991 there will be no air traffic control in the territory of the country. All responsibility for a situation that threatens the health and safety of passengers and crews occurring as a result of not informing the interested sides in time, we place with the leadership of the Ministry of Civil Aviation and personally with the minister. And if even one participant of the strike is subjected to administrative, criminal, or any other form of liability, the strike will continue until such a decision is cancelled. [passage omitted]

I would like to add that 21 May the trade union of the flight crews intends to join us; that is, the crews' collectives will back us, and they will also strike with us on 21 May if our problems are not resolved. The independent trade union of miners also supports us. [passage omitted]

Air Traffic Chief Makes Appeal

PM1405105491 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 May 91 Union Edition p 3

[Interview with G. Lipayev, chief of USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation Main Air Traffic Administration, by correspondent I. Andreyev; place and date not given: "Storms on the Ground Echo in the Air: Will the Air Traffic Controllers Go on Strike?"]

[Excerpts] IZVESTIYA has already reported (issue No. 102) that the USSR Federation of Air Traffic Controllers Trade Unions intends to hold a union-wide strike 21 May. Only days remain until the appointed date. How does the Ministry of Civil Aviation assess the approaching event? Our correspondent talked with G. Lipayev, chief of the Main Air Traffic Administration.

[Andreyev] Georgiy Yakovlevich, what is your attitude, as the country's chief air traffic controller, to your colleagues' demands and the calls for a union-wide strike in support of these demands?

[Lipayev] In brief, I support the demands and am categorically opposed to a strike. [passage omitted]

[Andreyev] How long could the strike last? Minutes, hours, days?

[Lipayev] On the basis of a talk with representatives of the federation, it is clear that they intend to strike until their demands are met.

[Andreyev] In aviation, it is customary to plan for the worst-case scenario. Let us assume that all the air traffic

controllers who intend to strike do indeed refuse to carry out their duties from 0000 on 21 May...

[Lipayev] This cannot be allowed to paralyze air traffic in the country, regions, or republics. It will be necessary to adjust flight scheduling in good time and bypass airspace that is left without ground control. And perhaps land planes at reserve airfields where the personnel understand the meaning of responsibility for human lives... Other measures are also planned.

[Andreyev] Including punitive measures?

[Lipayev] Oh, I would not want to talk about punitive measures against my fellow air traffic controllers. I have even less desire to invoke the law banning strikes by workers in transport sectors. While understanding what has made my colleagues resort to the strike threat and, I repeat, sharing in their demands, I appeal to their common sense and professional honor: Think about the consequences!

TASS Reviews Soviet Central Press for 14 May

LD1405073191 Moscow TASS in English 0622 GMT 14 May 91

["Soviet Press Review"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow May 14 TASS—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on Monday received a delegation from the South Korean National Assembly headed by its speaker Park Jung-gu, who conveyed a personal message to Gorbachev from President No Tae-u of South Korea, the Soviet Communist Party daily PRAVDA reports.

The message was welcomed as another step to develop a Soviet-South Korean dialogue at the summit levels.

The Soviet parliament on Monday discussed the second reading of the law on emigration, which has been debated for over a year and a half.

The Council of Nationalities voted down the bill and sent it to the parliamentary conciliation commission.

"Existing laws have widely opened not only windows but doors to Europe and the bill must serve a legal basis for existing procedures," the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA writes.

The RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA and SELSKAYA ZHIZN newspapers carry articles on candidates for the Russian presidency and offer interviews with former Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, who is adamant to run for the presidency.

Ryzhkov criticises Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet Boris Yeltsin and says if he believed in Yeltsin's reforms in Russia, he would not put his name forward for the post of Russian president.

Ryzhkov stressed that he does not oppose private ownership as such but is against private ownership of land.

The SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA newspaper reports that an initiative group began preparations for Ryzhkov's elections and carries an interview with its head Vladimir Savakov.

Savakov described Ryzhkov as "a politician of great abilities, cautious when making decisions and wise when taking steps".

The KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper offers a brief review of candidates for the Russian presidency and says that the number of Yeltsin's rivals "grows with every passing hour" and that "so far only Vladimir Zhirinovskiy from the Liberal Democratic Party has put his name forward to the Russian Central Electoral Commission".

Newspapers write about the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border.

The military daily KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA carry interviews with chairman of the organisational committee for Nagorno-Karabakh Viktor Polyanichko, who is also the second secretary of the Azerbaijani Communist Party Central Committee.

Polyanichko, who was attacked in Stepanakert on May 10, said that long-awaited peace in the region "can be reached only if a presidential decree on the disbandment of armed groups and confiscation of weapons is fully implemented in order to reestablish bodies of power in the region".

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA also carries articles about the situation in the region. It says that the village of Voskepar, which has been razed to the ground as the Armenian side alleges, suffered no damage in reality. It says that Azerbaijani police did not allow journalists into the village of Chaikend (Getashen).

The situation remains tense in South Ossetia, newspapers reports.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA writes that "neither Georgians nor Ossetians want war. Both peoples severely suffer from its consequences".

However, Chairman of the Georgian Parliament Zviad Gamsakhurdia and his "team" are resolute to continue war "until the last Ossetian is killed".

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA offers an interview with leading expert-seismologist from the Soviet Defence Ministry Vladimir Bocharov, who denied rumors in Georgia that the recent earthquake in South Ossetia was "caused by the military".

He stressed that the Ministry of Defence does not use geophysical weapons.

The newspaper carries the text of an agreement between the Soviet and Canadian Governments on the prevention of dangerous military activities.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA evaluates former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's chances of replacing Perez de Cuellar in the post of U.N. chief.

Shevardnadze told the newspaper that no official proposals had been made to him, but he had read articles speculating about his chances.

The TRUD newspaper tries to draw conclusions from recent coal miners' strikes. It says that "the movement of workers and farmers will mount and gain momentum and can and should become a consolidating factor in society".

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA carries reports on the Russian Communist Party Central Committee's plenary meeting on May 13, which discussed the forthcoming presidential elections in Russia and party organisations' tasks to provide social guarantees to people while implementing the government's anti-crisis programmes.

The newspaper publishes a report by Secretary of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee A. Melnikov on social guarantees.

The Soviet Communist Party daily PRAVDA carries an article about a meeting between Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, Chairman of the Russian parliament Boris Yeltsin and leaders of autonomous republics in Russia.

Anatoliy Leontyev, the parliamentary head of Chuvashia, believes that "autonomous republics are sovereign and equal entities and founders of a renovated union," and stressed their interest in preserving the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation.

The newspaper publishes a resolution by the Secretariat of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee "On Stepping Up Party Organisations' Work to Provide a Political Basis for Carrying Out Land Reform in the Country".

Newspapers also publish a presidential decree on additional measures to compensate the population for price hikes.

Prospects for 'Vzglyad' Program Examined

LD1305204391 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 2009 12 May 91

[Interview with "Vzglyad" announcer Aleksandr Politkovskiy by correspondent Sergey Belyayev, at the Festival of the Democratic Press in Moscow's Central Park on 12 May—recorded]

[Text] This is Aleksandr Kulikov continuing the evening programmes of Radio Rossii. There can be hardly anyone who would dispute the fact that over the years of perestroyka some of the greatest successes have been in the sphere of glasnost. Over these six years or so there has truly been a breakthrough, with practically no forbidden subjects remaining for the mass media. What a lot of new publications have appeared! Television and radio have been filled with fresh new voices. But as everywhere in this land of ours, not everything has gone smoothly even here in the sphere of the press, radio and television, despite the generally positive changes which have been visible. There is a fierce battle of views going on, a battle between what are called the official views and particular journalists, and sometimes even whole creative collectives. Of course you are all familiar with the story of the popular television program down, drove it off the air. Yet the program has remained alive. So how do things now stand with "Vzglyad"? This was the question my colleague, reporter Sergey Belyayev, opened with when he spoke to one of the "Vzglyad" announcers, Aleksandr Politkovskiy. So, how are things with "Vzglyad"?

[Politkovskiy] Everything is fine. Well, it is sorting itself out now. Sorting itself out because a [word indistinct] structure has been created for distributing video information. We have correspondents in Transcaucasia. One of our correspondents has just returned from Donetsk. One has gone off to Estonia, and yet another to Lithuania. On 17 May we are going out live throughout the Baltic region. We are getting on fine.

[Belyayev] And how do you see "Vzglyad" on the air, on Kravchenko's television, or...

[Politkovskiy] No, but there now exists a real alternative, in the form of cable and off-air systems of television, which are not subject to Bolshevik bans, Bolshevik governments, let us put it like that. So there are cable systems and off-air systems which are capable, which have sufficient political potential and are able to show this program. And indeed they are doing so. Where previously we had 150 million viewers, the figure is now 20 or 25 million. If we reach 30 million that will be very good. For me that is a sufficient number of viewers. So now we have [word indistinct] alternative structures and are forming a new team, a new team of people who will be ready to go out live on the air when...probably, this state of progressive emaciation cannot last long, and then we shall have a team ready to go out regularly on the air and provide publicly significant information. That is all we claim to want to do.

[Belyayev] So we shall soon be seeing a new "Vzglyad" team?

[Politkovskiy] Well, yes, because as yet there are specifically only two of the leading persons left, the two "A"s, the two Aleksandrs, Aleksandr Politkovskiy and Aleksandr Lyubimov. There are practicaly no producers. Television is something real and you need to have real broadcasting, real work, and you or any radio listener who is now listening to us fully realizes that there exists a plant, a factory, a team, an institution, a group, and

they are united because they have a common aim. This common aim is something that we lacked at one time and now we have created this common aim. It is a one hour 20-minute or one hour 30-minute program twice a month.

[Belyayev] What about your plans concerning the Russian Television and Radio Company?

[Politkovskiy] I would like to have a look and see what the Russian Television and Radio Company will be like, because, you see, what alarms me is that everywhere the top people remain where they are—the cabinet of chiefs. You understand? But time will pass, and in time it will become clear to television viewers that there really does exist another structure—independent and fairly democratic.

[Belyayev] As we shall shortly see a new, revived "Vzglyad", what audience is your program primarily aimed at?

[Politkovskiy] At a thinking audience. This is of fundamental importance because initially we were rather entertaining and we had a bias toward youth. Then we got a bit more serious, because we think our life has got a bit more serious generally. So we are now remaining a program for the family, although in principle this is not true because any mass news medium must be, well, more or less narrowly aimed at someone. Now we have a fairly broad spectrum and the latest sociological studies show that we are viewed, it sounds funny of course to put it this way, by everyone from nine year-old children to 90 year-old pensioners. I mean when we are working live on Central Television. That is the kind of spread we had.

[Belyayev] How does the commercial aspect influence your programms?

[Politkovskiy] That worries me least of all. I am not very up to date on that, but I know that we have incurred big losses from the commercial point of view, because for one thing we have tried to be fairly independent of the state structures and to avoid existing on state grants, to be financially independent, because political independence was already achieved. We will go on trying to be financially independent.

[Belyayev] To what extent did it influence the creative process?

[Politkovskiy] Mine, not in the least. To be honest I have not in the least... [changes thought] I have had situations when I have been asked to do some particular material which was of an advertising nature. I have always declined to do that because I have nothing to do with that. To continue this theme, the state committee for television and radio broadcasting lost, no, gained a lot from this. Because 90 percent of this advertising activity and commercial activity is paid to the committee all the same. Incidentlaly these losses are rather painful for us regarding the technical processes because we could buy new equipment and make a new studio and carry out normal television development. Even that has disappeared. Well, we shall create an alternative.

[Belyayev] Can we hope that the "Vzglyad" program will be new but just as controversial and interesting as before?

[Politkovskiy] Yes, of course, that is the fundamental thing for me. Perhaps I shall grow old one day and uninteresting and viewers will then stop watching, so I shall carry on until then.

[Belyayev] Thank you.

Autonomies' Status in New Union Considered

PM1405082391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 May 91 Union Edition pp 1, 2

[G. Alimov report: "Contradictions Removed. On the Results of the Kremlin Meeting"]

[Text] So, the main result of the Kremlin meeting is that the Russian autonomous formations, which had declared their sovereignty and claimed the status of parties to the new Union treaty, received agreement in principle to this in the course of an almost six-hour discussion. The right to determine the relevant procedure is vested with legislators in the republics themselves.

Why has this issue emerged so unexpectedly? The fact is that, following the well-known statement by the "10," the autonomous formations had certain worries about one of the document's points—the formula for signing the Union treaty. It stated that the Union treaty would be signed only by representatives of the republics participating in the meeting. The autonomous formations saw this as a violation of the USSR law of 26 April 1990 "On Demarcating Powers Between the USSR and Members of the Federation" and several other laws. The autonomous formations also referred to the draft new Union treaty published at the decision of the Federation Council, which reflected the agreed positions of the conference of plenipotentiary representatives from 27 republics. It is well known that it did not divide the republics into Union and autonomous republics, and it recognizes the republics' declarations of state sovereignty.

That is why the members of the USSR Federation Council and the leaders of 16 republics—Abkhazia, Bashkiria, Buryatia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Kalmykia, Karelia, Komi SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], Mari SSR, Mordovia, North Ossetia, Tatarstan, Tuva, Udmurtia, Chechen-Ingushetia, Chuvashia, and Yakut-Sakha SSR—issued a statement. It stresses that the question of members of the Union cannot be resolved outside of official structures or by ingnoring USSR laws.

The statement was serious and had to be examined. All the more so as it was no accident that the "10," declaring their readiness to conclude a new Union treaty, proceeded on the basis, it seems, of the formula "one

republic, one vote." The special position of Russia, which, apart from Russia itself, has another 15 claimants to direct participation in the establishment of the new Union, was taken into account. This would give it 16 formal votes. Hence the fears of some Union republics that Russia would have a "lock" on any decision. Of course, there is a logic to this. But then what should be done about the state sovereignty adopted by the Russian autonomous formations? Should it be ignored? Another question would then arise: In what legal respect should state sovereignty adopted by a union republic differ from the sovereignty adopted by an autonomous formation? The statement by the "16" provides an unambiguous answer to this: It does not and should not differ in any way. In a conversation with me, Yu. Spiridonov, chairman of autonomous Komi's Supreme Soviet, stated that he was prepared to subscribe to every letter of the "9 + 1" statement, with one exception. In his opinion, a group of very high-ranking leaders had interfered "'behind our backs' in the functions of the Federation Council on one particular point—that relating to the formula for the signing of the new Union treaty." It is impermissible, he believes, when equal members of the federation, which have already been constitutionally defined in the Union, are elbowed out [vychlenyayutsya].

"We need to take account of reality and not imitate people who are covering their eyes and do not want to see anything," Yu. Spiridonov said. "We are a state formation, that must be our starting point. We have firmly stated once again: We are members of the Union and will strive for the preservation of the Union and the revival and strengthening of our Mother Russia. That is our right."

[Alimov] But the Union republics' opinions have to be considered too, and their rights respected. They also want to have equal conditions—one on one, so to speak....

[Spiridonov] All these fears can be allayed if an appropriate mechanism is worked out. There have been proposals on this score—to set up a quota system, for example. We could agree that, when it comes to deciding certain issues, Russia will have a single vote, like all the other Union republics. We realize that there are questions which it would be easier and more correct to decide at the level of larger state structures. In this respect we would delegate our powers to the Russian Federation, as members of it. In this respect there should simply be no mistrust of Russia from any quarter.

[Alimov] Do you think that there are still any obstacles to the signing of the Union treaty?

[Spiridonov] There are none in principle, and today we must move more quickly to conclude the treaty and make further progress. The Union treaty is the basis on which mechanisms of mutual relations should be begun and developed. It is impossible for a single document to resolve all issues at a stroke. We need to realize that the signing of the Union treaty is not the culmination of our work but just the beginning—the foundation for future progress toward a new constitution and a new state structure.

[Alimov] And yet there are still plenty of issues. For example, can a state with 30 or more components be considered normal?

[Spiridonov] Yes it can! Just take the United States—50 states, but each one has far more rights than our republics. The state exists and works marvelously. We too want to create a state, or—as Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin put it—a union of republics, a union state of republics. Of course, we are creating a single state. Nobody needs any other kind—Russia least of all. [Spiridonov ends]

...Those were some of the difficult overtones of the Kremlin meeting. The contradictions that emerged were settled. Positions were stated. It only remains to be seen just when we will finally move from our state of suspension to a normal situation. Everyone is thoroughly tired of vagueness. We should be definite.

The republic representatives are counting on the Union republics being understanding about the conference decision. In their opinion, this decision is in line with Union interests and paves the way to the speedy conclusion of the treaty.

Deputies Cited on Election of Union Organs

PM1305132591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 May 91 Second Edition p 2

[Report by legislative observer Miroslav Buzhkevich: "We Hear Quarrels in Corridors"]

[Text] In the past two weeks the country's legislature has been working with "entractes" caused by the holidays. That did not prevent the deputies, as envisaged by the session's agenda, from discussing a number of important documents. A law on the social protection of citizens subjected to the effect of radiation as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear electric power station was adopted. Its importance is very great although in my view it should have appeared considerably earlier. I do not intend to analyze the debates on other draft laws examined. This time I was interested in the deputies' talk behind the scenes of the session, so to speak, in the corridors of the legislature.

I do not doubt that our readers are familiar with the joint statement by the country's president and the top leaders of the nine Union republics. And they have probably noticed that after the adoption of the country's new constitution it is planned to hold elections of the Union organs of power. It is this point of the agreement, which concerns the further prospects of the Supreme Soviet and the entire corps of USSR people's deputies, which has given rise to a very lively exchange of opinions among parliamentarians during breaks between sittings in the foyer, buffet, and smoking room.

First of all many of my interlocutors assessed what the country's legislature has done and how in the two years of its existence. The opinions were of course varied. There is something that unites them; it is a certain satisfaction at what has been done, although it is backed up by the understanding that considerably more could have been done. Here is what was said by V. Tetenov, chairman of the legislative committee for transport, communications, and information:

"I categorically deny the allegations of some journalists, who have christened our Supreme Soviet a 'sleeper.' Many people forget that the USSR people's deputies were trail blazers of a kind in creating and developing parliamentary methods of work in our country. Particularly in the early months there was considerable fuss and there were elements of a lack of organization. We attentively studied the experience of parliaments of many countries and sought our own methods. It seems to me that we have now worked out the style we need. In confirmation of the effectiveness of the present composition of the Supreme Soviet I shall say that it has prepared and approved many dozens of laws and other documents laying the foundations of the rule-of-law state and conditions for the transition to a market economy."

Indeed, our country's first legislature began its life with a blank page, as they say. One deputy put it even more trenchantly: The legislature has taken its first steps in the dark, because it could not use the accumulated experience of previous Supreme Soviets, whose main merit was unanimously voting "for." For what was imposed on them by the party and state apparatus. The legislature's present composition created a consistent system for the elaboration and adoption of laws. The main brunt of this complex matter now rests on the committees and commissions which, in assessing the draft laws submitted for examination to the legislature, are attracting a wide circle of experts and specialists and are preparing documents for a first, second, and even third reading. All this has considerably improved the quality of laws.

Frankly, I do not fully share this overoptimistic assessment of the legislature's work, or its high rating as they say now. It has committed blunders, it has not always displayed resolve.

The press has frequently noted that not all laws are "working." That is obvious. Of course, responsibility for that rests with the Supreme Soviet. In particular it has not always considered the real situation in the country. But there have been other reasons too. The "work" of the Union laws has also been impeded by the "parade" of republican sovereignties and in a number of cases the license of the local soviets. In all this was manifested the "residual" phenomenon of past years that is the disrespect for laws which has become entrenched in society, what lawyers call people's lack of a sense of law-abidingness, and the replacement of legal norms with telephone law.

To the ideas expressed above I should like to add a comment by one deputy. The laws have an important feature. Their justice and viability are displayed not instantly, not immediately after adoption, but in a year or two or even later. So we shall wait and see.

The deputies' talk about the "agreement of the 10" constantly contained the subject of the forthcoming unscheduled elections to the Union organs of power. I did not meet a single legislator who would not welcome the elimination of the superstructure that is the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. It has failed to justify hopes, has proved superfluous in the living body of legislative power. Many people suppose that the country's Supreme Soviet, approximately doubled by comparison with the existing Supreme Soviet, will prove far more effective than the present "two-tier unit" of power.

Only one problem arises—enhancing the professional potential of the Union legislature. A certain "paucity" of this potential is obviously impeding the Supreme Soviet in its work. A negative role here has been played by the traditional nature of the formation of the supreme legislative organ: the desire to represent all social strata of the population in it. Whereas, in the opinion of many deputies, the parliamentarian should be a professional politician. The more political scientists, sociologists, historians, lawyers, and people who by the nature of their activity are close to politics there are in the Supreme Soviet, the more fully it will fulfill its role to transform society. Of course, deputies will include representatives of the workers, peasants, and creative intelligentsia. But only those who have given a good account of themselves as real politicians prepared for lawmaking.

Some of my interlocutors presented approximately the following scheme for electing and forming the legislature. The ballot slip includes candidates from parties, public organizations, and movements. Those who are elected will join parliament and create the relevant factions. This will make their behavior more predictable (something which many present deputies lack) because they will have to fulfill a public mandate—pursuing and defending the electoral platform of their party or public organization. I think you cannot deny these thoughts have logic.

The deputies are assessing closely and critically the structure of the legislature proposed by the draft Union treaty. Nearly all deputies with whom I have talked recently share the position that both existing chambers should be preserved. Further on quarrels begin—about what they should be like. Deputy V. Kirillov takes the following position:

"In holding elections and forming a legislature, we must be concerned for the stability and continuity of its work. That is why there is no point in altering the structure of the Supreme Soviet. We must keep both chambers. One is the Soviet of the Union, the other the Soviet of Nationalities. I stress: the Soviet of Nationalities, not the Soviet of Republics, as the draft Union treaty states.

Why? Far from all national formations are republics. If the present formulation taken from the Union treaty remains, there will be a chain reaction of "republicanization": All national autonomous territories and formations will want to become republics. The splitting of the Union and above all of Russia into many states will begin. And each of them will require its own quota in the Union of Republics. Is it not better to keep the existing title of Soviet of Nationalities and, having tuned the mechanism of its formation, provide each ethnic group, even if it is a small one, with representation in it.

He also believes that the control functions which in federative states are usually performed by the upper chamber of parliament should be handed over to the Federation Council, investing it with the right of veto. Not an absolute right but a postponing right, that is the right to "freeze" the action of a law which has been adopted until a special conciliatory commission of the Supreme Soviet has examined the complaints made by the Federation Council against the document. This proposal has a rational kernel—stepping up control over the quality of laws. But there will probably be other less contentious proposals for achieving this goal.

Finally, I present the position of Deputy A. Kuzmin which, incidentally, is shared by many of his colleagues.

"Now is the wrong time to hold new elections of union organs of power. The people are already tired of the endless succession of election campaigns and it is entirely likely that the latest such campaign will be held with a low level of activeness on the part of the population, which could affect its results. But I am more perturbed by something else. Demands are now being heard for the dissolution of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the country's Supreme Soviet. It seems to me that it is hard to imagine a more dangerous path toward instability. If we take this path we shall create a dangerous precedent. Because in a year or two it will cost nothing to accuse what will be a new legislature of some sins or other and to demand its dissolution. Under these conditions in our enormous country we will be unable to do anything sensible regarding the regulation of the economy, the social sphere, or the consolidation of the rule-of-law state."

There is food for thought here, but if new elections are scheduled then, as Yu. Kalmykov, chairman of the legislative committee for legislation and law and order, noted, this must be done by constitutional means, taking the decision at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

Talk in the corridors is all very well. But the Supreme Soviet members are not experiencing any "demobilization" feelings. They are not reducing their activeness, are discussing and preparing new draw laws without which society will not manage either in the transitional period or in 10 years time or more. The session is continuing to work within the planned agenda.

Shakhnazarov on Union-Russia Relationship

PM1405093091 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 May 91 Union Edition p 3

[Article by G. Shakhnazarov, president of the Soviet Association of Political Scientists: "If a House Be Divided... Is Russia Possible Without the Union, or the Union Without Russia?"]

[Text] History has seen plenty of deception and self-deception. Individuals, entire peoples, and the whole human race have been subject to deception—sometimes cruel deception. The chicanery I am about to discuss would probably break all records in the "deception stakes." I am talking about the idea of confrontation between Russia and the center, an idea that is being forcibly instilled into people's minds.

The arguments are well known: The center is wickedly ruining Russia, depriving it of autonomy, and humiliating it. It dreams of dispossessing Russia's people and provoking quarrels between the nations living in its territory, to preserve its own domination over the country, according to the formula "divide and rule." "Have you ever wondered," one author writes, "why it is the center that grows rich by dealing in Russia's gold?" He concludes this revelation with a bitter exclamation: "You people of Russia, you Ukrainians, Belorussians, and other peoples of our astonishing country, do not expect the center to do anything useful for you."

I do not think anyone is left in any doubt that one of the main factors that has reduced the country to its present disastrous state was monstrous supercentralism, the like of which it is hard to find in world history except perhaps in the ancient despotic states. Even then it was not the same. In those days it took months, even years, to travel from the capital to the regions on the borders of the empire—be it the Persian Empire, the Roman, or the Chinese. Even in a later age geographical remoteness gave local authorities a degree of autonomy. In the era of instant information, there is no escaping the vigilant oversight and petty tutelage of the central authorities.

It is apposite to recall that on one of his very first trips around the country M.S. Gorbachev said that in such a vast country you cannot decide every question at the center, depriving people in the localities of the opportunity to live as their own reason dictates. Since then the idea of decentralization has developed from a good intention into a concept presented in practice—with theoretical justification—for the transformation of the USSR into a federal state with wide local self-government.

The republics' declarations of sovereignty, the drafting of a new Union treaty, the 17 March referendum, and, finally, the joint statement by the president and the leaders of nine republics, which defines the stages and timing of the completion of this whole vast, historic task, leave no doubt that the process is irreversible. You would have to be a very determined retrogressive to try,

under present conditions, to campaign for the revival of the center in its former totalitarian capacity. Not even those who, in their heart of hearts, would not be averse to things turning out that way, will risk saying so openly.

True, some reservations must be made. A year to 18 months ago, when everyone was joining in exposing the defects of supercentralism and calling for self-government in all spheres of society's life—from the economy to art—this did not, of course, imply anarchy and chaos.

Society needs a rational measure of centralized government; too much and too little are equally pernicious. Unfortunately, here, too, we have once again failed to avoid our lamentable custom of swinging from one extreme to the other. The idea of "sovereignization," fruitful in itself, was carried to "infinity." As a result, the sovereignty of the Union state was shaken and the newly acquired independence of the republics themselves was called into question. Rampant self-government is increasingly degenerating into a total lack of government. Enormous difficulties are involved in restoring a rational measure of centralized regulation so as to save ourselves from ruin and starvation.

Now let us consider what the center consists of. What is it, a detachment of outsiders installed in Moscow to annoy Russia and wearing for the purpose the aspect of decent Soviet citizens (a kind of version of Voland [the devil in Bulgakov's novel "The Master and Margarita"] and his team)? Or, even worse, a group of CIA agents who have contrived to penetrate the country's heart to bring it under foreign diktat?

Calm down, friend, any normal person would say. The center consists of the Union bodies of power, sited in the capital of the USSR: the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies, the president and vice president, governmental institutions and departments. Or if you take a wider view, it is apposite to include in the concept of the political center the all-Union boards of social, economic, and creative organizations.

In the institutions and offices that are the embodiment of the Union principle you naturally come across people of all nationalities. Although no precise figures exist on this point, there can be no doubt that the vast majority of the "Union men," so to speak—and here I am talking about representative bodies and, particularly, the apparatus—are Russians. That is understandable, because the Russian people make up more than half the entire population of the Union, and the Union capital is, at the same time, their own capital city.

How does it look according to the logic of those who abuse the center, or, to put it more succinctly, the anticentrists? Apparently one section of the Russian people has set about ruining the other section of the Russian people purely because the former group works in Union organizations and hangs out in the Kremlin, while the latter group works in Russia's organizations, with headquarters on Krasnopresnenskaya Embankment. Rubbish! Fantasy! Chicanery—your normal person will say. Precisely. The question is what lies behind this chicanery, and who needs it.

It should be clear to anyone that there is no such thing as a center cut off from Russia and standing in opposition to it. The center is the ultimate abstraction, the embodiment of our Union statehood. Since Russia holds a key place in that statehood, the center is, first and foremost, Russia.

Not only Russia, of course. According to the laws of the federal state (it is another matter that it was not formerly a federal state in reality, and the possibility of its acquiring a content to match its form has only now emerged), Union organizations embody the will of all the republics. I do not suppose any reasonable person, irrespective of his nationality, would see anything offensive in the observation that Russia is the backbone of the Union state, that the state has developed, over the decades, around Russia, and simply could not exist without it. In other words, this is an objective reality, or something God-given.

If you admit the simple truth that the center is also Russia, or primarily Russia, then it becomes clear that the contraposition of Russia and the center is largely artificial. Of course, the functions that people fulfill are bound to leave their imprint on their style of thinking and way of acting. Those whose position obliges them to proceed on the basis of broader, Union-wide interests do not approach the resolution of concrete problems in precisely the same way as those who are installed in the Russian corridors of power. Disagreements can arise here, demanding that the Union administrator understand the needs of Russia, and of all the other republics, and that the Russian, in return, take Union-wide interests into account. This may not be as simple as it appears, but given a normal state of affairs and a well-adjusted regime of collaboration, there should, of course, be no grounds for irreconcilable hostility.

It must be admitted that attacks on the center, attacks on Union organizations, are the opposition's chosen tactics in the power struggle.

As we have said, the country certainly needs decentralization. The state certainly should be turned into a real federation, not a parody of one. The enormous changes that have taken place in our peoples' lives certainly do make the republics' proclamation of sovereignty inevitable, as the people's unreserved support for this idea attests. In other words, the opposition is "harnessing" progressive development trends, and this brings it tactical benefits and would put its actions beyond reproach from the moral viewpoint, were it not for one crucial point.

The fact is that the center, which is reviled in every way, has long ago ceased to be remotely like a monster seeking to stifle everyone in its embraces and chop off the heads of the recalcitrant. Nothing of the kind! It is a fortress that has of its own accord raised the white flag and flung

open its gates. It is the reform headquarters that started on its own initiative to let the localities take the reins of government, in the hope that creative initiative and self-government would soon produce miracles.

So why, one wonders, break down an open door? Because they want to rule not only without rivals, but without partners. There would be nothing reprehensible about that, if they were operating within the framework of the democratic institutions that have been set up. Alas, the radicals, who are urged on all sides not to repeat the Bolsheviks' experience, are eager to carry out another execution of the state, this time a legitimate one, and have already done a great deal to incite the people's masses to pursue this highly dangerous venture, by means of artificially distilling economic dissatisfaction into political passion.

It would, however, be simplest of all to regard the matter as merely someone's machinations. Hegel spoke ironically of the assertion that between two extremes there lies the truth. In actual fact, he said, between two extremes there lies a problem.

In the last analysis, behind the artificially fanned conflict between Russia and the center, there is a bifurcation of the Russian national consciousness. By the will of history or providence, it has now reached a fork in the road and must make a choice that by any standards is historic not only for itself, but for the entire world—to seek the country's preservation as a superpower, or to consent to its becoming an averagely powerful state, no more than ordinary by today's standards.

The arguments on both sides are well known.

Those who would like to jettison the "Union cargo" from the Russian ship justify this primarily in terms of the desire to put an end to the squandering of the national wealth (in which they include not only material resources, but also the genetic pool) on maintaining an essentially chimerical imperial idea that gives the people nothing, except an ephemeral consciousness of their own might. After getting rid of this "ballast," these chains that currently fetter them hand and foot, the Russian people, like any leading European nation, will be able to reach world standards in a short space of time. The wealth that is now squandered or given away for nothing will be channeled into internal consumption—this means oil, coal, gold, diamonds, the boundless fields and pastures, and also, of course, the talents and skills of people capable of creating wonders no less than those with which Japan, Germany, and other highly successful modern states astound the world.

To avoid accusations of unpatriotic behavior, our present-day isolationists seek to demonstrate that their course is the only possible realistic policy in present conditions, and that regardless of Russia's position the disintegration of the Union is inevitable, since that is what its other components want. That being so, the mutual commitments that our peoples have inherited from their long period of cohabitation are exhausted, mutual accounts are closed, and it is every man for himself. Furthermore, a division into autonomous states does not necessarily mean a final break. A kind of zone of magnetic attraction will persist between the independent states, primarily in the economic sphere, and once passions have died down, something like the European Community will be formed, making it possible to exploit all the advantages of integration without the importunate tutelage of the center or the permanent risk of losing once again the sovereignty that was won at such a cost.

This is not idle reasoning, but the well-thought-out program principles of our democratic movement. Their political basis is expounded with disarming frankness in G.Kh. Popov's pamphlet "What Is To Be Done?", which presupposes both the probability and the expediency of the division of the Union into 40 or 50 states. As for the legal form of the entity that will, according to this theory, be glued together from these fragments in future, a prediction on this score can be found in the draft "treaty on a community of sovereign states." This document, drawn up by "Democratic Congress" experts, was published in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA for 13 April this year. Its key thesis goes like this: "A community is a form of interstate cooperation, and is neither a state nor a suprastate formation."

The arguments of those whose opponents accuse them of imperial thinking are equally well known. Here prominence is given to the self-evident fact that our economy was developed as an integral national economic complex. Obviously, claims that individual republics are incapable of existing without the Union are an exaggeration. After all, states that are incomparably poorer contrive to exist somehow. No one will dispute that those who break away will feel a blow of colossal force, from which it will only be possible to recover over several decades. Such a sacrifice appears all the more pointless when the general development trend promises to bring in the next 10-15 years a breakthrough along the path of all-European and even worldwide integration.

Furthermore, it is impossible to leave out of the reckoning the ecological emergency and other highly acute global problems, which could wreck all expectations of achieving prosperity in isolation. Whatever the advocates of national states may say and however they may scoff at "globalists, cosmopolitans, and the rest of the internationalist crew," you would have to be not only blind, but stubborn too to fail to see that the formation of a new world order has already begun, based on the joint regulation of world development by all nations in coordination.

Paradoxical as it may seem, the advocates of the preservation of a powerful Russian statehood find one of their main arguments in the burgeoning processes of internationalization. The patriotic idea plays no less a role in their arguments. Many generations of Russian people have devoted their lives to "bringing the country together." They were not only valiant military captains and soldiers, but also pioneers, colonists, explorers,

and—not least—political thinkers and statesmen. How can you squander this titanic labor without hesitation and without regret; is this not tantamount to betraying your own people's past, including the memory of the millions who defended the country, in the Patriotic War, not only as Russia, but as the Soviet Union?

The attempt to "recarve" the country, without taking account of the fact that one in four people lives outside his own national territory, could generate not merely a "war of laws" or even a cold war, but a series of ruinous armed conflicts for land and water, for the right to use your native language, and for human dignity. Surely the flashes of storm lightning in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, Moldova and the Baltic, and other corners of the country are enough.

In short, as has been said repeatedly before: The Union is impossible without Russia, but Russia without the Union would not be the same.

A good many other arguments are adduced on each side, with the aim of influencing minds and hearts, but the key arguments of the ideologists in both camps have been cited here; I mean the ideologists, because the question of whose side the people's masses are on has yet to be fully resolved.

People may ask: How come?—After all, the 17 March referendum demonstrated the clear preponderance of those who are in favor of preserving the Union. Three-fourths of the votes were cast "in favor," which provides a secure political basis for concluding a new Union treaty. There should be no doubt on that score.

There is no escaping the fact that one-fourth of the population said "no" in the referendum. In Moscow, Leningrad, and certain other major cities the majority for the "yes" vote was not large. This testifies to what was said above: The Russian national self-awareness is today not monolithic, it has undergone that "division against itself" of which the Gospel says:

"If a kingdom be divided against itself,
"That kingdom cannot stand;
"And if a house be divided against itself,
"That house cannot stand..."

Perhaps the dangers arising from "division against oneself" are exaggerated? After all, the branches that have sprung up as a result of that division (or splintering of the whole) share the same roots. It is a kind of political version of Siamese twins. They may differ in their views on this or that topic, they may squabble, but in the end they are forced to seek a consensus. There is no getting away from it: After all, the country is one, and the people are one.

I am afraid this is a mere reassurance with which incurable optimists soothe themselves; the hope that everything will turn out okay in the end and common sense will prevail could lead to severe disappointment.

There can hardly be any doubt that many of those who launch into diatribes against the center and in effect help bring about the disintegration of the Union nurture in their heart of hearts the hope that after a certain time they will be able to revive the Union under their own auspices—if not the whole of it, at least the greater part. Of course, no one admits to such intentions. You might think this would be a way to parry accusations of lacking patriotism, but how can anyone admit that they are prepared to leave the country's future to chance?

Maybe the "anticentrists'" strategy is inspired by historical analogy? While urging the conclusion of the Brest peace and proclaiming a course of self-determination for Russia's former national regions, Lenin held on to power for the Communists, and used that power to regain the majority of the territories that had broken away from the country. Later Stalin succeeded not only in recovering losses, but even in extending Moscow's influence to a zone of border states in Europe and Asia. Why should history not repeat itself?

History seldom repeats itself, however. The situation in the world toward the end of the 20th century is very different from what it was in the late twenties and early thirties. Then, the continent was preparing for another battle of powers to recarve territories and spheres of power. Now, except for its eastern part, it is reconciled and united to a degree that Europe has never seen before. Furthermore, something will spring up in the near future that is rather like those United States of Europe, which Lenin declared to be either reactionary or impossible, and he was right, as far as his own time was concerned. Circumstances have changed to such an extent that European integration on the basis of mutual benefit and democratic principles is becoming a reality.

The new distribution of forces and the international climate, which has come to prevail largely under the influence of our own new thinking, effectively rule out the use of the strong-arm tactics that were considered the norm in the past. Consequently if the Union disintegrates it will only be possible to reassemble it with the help of economic interest, the art of political maneuvering, and spiritual affinity.

Russian culture is one of the mainstays of world civilization. Access to it, and not merely passive access, but with the possibility of participating in its development and enriching it with their own contribution, has enabled our peoples to rise to world standards of scientific, technical, and esthetic consciousness. Along with national values, this was what the entire intelligentsia grew up on. You can understand how great the loss will be for those for whom Russia will become a foreign country. As for the economy, Russia, with its enormous intellectual and material resources, will, of course, regain its place among the countries that set the standards of scientific and technical progress. By that time, an entirely different configuration of alliances will have grown up, and it will scarcely be possible to return to the former structures.

That is the objective side of the matter. Such questions, however, are not necessarily decided in the light of all the circumstances, in the optimum way. It is a characteristic of nations, as it is of individuals, to succumb to emotional outbursts, otherwise world history would have seen neither great visions and exploits, nor boundless losses and tragedies.

It can be said confidently that each republic, each nation will decide the question of its own relationship with Russia, with the Union, in its own way—depending on its economic interest and spiritual makeup, and also, to a great extent, on the balance of gratitude and grievances recorded in its genetic code. After all, the peoples' relationships with Russia have developed, as it is fashionable to say nowadays, heterogeneously. Russia was beyond reproach in its dealings with some, and it is entitled to count on their eternal gratitude. Others have reason to complain. There is no escape from the past or from the present, and here a great deal is determined by national characteristics—magnanimity, the capacity to forgive, or, on the contrary, vengefulness, obstinacy, and the desire to settle scores without fail.

This topic requires a special study. I deemed it necessary to touch upon it, since the Russian people's choice will depend to a great extent on how the country's other peoples decide the question for themselves. When nationalists in certain republics are able to raise a wave of blind ill will toward those who were recently their brothers and are now called "occupying forces," this naturally angers the Russian person, and he says to himself: "Since that is their attitude to us, they do not value all we have done for them, let them go their own way and live as they see fit." That is putting it politely. But as you know, nothing is so quick to take on its extreme form as man's hostility to man, or a nation's to another nation. Sometimes a word of abuse is enough to cause mutual alienation, and then an accidental or deliberately provoked incident can suffice to turn that alienation into hatred.

Onto which side of the scales will the republics throw their weight? Nine of them have voted for the Union. The former autonomous republics have also come out clearly in favor of the Union. As for the six that are not prepared to sign the Union treaty, time must be allowed to do its work, and they will overcome their prejudices and their illusions. It should be assumed that Armenia and Georgia, having satisfied their need for independence and felt the burdens of isolation, will prefer to return to the Union. A consensus formula could very well be arrived at for Moldova. The case of the Baltic republics is more complex, but I believe that even for them a mutually acceptable form of participation in Union affairs cannot be ruled out.

That is only an assumption, but the other possibilities appear no more convincing. The disintegration of the Union will be inevitable only in the event that Russia itself, and primarily the Russian people, choose a different path.

Thus the bifurcation of the Russian national consciousness has certain objective causes, but that fact in no way changes the basic assessment of the positions of the political parties on either side. It is their duty, a matter of truly patriotic honor, to help the people to make the right choice at what could be the most crucial point in their 1,000 years of history.

The "Democratic Russia" analysts should think seriously about the fact that their calls to vote against the Union in the referendum were ignored even by many of those who vote in their favor in other circumstances. The people's consciousness prompted them to make the right decision.

Unfortunately, there is as yet no sign of any serious reinterpretation of "Democratic Russia's" position on this question. True, there have been formal statements in favor of preserving the Union. At the same time, however, attempts are made to rob it of even the minimal prerogatives without which there can be no Union state, and to turn it into an "international alliance like the EEC or the British Commonwealth" (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 7 May).

Preserving the Union as an integral sovereign state is today not a matter for individual social strata and parties, it is the cause of the whole people, and is even a matter for the whole world, in terms of its significance and consequences. To make this historic task subordinate to tactical calculations aimed at winning power is a fatal mistake, not to say a crime, which cannot be justified by any arguments or by citing even the loftiest goals.

France's F. Mitterrand, Germany's H. Kohl, Italy's G. Andreotti, India's R. Gandhi, and many other leading politicians in foreign countries are expressing concern for the preservation of our state's integrity, rightly seeing it as one of the bulwarks of the modern world and guarantors for the future. So how can Russian democracy turn its hand to the destruction of the Union, which will inevitably be followed by the loss of Russia's own identity and unpredictable international cataclysms?

There must be an end to "division against ourselves." Otherwise neither our country, nor our house can stand.

Democratic Conference Fails To Set Up Party

LD1305112991 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1000 GMT 13 May 91

[Text] A conference of leaders of democratic parties from the Russian Federation, Belorussia, republics of Central Asia, and Kazakhstan has ended in Dushanbe. The meeting sought to resolve the issue of creating an all-Union democratic party. But in the process of discussion this idea was not supported by the majority of the representatives of republican democratic parties.

As a result, the meeting adopted an Eastern model—the creation of a regional democratic congress under whose

flag all democratic currents of the republics of central Asia and Kazakhstan decided to unite. A statement by its participants says that the congress' objective is to consolidate forces for the construction in the region of genuinely democratic states through peaceful and strictly political means.

Ligachev Cautions Against Collapse of Communism

PM1305154991 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 91 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Ye. Ligachev as Pioneer of Perestroyka"]

[Text] The Don people received some curious information during meetings with Ye. Ligachev, former member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, who visited here as a writer and memoirist at the invitation of the literary club "Return."

"I was one of the first, maybe even the first, to come to the conclusion that it is necessary to repeal Article 6... I am in favor of the plurality of parties, if only because this has made the CPSU work," the guest said. However, he remarked that at the same time "if communism collapses, the working class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia will collapse, for communism reflects their interests most fully."

Yakovlev Interviewed on 'New Thinking'

LD1005203291 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1500 GMT 10 May 91

[Interview with senior presidential advisor Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev by program announcer Nikolay Shishlin; place and date not given; from the "International Panorama" program—recorded]

[Text] [Shishlin] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, first of all I would like to express my best wishes on the [Victory Day] holiday, and, even though it is a holiday, I would like to ask you a few questions. You are a former frontline soldier. You were in the marines. Great expectations were attached to spring 1945, of course. In your view, did the expectations of that cherished spring of 1945 come true?

[Yakovlev] You know, after the war...first of all, thank you for your good wishes. I regard them as addressed to all my comrades who fought on the front. As I was saying, the spring of 1945 was such a joyful time that it seemed to all of us at the time that all our expectations, hopes, and dreams had of course come true. For all the bitter suffering and pain, the main thing was that something truly historic had been achieved. It was a personal victory for each one of us—those who went through it and survived. And there was grief for those whom we left in the ground.

With time, of course, these romantic and sometimes idealistic expectations ran up against the very harsh reality of postwar devastatation and the realities that today, too, cause pain in all of us.

[Shishlin] Light and dark have gotten mixed up....

[Yakovlev] Yes, everything mixed up together. But now we all have to endure and suffer as a result, and redo things.

[Shishlin] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, the state of the world and Europe in 1945 was of course quite different from the state the world and Europe are in in 1991. In West Europe, of course, after all the upheavals, they seem to have reached a stage of more or less stable development. At the same time, Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, are all astir. What is your view of this? What sort of process is going on? What is the essence of this process? Are these the death-throes, as some say, or a rebirth?

[Yakovlev] It is an obvious fact that our country liberated part of Europe from fascism. No one can take that away from our country or our people or our Army. Afterward came the politics, and it seems to me that it had little to do with the feat of arms of the people and the army. It was a policy of hostility and confrontation, which built and shaped the maimed Europe of the postwar period—a Europe of confrontation and Cold War, of artificial regimes, of preparations for a new war: that terrible world from which we are only just beginning to extricate ourselves. It is difficult now to say whether these are death-throes, or a rebirth, or a period of reflection, or whether it means we have come up against some new impasse. I believe that the full outlines are only just taking shape, but it is obvious that the situation is considerably healthier and substantially more promising than before. We just have to realize that everything is being restored to its normal track. And that is how it should be. Every state is a state, an independent state, existing with its traditions and its past and future. That is really all there is to it.

[Shishlin] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, more and more in recent months one has seen assertions, not just abroad, but in our own press as well, that the new political thinking has had its day, and that at the present stage the new political thinking is already proving untenable. What is your view of such assertions?

[Yakovlev] I think that the actual processes taking place in the world not only do not reduce the significance of the new political approaches, but every day actually confirms them. Even the latest events in the Persian Gulf showed that for the first time since the war the world community found the strength to join forces and give a collective rebuff to aggression. The world has been talking of collective action and collective security for very many decades now.

However complicated the processes now taking place, they all show that the direction of travel has been completely reversed—away from confrontation to accords and cooperation. That is, endeavors are going in

a common-sense direction. I see that as a triumph for the new approaches, which must of course carry on developing. The new political thinking is not a static phenomenon, something thought up by someone today, involving two or three measures, and nothing more! It is a process of development.

Of course, when it first arose, such Augean stables had to be cleared out in the world—piles and mountains of weapons, missiles, warheads, confrontation, anger, hate, and so on! The situation is quite different now. And the tasks facing the new approaches in international politics are changing. And they have to be tackled. They are, if you like, more civilized, because we are moving toward a more civilized world. No, not only has it not died, not only has it not lost its significance, but perhaps it has even acquired a different complexion and fresh significance, and, if you like, fresh tasks.

[Shishlin] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, many thanks for the interview, and best wishes once again on Victory Day.

Pugo Addresses Conference on Drug Trafficking

LD1005223591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1706 GMT 10 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Neshumov]

[Excerpts] Oslo, 10 May—The all-European conference on "the problems of drugs in a changing Europe" has come to a close here today with a concluding declaration in which a plan to implement a series of international measures to fight against the drugs business has been adopted. [passage omitted]

The activities of Soviet law-enforcement bodies in the fight against drugs was a focal point for participants at the conference. Therefore, the report by B.K. Pugo, the head of the Soviet delegation and USSR minister for internal affairs, attracted a great deal of attention at the closing session.

The minister noted that the continent of Europe is becoming an increasingly attractive target for the activities of the international drugs mafia. He reported an increase in the amount of heroin entering Western Europe by means of the so-called "Balkan route," and he also spoke of the more active attempts by those involved in the drugs business to open up the "eastern front" using the territory of the USSR for their smuggling.

B.K. Pugo, in evaluating the situation in the USSR, noted the overall increase in the abuse of drugs and psychotropic substances, the expanded geographical area covered by this phenomenon and the appearance of organized crime in the area of the illegal trade in drugs and the increase of illegal acts relating both to their import and export. "The drugs business is turning into one of the branches of the shadow economy, there is the hidden threat of its destabilizing effect on the country's national economy and the situation is becoming more conducive to criminal activity," the minister emphasized.

B.K. Pugo expressed great interest in efficient international actions to be taken against the drugs mafia. He noted that the USSR has signed intergovernmental agreements on cooperation in this sphere with five European states. "The conference has afforded an opportunity for exchanging work experience, ideas and information with the aim of working out a joint strategy and joint tactics for countries in the European region in the battle against drugs," he said. "The peoples of Europe are building a new home and they want it to be bright, beautiful and comfortable. It is our duty to do everything to ensure that it is a fortress which is unassailable to the 'white death' and to those who bring it."

Soyuz Aims Tantamount to 'Coup d'Etat'

PM1305142391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 May 91 Union Edition p 3

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences A. Kiva: "'Union' of Obsessives. Political Portrait of a Deputies Group Aspiring to a Serious Social Role"]

[Text] The recent Second Congress of the "Soyuz" ["Union"] Deputies Group, which proclaimed itself an all-union association of people's deputies and voters, found itself in the center of Soviet and world public attention. To speak plainly, implementation of what the "Soyuz" faction proposed would in fact signify a coup d'etat.

What did the congress participants demand, although there was not unanimity on all issues among their ranks? The introduction of a state of emergency throughout the country's territory. A ban on rallies and strikes. Suspension of the activity of all political parties, the CPSU included; dissolution of the most radical of them. The establishment of controls on the mass media. Renunciation of the new Union treaty. As Yu. Blokhin, one of the top "Soyuz" leaders and the deliverer of the main report, declared, "we do not want the draft new Union treaty." There were demands for the president's resignation and elimination of the institution of the presidency.

Admittedly, it was asserted that the state of emergency was supposed to last just six months. You have to be a real political dilettante not to realize that a state of emergency has its own logic and this itself dictates the duration. What is the purpose of this extreme measure? Apparently it is to successfully carry out the spring sowing campaign, resolve the food problem, and relieve the internal tension. All this sounds naive. A state of emergency only exacerbates the problems in society.

What does all this mean?—I ask myself. Are we faced with an "infantile disorder" of unprofessional politicians who have lost their heads in a complex situation, or with something more complex and dangerous? One possible answer is: "Typical loudmouthed bragging. A total loss

of sense of reality. Just imagine, Blokhin declared that 'if the president is unable to implement the program we propose, "Soyuz" is prepared to assume full responsibility for implementing every point.' Does he know what he is saying? It is practically impossible to implement this program except by means of a harsh military dictatorship. And any attempt to establish a dictatorship would evoke such massive and fierce resistance that God alone knows how all this would end. It is a dangerous adventure camouflaged by concern for the good of the state. Anyhow, whom does 'Soyuz' represent? Do Blokhin, Alksnis, Petrushenko, Kogan, and the rest enjoy prestige and trust among society? Certainly not! The 'Soyuz' leaders have nothing but their ambitions. It is simply ridiculous for them to offer themselves in place of Gorbachev and his team. And also in place of the Politburo of the CPSU as the ruling party."

Tell me, has any analyst not racked his brains about the "Soyuz" phenomenon? On the one hand, in "Soyuz" we seem to be dealing with politicians who have no roots actually in the republics. On the other hand, everyone remembers perfectly how last fall the president yielded to pressure from the "Soyuz" group by making substantial personnel changes. It is said that "Soyuz" is backed by the military-industrial complex. At any rate, the "Soyuz" group displays exceptional activeness and tries to exert extremely strong pressure on the government.

To be frank, the Second "Soyuz" Congress left me with a grim impression. I was literally astonished by the incompetence of many speakers. By their emotion and nostalgia for the times of Stalin and Brezhnev and for harsh measures, by their total failure to understand the situation, by their illusory notions about ways for the country to emerge from the impasse. People who are incapable of constructive work in the soviets are trying to compensate for this by bringing rabble-rousing off the streets and into the hall of sessions.

Who backs "Soyuz"?—I ask myself yet another question. The simplest answer here would be: "No serious force backs them. At any rate for the moment. For they have turned against themselves Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, and the other republics, which all, without exception, advocate national sovereignty. But all this is fragile. I think that what plays the decisive role here is the ability to bluff, to make themselves out to be a more serious force than they actually are and to shout loudly at every crossroads: "Help! The motherland is facing destruction. Rally around us, we know how to save it and extricate the country from the crisis."

I subscribe to a somewhat different view of "Soyuz." If an organization emerges, gains strength, and continues to develop, then there is a social need for it. That is the first point. Second, "Soyuz" certainly has a sociopolitical base and it should be represented in the soviets at all levels. "Soyuz" has reached a formal decision: It is going to be in opposition to both the government and the democrats.

To understand "Soyuz's" place in society, however, we must answer two fundamentally important questions. First, what do "Soyuz" and its program for "saving the country" represent, if you view all this in a broad historical and sociological context? Second, who are the forces that call the political shots in this movement?

In my view, the "Soyuz" phenomenon is an oversensitive reaction by certain political forces and a section of the country's population to sharp and sometimes dramatic social changes. To be more precise, to the fading into the past of the imperial Union whose price was the ruin of the country and impoverishment of the people; to the change in the country's position in the world.

This is a truly agonizing process, and not all of us are prepared to accept it as objectively inevitable and historically foreordained. Certain hotheads are ready to seek the "enemies" who are to blame for undermining the empire and to indict perestroyka and its leaders, the new thinking, and even pan-human values for everything. It is this that is the source of the restoration impulses: Save the empire at all costs!

Other deep-seated changes in society also facilitated the emergence of "Soyuz" on the political scene. The most important of them is, of course, the people's rejection of the brutal, inhumane system of totalitarianism camouflaging itself as socialism and worker and peasant power. This process is accompanied by a rejection of many anti-values (the class approach, the cult of violence, poverty, and sacrifice, the principles of crude leveling, equally crude collectivism, militant atheism, and so forth). And this is an extremely painful process. Here too there are intentions for a restoration: to save the anti-people social system with the help of "Soyuz."

"Soyuz" has begun to attract both the "neo-Slavophils"—supporters of a great-power approach—and supporters of Stalin's communofascism. Having come together in the quest for a unifying idea for the new state, the national-patriots and other supporters of a "united and indivisible" Union began to understand: The former unifying idea has outlived its usefulness and has been severely discredited. They decided not to bandy cunning sophistries, but to return to something that had already been used: "The Orthodox Church. Autocracy. Popular spirit." While changing certain components, of course. And here is the paradox! Those for whom the "state takes precedence over everything" but who hate Marxist socialism and those for whom the socialist choice and the communist future take precedence over everything have no problem in finding common ground and sometimes act in concert.

The natural reaction of people who have found themselves in a difficult or even calamitous situation with the start of the crisis of the unitary state has also been displayed in the activity of "Soyuz." Both the central authorities, on the one hand, and the democrats, on the other, must assume at least part of the blame for the fact that the aggressive wing has begun to gain strength in

"Soyuz's" activity. We must ensure a timely solution of pressing problems of interethnic relations and be more considerate toward our fellows who find themselves (usually involuntarily) outside their age-old homeland. I think that then the Leningrad TV reporter A. Nevzorov would seek his subjects in doorways, on "skid row," instead of in big-time politics.

As for the answer to the second question, amorphous though "Soyuz" is, I would single out the following forces in it. There are the imperial-militarist circles connected with the military-industrial complex, the conservative section of the party apparatus, and the national-patriots. There are also those who have proved bankrupt during the period of perestroyka and have a "grievance" against it and those who have suffered defeat in their own republics and are thirsting for revenge. I am afraid that the idea of revenge is obstructing many people's sight and is depriving them of the ability to take a sober view of things.

It would be an oversimplification not to see the following. First, even among those who feel nostalgia for the past and are incapable of understanding that totalitarian-imperial structures are doomed, there are many extremely honest people who are sincerely concerned about the fate of the country. And, second, "Soyuz" is a more complex phenomenon that it may appear at first glance. If the reformers and democrats display passiveness, many of our citizens whose perception of reality is perfectly normal may end up as direct participants in "Soyuz." This may go for those who are deeply concerned at the fate of the state and are aware of the danger of its chaotic disintegration. Those who are victims of discrimination on ethnic grounds, who have lost their jobs or property, and so forth. Not to mention the victims of the policy smacking of genocide on the part of the erstwhile "defenders of human rights" who have come to power. Incidentally, the former "fighters against totalitarianism" in certain republics have created intolerable conditions for officers' families, who have never exactly been spoiled with a normal everyday life. And this to is giving rise to natural protests, which are exploited by "Soyuz."

"Soyuz" impresses those who are terribly tired of our adversities and disorder, hate the "shadow economy operators," and are afraid of rising crime but are confused and fail to realize that all these are the product not of perestroyka, but of the Stalin-Brezhnev era. There is only one way out: to march forward, no matter how difficult this may be. To sign the new Union treaty as swiftly as possible. To switch more rapidly to new economic relations, to interest people in the results of their labor, to emancipate their initiative, to more boldly transfer state property, nobody's property, into the possession of the working people, and to eliminate the bureaucratic structures that are hostile to anything new. But many "Soyuz" figures seek a solution to our extremely complex problems only in the past.

What constitute the strong suits of "Soyuz"? The objective difficulties of our society's transition from one quality to another. The errors of presidential power, on the one hand, and the democrats, on the other. In answer to the well known questions of Russian history "Who is to blame?" and "What is to be done?" "Soyuz" can point the finger at Gorbachev and Yeltsin and their supporters and propose "imposing order" by introducing a state of emergency as the prologue to establishing a dictatorship.

What are the weaknesses of "Soyuz"? I think they lie above all in the lack of leaders and the lack of a positive program. By leadership I mean the scale of leaders' personality and their level of education, competence, and general and political culture. "Soyuz's" leaders and active members often deliver speeches and eagerly grant interviews, and we have an approximate impression of them. Who does not remember the speeches of N. Petrushenko and Ye. Kogan? A. Chekhoyev recently revealed his program in the mass media. And how often L. Sukhov, another active figure in "Soyuz," speaks out!

If I were asked what is striking about the positions of "Soyuz" figures, I would say: neo-Bolshevism. The gamble on simple and speedy solutions to extremely complex and vital problems. The inability to see things as a whole, in their development and prospects. And also the reliance on political will, force, and edicts. Along with the disregard of economic laws and an extremely approximate notion of the laws of social progress.

Viktor Alksnis certainly stands out among the "Soyuz" leaders. Many people find him open, sincere, and bold. But not everybody does. "The more I look at Alksnis," a writer friend says, "the less I trust him. He is constantly playing up to his audience. At one moment he makes a loud but unsubstantiated accusation against somebody. At the next he significantly omits to mention something. At the next he hints at some nonexistent conspiracy."

I do not know whether this is true. The fact that Alksnis is trying to create a certain "image" for himself is no problem. That is standard practice in the West. A contender for the role of major politician presents himself to the public or "is presented," and you take a look at him and make up your mind. If you want to be deceived, that is your business.

To be frank, I am more interested in Alksnis not as a politician but as the author of a well known program for extricating the country from the impasse. Especially because this program may become and in part is already becoming the "Soyuz" action program. As someone who for many years studied concepts of social progress, I have the impression that Alksnis is constructing his concept on the fly and scarcely regards it as completed. But I can judge only what currently exists.

I will briefly remind you. Alksnis is proposing to erase all our perestroyka with its new political and democratic institutions, to establish a dictatorship in the shape of a Public Salvation Committee (admittedly not as a result of a direct military coup but with the approval of the

Congress of People's Deputies), to suppress all political activity, and to begin an accelerated transition to the market. Over an extremely short historical time it is planned to create a viable economy, to fundamentally transform the social-class structure, and then to embark on creating democratic institutions. Apparently the way to developed democracy is via developed socioeconomic relations, not the other way round. Yes, and it is also proposed to isolate the country from the West for this transitional period. And the interests of the Army and the maintenance of superpower status remain priorities, of course.

Where do Alksnis' ideas originate? He is a military engineer and has scarcely been able to make a serious study of questions of political science and sociology, still less to do so on a global scale. I think there are two sources here. One. The discussion in our press about the need for a strong authoritarian power in the process of the transition from totalitarianism to democracy. But what did this discussion, in which I too was involved, say? First, that authoritarian power is by no means dictatorship, but merely strong power. Its center of gravity may even be in the republics as subjects of the federation. Which is apparently indeed what is happening. One after another the republics are establishing presidential power and vesting it with wide powers. Second, authoritarian power is based on the law, on the relevant provisions of the constitution, and on the new democratic institutions (rather than in spite of those institutions) which are succeeding totalitarianism, but not for the sake of restoring it. Third, the very concept of "authoritarian" is cognate not only with "power" but also with "authority" and "prestige." Usually authoritarian power is linked with the personality of a specific fairly major and authoritative politician.

Fourth, the sociopsychological moment is important. Authoritarian power is not foisted on society suddenly on somebody's whim. It grows out of reality itself, with the masses' approval and via representative institutions of power.

All this is not invented, not simply conjured up out of thin air, but is based on the realities of our transitional period. Without a strong power it is simply impossible to end the antipeople system and create a modern democratic state. You cannot even implement measures which are clearly unpopular among the people (but of course, not as unpopular as the new prices introduced by the Pavlov government) but without which we will never arrive at civilized forms of economic activity.

Another point. Our society still tends to personify power. That is the way our political culture is. I am convinced that the idea of the presidency in the Russian Federation emerged "to suit Yeltsin." Had Polozkov been in Yeltsin's place, the democrats would have fought to the death against the "usurpation of power," just as they fought against Gorbachev's presidency without considering the future. Incidentally, I think the left radicals ought to be ashamed of some of their hasty judgments.

Yes, authoritarian power is not a fiction, not an illusion. It is a reality. But what does this have to do with people who are putting themselves forward for the role of Bonapartes? Does "Soyuz" have even one leader recognized among the people? It has no leader at all. There is a plethora of cochairmen.

Many advocates of an "iron hand" have fallen victim to common impressions of the model of development employed by countries like Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Chile, and others. Alas, both the Asian and Chilean models are absolutely unacceptable to us. For many reasons. Primarily because the "tigers" or "dragons" develop naturally. From the lowest phase to the highest. Each new rung is for them another victory on the long road to a mature society. That is how this is perceived by society, which can clearly see the fruits of progress. That is how this is established in the public mind. People are proud of what they have achieved, and the undeveloped forms of democracy there do not prompt social discomfort. There is a time for everything.

But we are developing according to an upside-down plan. We are not going from the lowest phase to the highest, but are carrying out a kind of somersault: a leap simultaneously into the past and the future. Into the past, because before October we had not only developed entrepreneurship and market relations but also democratic rights and freedoms won by several generations of Russian people—a multiparty system, freedom of the press, the right to strike and hold rallies and demonstrations, and so forth. Essentially we are now winning back from totalitarianism that which the people once gained, but which was later taken away. And all this is registered in the public mind. All this is perceived as a national tragedy. The country was making progress, then it took the wrong road and found itself in a historical impasse. This is indeed a tragedy.

We have come to the brink of the abyss not because of a surplus of democracy, but because of the total absence of it. Because of total violence. And now in the seventh year of the fight against totalitarianism "Soyuz" is proposing that "overweening democracy" be curbed and a new round of violence begun. They make no secret of the fact that there will be jails and bloodletting. But for the sake of what? Here it is clear at a glance that some are thinking about saving—albeit by worthless means—the homeland; others are thinking about saving the rotten totalitarian system; yet other are thinking about saving their jobs; others are thinking about regaining what they have lost, and so forth. I am sure that these motives will not persuade many of our citizens.

There is another point. "Soyuz" is wrong about the health-giving role of violence. Stalin's dictatorship was based not only on violence and terror, but also on belief. On many people's fanatical belief in the advantages of our system. In the omnipotence of the Marxist doctrine. In the reality of our historical mission. And also on the fanatical dedication of the party, which "never errs." You know what is left of all this. And anyone who, taking

refuge in patriotism and the interests of "saving the homeland," tries to resort to total violence in these conditions must fully realize that he will encounter total resistance, both direct and covert, which will ultimately lead to total disintegration. The curse of history will fall on such "patriots."

Alksnis' idea about our progress to the market by smashing the existing democratic institutions of power by establishing a dictatorship in the country in the shape of a public (or national) salvation committee either should not be taken seriously because it plays an auxiliary role and performs certain tasks set by its author (possibly including that of generating "publicity") or else is utopian and reactionary. In any event the only attention it deserves is purely academic. Permit me to doubt whether its implementation, even hypothetical implementation, is possible without taking into account the interests of at least part of the old ruling class, including the conservative partycrats. Is that not clear? Or is there something else in mind? Moreover, Alksnis must realize that if a dictatorship in any form or under any name were established in our country, the entire civilized world would shun it like the plague. The country would find itself in the deepest of isolation and would go downhill with catastrophic speed.

It can be hoped that, as our renewed state is formed and strengthens, many of the problems which "Soyuz" is now fighting to solve will automatically vanish. Many others will lose their urgency. We need only survive this extremely complex transitional period, not lose our sense of realism and responsibility for the fate of our peoples, and not take the path of adventurism.

"Soyuz" has no positive program and, I am convinced, can have no such program so long as its leaders look to the past rather than the future.

Figures for Newspaper Sales Reported

PM0705102191 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 5 May 91 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "For Your Information"]

[Text] As previously announced, Soyuzpechat [Main Administration for the Distribution of Printed Matter] has issued figures for newspaper print runs for the second quarter of 1991 as follows (in thousands of copies):

Title	1 January	1 April	Percent
ARGUMENTY I FAKTY	23822	24315	102.1
GLASNOST	236	242	102.5
IZVESTIYA	3876	3960	102.2
KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA	17215	17821	103.5
LITERATURNAYA GAZETA	1113	1089	97.8
MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI (in Russian)	1297	1331	102.6
PRAVDA	2202	2207	100.2
RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA	636	665	104.6
SELSKAYA ZHIZN	3399	3610	106.2
SOVETSKAYA KULTURA	236	235	99.6
SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA	1317	1390	105.5
ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA	—	92	—
TRUD	18255	18860	103.3
EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN	506	555	109.7
UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA	475	477	100.4

In the month of April subscribers to SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA increased by an additional 20,800.

Economic

Cabinet Discusses Market Transition

LD1305223291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1540 GMT 13 May 91

[By TASS observer Boris Grishchenko]

[Text] Moscow 13 May (TASS)—The session of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers which took place at the beginning of May, at which the concept of the forecast for the development of the country's economy in 1992 was discussed, put an end to the debates on the time schedules and ways of making the transition to the market. The conclusions drawn may be considered the ultimate answers to the three main questions that have long worried people.

First, 1992 should become a period of acceleration of the transition to the new economic relations. One should not allow any more slowing down. Otherwise the economy will completely collapse with unpredictable consequences. Second, one is faced with resolutely rejecting any kind of half steps or half measures, which, as practice has shown, will only aggravate the crisis. Third, the building of the market should draw support from a definite programme of involvement of foreign investment in the Soviet economy.

The discussion of the concept of the forecast for the development of the economy has become the reason for a decisive "elucidation of relations". The draft document was sent to be radically revised, since even a superficial acquaintance with the forecast itself and the appendices to it convinces one of the following: The cabinet has received another program of nothing but state orders, leaving the market only one possibility—to take shape on a "left-over principle".

A key element in the discussion was the issue of who should be the main character in creating the market: the union, the republics and the regions, the departments, or the enterprises. An unambiguous answer has been given to this fundamental question—the producers themselves of the products, the enterprises, should become the masters of the economic space being created. And in order to start the advance toward the target without constantly looking back, the conditions of work in 1992 should be shaped as market ones. "A stake is being made on the strong ones," those who are in fact capable of insuring a real return on the foreign and home markets in the near future. It is precisely these enterprises that should become the levers, through the application of which the country will be able to get itself out of any kind of crisis quagmire. And everything that does not work, as the prime minister put it, should simply be removed.

Yet another priority in the immediate future should be the internal convertibility of the ruble.

It was also decided at the session that the forecast for the development of the economy for the coming year should be based on the joint organizational work of the center and the republics.

Kuzbass Coal Mines Returning to Normal

LD1305124691 Moscow TASS in English 1147 GMT 13 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Grigoriy Shalakin]

[Text] Kemerovo May 13 TASS—The personnel of 100 coal mines of Kuzbass gradually catch up with the normal work pace following an almost two-months-long strike. On Sunday they produced tens of thousands of tonnes of coal to offset the shortfall for March and April.

Today coal production rate remains the same and, experts believe, is expected to increase on Tuesday.

Only one mine in the city of Kiselevsk is at a standstill in Kuzbass because of internal problems. These days the personnel of the mine tackled the possibility of holding a referendum on a mine director candidacy.

Upon getting consent to the holding of a referendum, the Taibinskaya mine personnel in Kiselevsk will also resume coal production on Tuesday.

Miners Strike Results in R4 Billion in Losses

LD1305151191 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1200 GMT 13 May 91

[Text] The continuing strike of coal miners which swept the main coal mining regions of the Soviet Union has been very destructive on the country's national economy. According to the Soviet State Statistics Committee, the total losses for March-May with account to other industries has constituted four billion rubles [R].

Experts believe that despite all the measures being taken, the miners' position will go worsening, and this may provoke another wave of strikes. And the Union Government also fears this: Foreign news agencies carry reports quoting the interview that Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov gave to the British FINANCIAL TIMES where the talks about the coming decree by the Soviet president banning strikes.

Ligachev Views Aftermath of Mine Strikes

PM1305144191 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 12 May 91 First Edition p 2

[N. Belan report: "Coal Face in Alarm. Donetsk Miners Invite USSR People's Deputy Ye.K. Ligachev"]

[Excerpts] The deeper we descended into the mine, walking to the face through a twilight of underground workings, the hotter the air became and the harder it was to breathe because of the increased humidity.

"What if you had been taken to Section Five!" one of the miners we encountered on the way grinned good-naturedly. We had many such meetings and brief conversations with miners. "The temperature there is close to 40 degrees, and water is constantly dripping on your head," he continued. "That's where you'll feel what our coal costs."

But Boris Korneyevich Litvinenko, director of the "Selidovugol" Association's "Kurakhovskaya" Mine, had evidently been understanding about his guest's age—he is 70, after all. He took something else into account too: Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev, who had come to them, has repeatedly been down mines and knows all the "delights" of a miner's work. Although Ligachev had insisted that no concessions be made for him, and not only at this mine: He had been traveling around Donetsk Oblast for four days, every day was packed full with meetings, and when the moderator at one meeting, with the working people of the "Komsomolets Donbassa" Mine, had urged his comrades to be more delicate in their questions, Yegor Kuzmich had protested: "There is no need to smooth sharp corners—I do not want such 'pity.'"

Yes, the air temperature in Section Five was far higher than in the section where Ligachev met with miners, but you cannot call another temperature—that of blazing emotions—and the acuteness of the discussion low or even middling. The "Kurakhovskaya" Mine is not only the oldest in the association, its half-century having been celebrated last year, but also the most difficult in terms of mine workings and working conditions. And life recently has also been generous in supplying additional difficulties. [passage omitted]

Members of the "Return" literary club, the majority of whom are miners, had invited USSR People's Deputy Ligachev to Donetsk. True, the republic youth newspaper at once put the club under oblast party committee jurisdiction—some people really do never fail to see a

Communist Party "hand" in every association of working people. I talked with club chairman A. Rubinshteyn, timberman at the Abakumov Mine. "The club came into being after our first strikes in the summer of 1989," he said. "Why? We took to the street not only because of low wages and empty counters—spiritual hunger also brought many people. Not everyone notices this reason or takes it into account, and that's a mistake." At the time I did not understand my interlocutor, but I remembered his words when I listened to the miners at the face.

Here are just brief excerpts from a dictaphone recording that lasts more than one hour: [passage omitted]

M. Yudin, mine foreman: I worked in Chernobyl and made 57 trips to the station. Compassion and civic duty took us there. But now it is as though a new Chernobyl has passed over the earth—no faith, no ideals, and commercial consideration the chief thing. I am in favor of perestroyka, and I want to lead a better life, but a full, spiritual life.

The miners no longer sought those to blame for the economic and spiritual crisis and for the outbursts of interethnic passions in the stagnation times—so many years have passed since then. They criticized the president, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the country's government and leveled complaints at the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. Ligachev too was criticized—he did not absolve himself of responsibility. But this was not a skirmish but a joint meditation of people who understand each other and who are concerned at the fate of the motherland and the people.

Ligachev imposed his views on no one. The strike? He frankly said that this was no way to achieve an end, although he considers the miners' economic demands just. But a strike is a destructive process, and the "Selidovugol" Association's losses because of it have amounted to 240,000 tonnes. And coal extraction fell by 4.3 million tonnes in the oblast as a whole during the first quarter alone, with the result that metallurgists failed to produce 850,000 tonnes of steel, rolled metal, and pipes. Yes, it is a rotten method, the miners agreed, and they asked: But what are we to do if they refuse to listen to us?

In just the same way the guest tried to convince people that the working class must do everything to ensure that ownership remains public and to maintain the Union and the soviets to the end—to the prop, as they say in the mines. Instead, people want to impose governors, mayors, and prefects. He shared his cherished desire: Since the strike originated in a mining region, the call for highly productive work in the name of saving the motherland must also resound from there. And again the miners agreed.

"It turned out a frank and honest discussion," G. Terekhov, breakage face worker, opined. He is 52, and it is time he retired, but he is not doing so—it is hard to live on a pension now.

"Do leaders of such rank come to you frequently, albeit even former leaders?" I asked him.

"This is the first time. If others had remembered us, then we would have found a common language and understood each other."

Returning to Moscow in the aircraft, I asked Yegor Kuzmich to share his impressions—what was the outcome of the USSR people's deputy's trip?

"Above all, I felt once again the excited state in which society finds itself," he said. "People are agonizingly seeking the answer to the question of how the country has ended up in such a profound slump and disorder and how to extricate itself from it. I heard a mass of demands to the center, above all for definite, decisive actions, within the framework of the constitution, within the framework of the laws. People yearn for a strong democratic power. A certain confusion and depression is apparent, particularly in connection with the price increase. People simply do not know how they are to live and provide their families with the living wage that they had in the recent past. They are particularly concerned about their children. The existing compensation is not taken seriously, because it is infinitesimally small compared with the galloping prices of children's goods and foodstuffs.

"I also encountered a mass of local questions, which can and must be resolved. Miners' settlements, for example, are old and drowning in mud, municipal services go out of commission, and communications fail. I am convinced that it is necessary to allocate funds and set about modernizing and reconstructing them with the same energy as we carry out industrial construction. This alone will do a lot to boost people's strength and optimism."

[Belan] Were the miners' political demands introduced from outside, or did they stem from the essence of economic difficulties?

[Ligachev] In my opinion, they emerged because of the serious mistakes made by the leadership, above all at the center but also in the provinces. It is the continuous making of laws with no attempt to enforce them that has resulted in the serious impairment of order, the disorganization of production, speculation, and crime. People have begun feeling uneasy and they live in alarm. Seeing the inactivity and indecisiveness of the authorities, which is resulting in tremendous suffering and losses, in the end people think: Is this leadership capable of governing? This is the first point.

Second: Antisocialist forces speculate on all this, acting like parasites and making skillful use of mistakes by the center and local organizations in order to achieve power. This must also be borne in mind.

[Belan] I have been told that when a secret ballot was held in miners' collectives the majority of people came

out against strikes. In fact, however, they acted differently and supported the instigators, who were few in number. How is this to be explained?

[Ligachev] I believe that this is because the comrades are under pressure from constant moral terror. I have repeatedly been told of examples where so-called activists have come from striking mines to working mines and literally blasted these people, reviled them, mocked them, and demanded "solidarity." This is imaginary solidarity which leads not to creation but to destruction. But it has achieved its purpose.

In addition, many people do not believe that the local authorities and law-enforcement organs can protect them, and so they were forced silently to join the strike movement against their will, by way of self-preservation. I believe that both things played a part here. Of course, there were hopes that it would be possible to resolve vital questions with the help of a strike, although hardly anyone believed in the realization of political demands.

[Belan] Now that miners have begun work, the time has come to interpret what happened and for political, organizational actions to prevent a repeat wave of strikes. What do you think about this?

[Ligachev] First of all, I wish to say that the center, the government, and the president have been slow to tackle the economic problems. They are all complex, certainly, but the complaints are absolutely justified. Even the solutions which we have adopted are no compensation for the miners' labor It would be a very important factor in strengthening central and local power and also in enhancing the party's prestige if we could get this done without delay and not give the winner's laurels for resolving the economic problems to demagogues, anti-communists, nationalists, and separatists. This is the first lesson.

Second, the decisions which have been adopted must be implemented. This is important not for Gorbachev and Pavlov personally; it is important for the country, the soviets, the party, and for central and local organs. Either we strengthen prestige and, on this basis, find it easier to work, or we undermine it once and for all. I felt that the miners are now trying to make sense of their way of life. There is disappointment: Why, they say, did we undertake the strike? At least, I did not notice any enthusiasm either among those on strike or among those helping them. People realize that problems must be resolved on the basis of increasing production, because otherwise there will be no bonuses, and increased wages are closely linked with coal extraction, and more of it.

But here's something that disconcerted me. In the meetings people rightly criticized the center and local authorities. But, as for understanding their own role in surmounting the crisis situation and making a self-critical assessment of their involvement in strikes—there was none of this. I am far from thinking of blaming the working people, but I do want every citizen to reflect on his own position. Without this it will be a complex matter to resolve anything. I will say this: A major initiative is needed, moreover in teams, shops, mines, construction sites, and enterprises—they have been on strike and lost a great deal, and now they must make good and organize themselves for work. Naturally it is necessary to help people, provide material resources, etc. And local soviets and party committees must work in this area.

[Belan] If I have understood you correctly, this trip has been very useful to you?

[Ligachev] Extremely useful. I am returning filled with confidence that we are still capable of rectifying matters and that people are ready for this work. I have felt not only the acuteness of the whole situation but also the possibility of surmounting it.

Military

Navy Chief on Manpower, Service Reforms

PM1405091591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 May 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Fleet Admiral V. Chernavin, commander in chief of the Navy and USSR People's Deputy, by V. Izgarshev under the "Our Commentary" rubric; place and date not given; first two paragraphs are an introduction: "Two Years Will Now Be the Term of Service for Naval Seamen"]

[Text] As readers are already aware, the USSR Supreme Soviet has made important changes to the law "On Universal Military Service." All our young men drafted to the Armed Forces will now have to serve two years.

We asked Fleet Admiral V. Chernavin, commander in chief of the Navy and USSR People's Deputy, to comment on this recent decision by the country's supreme organ of power.

[Chernavin] The problem of the three-year term of naval service has existed for a long time—many years. Some parents, and this is common knowledge, annually lay siege to military commissariats in an attempt to arrange a two-year term of service on dry land for their offspring. Admittedly, there have been many examples of young men themselves asking to go to sea, contrary to their parents' arguments. But, I repeat, the problem has existed, and now it has ended.

[Izgarshev] Did the proposal to reduce the term of service come from the Navy?

[Chernavin] No. But when the proposal came up in the course of a discussion on all aspects of the military reform that is beginning, we agreed to it. Although, I admit, it will harm the Navy to a certain extent.

[Izgarshev] In what way?

[Chernavin] The Navy has the most complex combat equipment. Whatever you take—be it missiles, aircraft,

communications, navigation equipment, sonar—everything is complex. Judge for yourself: Land-based missiles are not "carried" and do not have to "surface." Or if they are "carried," they can halt at a spot that is precisely "attached" to the local area. And communications on land are easier than at sea. So it is far harder for us to train specialists. And, as a rule, it takes us a year to train them up. And then sailors and petty officers apply and perfect their knowledge and skills on board ship for two years.

[Izgarshev] Now they will have just a single year of practice at sea, if I can put it that way?

[Chernavin] A single year. We support the Supreme Soviet decision. It is correct, it removes many issues, and places all draftees on an equal footing. At the same time, the transition to a two-year term of service will create a lot of additional tasks for us.

[Izgarshev] Could you perhaps summarize them, if possible, Vladimir Nikolayevich?

[Chernavin] Well, first, we will need to additionally draft a certain contingent of personnel. And a sizeable contingent at that. Second, we will need to expand the network of training subunits. And, consequently, this will mean an increase of more than 100 in the number of teachers and training officers. It will mean new barracks and camp accommodation. We will need additional funds, but where will they come from? The military budget is already at the limit, there is little likelihood of getting additional funds. It may seem to some people that it is worth cutting defense spending—then we will straightaway have good clothes and shoes and be able to eat our fill. That is an illusion! Even if the entire Defense Ministry budget were taken away it would change nothing if we do not work productively. But that is another story...

[Izgarshev] What can you say to those sailors and petty officers who have already served their two years? Should they start packing?

[Chernavin] I think it is too early to ask that. The fact is that it will take us a year to move to the two-year term of service. We will not be able to cope any faster than that. So some people may have to serve two years, some people two and a half, and some even a full three years. We will have to envisage everything so as not to make fools of ourselves. We have had plenty of good ideas and solutions whose implementation has had the opposite result. The decision on students' service was one such, in my view.

[Izgarshev] One more question, Comrade Commander in Chief. The Supreme Soviet has adopted a resolution on staging an experiment in voluntary staffing, allowing servicemen on active military service to be hired as sailors and petty officers under contract. How do you view that decision?

[Chernavin] Very positively. We are staging this experiment in all four of our fleets. Contract service will last for at least three years.

[Izgarshev] On what terms?

[Chernavin] Many terms and privileges will be stipulated. And pay will increase sharply. I do not want to give the monthly pay rates at this juncture. So far there are no final figures, but I can say that pay will be several times higher than it is for draftee sailors and petty officers. And, incidentally, their pay will be considerably increased in the very near future. So the "volunteers" will be paid several times more compared with the new rates.

As you can see, real changes are under way in our Navy. I am confident that they will all have a favorable impact on naval seamen's service.

Baltic Republics

Baltic Finance Ministers Discuss Policies

LD1305213891 Riga Radio Riga International in English 2030 GMT 13 May 91

[Text] A meeting of the Baltic republics' finance ministers was held in the capital of Lithuania, Vilnius. This meeting was aimed to work out a joint financial policy among three Baltic republics with a regard to the USSR.

This meeting was organized (?viewing) the coming session of the USSR Council of Ministers, where an economic program is planned to be discussed directed to lead the country out of the economic crisis.

In case the program is adopted in the present edition, then Latvia will carry out financial transactions with the USSR in free convertible currency in the future, transferring rubles according to the market prices, and it will mean the recognition of an independent state de facto.

In case the USSR continues to deliver raw materials according to the presently existing prices in rubles, Latvia will continue the negotiations with the center on the amount of the deductions to the state budget.

Estonian-Latvian Border Talks Considered

LD1205221391 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1730 GMT 11 May 91

[Text] BALTIJA/LETA reports that in Tallinn on 10 May there was a gathering of a working group formed by the government to carry out preliminary work for talks on the restoration of the border between the republics of Estonia and Latvia. (Uno Helme), leader of the group, and consultant to the state and border protection department at the Estonian State Chancellery, believes that no special difficulties will arise in talks with the Republic of Latvia, because both sides have worked on this question for almost a year. The bases used for defining the state border are historical and scientific acts ratified by both sides up to 1940. The fact that the present border differs slightly from the earlier one is due to land use under the authority of local bodies of power. Such differences have been ascertained in 18 places.

Latvian, Estonian Leaders on Need for Independence

LD1205193691 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1730 GMT 12 May 91

[Text] Edgar Savisaar and Ivars Godmanis, prime ministers of Estonia and Latvia, have declared that independence is vitally necessary to the Baltic states for the implementation of economic reforms. They were speaking at a conference in the state of Vermont on economic problems in the Baltics. Edgar Savisaar also said that Estonia (?may) not fully break its economic links with the Soviet Union. According to Edgar Savisaar, Estonia and the Soviet Union can collaborate only by establishing relations in a different form. Our Prime minister, Ivars Godmanis, also agreed with his Estonian counterpart's stance.

Treaty Prepared for Trade Between Latvia, CSFR

LD1305012291 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0430 GMT 11 May 91

[Text] A draft treaty between the Republic of Latvia and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic has been drawn up. This treaty provides for goods exchange between the two states. In addition, in defining the value of goods, their prices on world markets in freely convertible currencies will be taken into account.

According to the treaty currently in force, the Czechoslovak Republic has agreed to supply Latvia with streetcars and their spare parts, spare parts for medical equipment, offset plates, and compact discs. Latvia, in turn, is to supply fish products, perfumes, books, telephones, and records. It is possible that the interstate treaty will be signed at the end of May.

'Many' Latvians 'Far From Happy' About Housing

LD1105162791 Moscow TASS in English 1443 GMT 11 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Text] Riga May 11 TASS—Many former owners of housing facilities in Latvia to whom the right of ownership is to be restored soon are far from happy about the prospect. They are worried about mustering sufficient strength and monetary resources for the proper maintenance of the property, a spokesman for the local Liberal Party, whose lawyers offer consultations to former house owners, has revealed.

Parliament Deputy Andris Grutups, who heads a group busy drawing up relevant legislation, told a news conference here that the authorities planned a rent ceiling. "But there is no doubt the ceiling will be higher than the present rent," he said.

The news conference was told that the principles of conversion had already been endorsed by the parliament. According to these principles, housing facilities may be returned to the owner's descendants residing in other countries. The rent in such cases will be collected by the manager appointed by the new owner.

The bills will come up for discussion in parliament this may and it will become clear that the rights of owners as well as those of the present lodgers are well protected under new legislation. The owner will be allowed to oust a lodger only in exceptional cases," Grutups said. [quotation mark as received]

However, the local authorities in some districts defy legislation. One instance is the decision of the authorities in Riga's central district to cancel, much ahead of term, the lease held by the Salang Club for some basement rooms, which the Club members, Afghan war veterans,

planned to turn into a rehabilitation centre for their disabled comrades. The decision to cancel was prompted by a prosperous cooperative's offer to pay more.

Latvian Democrats Oppose Town Council Communists

LD1205220991 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1730 GMT 11 May 91

[Text] LETA reports: The congress of democratic forces of Daugavpils region, which took place in Daugavpils today, announced that it will start active opposition and even civil disobedience to the town council, which ignores the laws of the Republic of Latvia and does not recognize the independence declaration of Latvia. The delegates to the congress represented 30,000 members of various parties, public political organizations, and national cultural associations, which no longer want to be associated with the stance adopted by Daugavpils town council, where the great majority of deputies are communists.

The association of democratic forces calls on the local bodies of power, on the basis of equality, to organize an independently functioning roundtable that can reflect the views of all residents and polarities of interests. A program has been worked out whereby commissions and groups will be acting to form alternatives to the present commissions and groups of deputies. The delegates to the congress recognize that at the moment it is not useful or timely to create a radio and television studio for the town, and propose that the 2 million rubles allotted for this expensive purpose be used to satisfy the most important needs of the town's residents.

Latvia Servicemen's Union Assigns Tasks

LD1005200991 Moscow TASS in English 1924 GMT 10 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Text] Riga May 10 TASS—Representatives of the Union of servicemen in the Baltics had a meeting today with members of the Latvian parliamentary Commission for Defence and Internal Affairs. Servicemen turned over to deputies a perfected charter and a provision about the Union. The Latvian Government had earlier prohibited the activity of the union of servicemen in the Baltics, describing it as an "unconstitutional organisation".

Deputies and military admitted that such a meeting should have been held earlier. It was established during the meeting that the two sides had different notions about some functions of the union of servicemen in the Baltics, formed last December by servicemen from Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and the Kaliningrad region.

The independent socio-political organisation set itself the task of protecting interests and rights of servicemen, their families, of factory and office workers and war veterans. The organisation intends to use political methods. However, it was stated that "in the event of the worsening of the situation it may employ methods characteristic of armed units".

Lieutenant Alexander Avdeyev, co-chairman of the union's coordinating centre, said that the army shows restraint even when terrorists set off explosions in houses inhabited by families of servicemen, when military are attacked. "I am not going to shoot at people, and only defensive measure will be taken," he said.

Lithuania Assails Destabilization Moves

LD1305212791 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 13 May 91

[Lithuanian Government statement issued on 13 May; read by announcer]

[Text] Having failed to bring about the overthrow of the Government of Lithuania in January, the conservative and militarist strata of the Soviet Union are now striving to destabilize the situation in the republic through force and provocations.

This is evident by explosions, shooting with firearms, and actions involving violence and looting within the Republic of Lithuania. To date, the Soviet Union's Ministry of Internal Affairs and the armed forces leadership have denied that militarized detachments under their jurisdiction are participating in such acts of terror.

On 3 May, some soldiers of the Soviet Union's Ministry of Internal Affairs special purpose militia detachment, who perpetrated out the explosion in Ukmerge, were apprehended at the scene of the crime. This incident showed who is the real culprit in the disturbances and provocations.

The leadership of Lithuania is not urging armed resistance and is taking every measure to prevent force from being met with force. The Lithuanian media is defending its rights by peaceful means. The entire responsibility for the provocations that have taken place, or those possible, rests on the old communist structures, the commanders of the militarized detachments, and their supporters, the statement emphasizes.

In developing good-neighborly relations, based upon traditional goodwill and trust, between us and the Soviet Union as well as its republics, the people of Lithuania are striving and will continue to strive to establish their democratic state through peaceful means.

Six Lithuanian Legislative Factions Registered

PM1405084991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 May 91 Union Edition p 1

["Direct Line" report by Nikolay Lashkevich: "Factions Start Fighting"]

[Text] Vilnius—Six legislative factions have been officially registered in the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet.

All the factions have presented their political programs, pledged to adhere to the republic's Constitution and laws, and to uphold the independence of the state. Only the Polish faction was not registered, since it does not have the number of members required by the regulations—a faction should comprise no fewer than nine people.

The largest of the registered factions (comprising about one-fourth of all the deputies in the legislature) is the united "Sajudis" faction. The liberal faction has the smallest number of deputies. The center factions of "Sajudis," the tautininkas (national) party members, and the so-called seventh and left factions have also obtained legal status. About one-fourth of the Supreme Soviet deputies have decided to remain independent.

Pro-Moscow Lithuanian TV, Radio Registered

PM1405092591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 May 91 Union Edition p 2

[Correspondent N. Lashkevich report: "Passions on Lithuanian Television"]

[Text] Vilnius—IZVESTIYA has written about the dramatic fate of Lithuanian radio and television (see: "What Lithuanian Television Is Saying and Showing," issue 91) which has been under the control of the military and the Lithuanian Communist Party since 13 January.

Quite a few events have occurred in the three weeks since the article was published. First, there was a sensitive reaction to the article from certain active viewers of Channel 4, the so-called "occupation" channel, as it is openly called in Lithuania. They think that all "facilities of Soviet power" in Lithuania should belong to the USSR which, according to their logic, is personified by the republic's Communist Party. The Television and Radio Committee is first among those facilities. A group of war and labor veterans published an open letter on the same theme. It accuses IZVESTIYA's own correspondent of tendentiousness and essentially justifies the use of force to recover "facilities of Soviet power." According to my modest calculations, USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] subunits may not be enough to effect the armed seizure of all these "facilities" and their subsequent protection. The veterans demanded that IZVESTIYA's own correspondent be recalled from Lithuania and punished accordingly. Furthermore, the correspondents' center has begun receiving nonstop telephone calls from people who do not give their names but issue threats and use crude blackmail.

Second, S. Valjulis, general director of Lithuanian Television and Radio, has been sent a telegram from the leadership of the All-Union Television and Radio Company. In the telegram, first deputy chairman Lazutkin gives an assurance that the company had and has no claims to the property of the Lithuanian Television and Radio, nor does it intend trying to turn Lithuanian Television and Radio into a subsidiary of the all-Union company.

Third, and most interesting, literally the day that the telegram was received in Lithuania—that is, 30 April—that same company officially registered the "Sovetskaya Litva" television and radio studio. The case was made that there were no objections, although in fact there were. The news was announced during an evening broadcast by Colonel E. Kasperavicius, a TV commentator and now chief of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Organizational Department. While making the announcement he showed viewers the official registration document.

The new TV and radio studio, it turns out, will broadcast in three languages: Lithuanian, Russian, and Polish. Its founders are the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, a free enterprise company, and the Congress of Democratic Forces—a bloc of sociopolitical movements and organizations close to the Lithuanian Communist Party created in December 1990 (the widely known or, rather, little known Lithuanian National Salvation Committee was formed on its initiative), and other organizations.

There are a number of questions that can be answered more competently in Moscow, which gave the legal authority for the "Sovetskaya Litva" Television and Radio studio's activity. What guided the all-Union company when it registered the studio in Vilnius? Especially if the company publicly distances itself from property claims and ownership rights? Is it empowered to perform such registration functions? It is common knowledge that there is another department with the relevant powers to do that. Does the registration mean that the newly created studio will renounce its rights to the Lithuanian Television and Radio Committee and, accordingly, to the television tower and will only lay claim to part of the TV and radio equipment and premises for a certain amount of broadcasting time alone? Where will the newly formed studio operate? Informed sources at the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee have let it be known that the present TV crew does not intend to leave the territory that it occupies—together with the USSR MVD troops—at the Television and Radio Committee.

The most important thing is this: Do the interested parties in Moscow seriously believe that such a tactic will make it possible to resolve the painful Lithuanian TV problem? It is one thing if the studio is going to work autonomously outside the structures of the Lithuanian Television and Radio and quite another if it is going to continue working within the walls of the occupied committee building. This means that armored personnel carriers will again stand guard in front of the building and that details of soldiers in bullet-proof vests will again continue to patrol there.

As for those telephone callers who have recently been actively inquiring after the health of IZVESTIYA's own correspondent, I would like to warn them about criminal liability for blackmail. There are quite a few ways of exposing blackmailers. IZVESTIYA no longer intends kowtowing to certain political forces who disregard the principles of objective journalism. The truth, whether they like it or not, is that the civilian facility, which was under the republic's jurisdiction and which has been seized illegally and contrary to all the constitutional norms, must be returned.

RSFSR

First Russian TV Station Begins Coverage

Yeltsin Hails Event

LD1305215891 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1744 GMT 13 May 91

[Interview with RSFSR President Boris Yeltsin by Oleg Poptsov in Moscow on 12 May; from the "Happy Birthday" program—recorded]

[Text] [Poptsov] Boris Nikolayevich, we have gathered together today for a special occasion, so to speak, for our republic, for our country, for politicians and non-politicians, for our fellow citizens. Clearly what is going to happen is something that we have all been thinking of for a long time, something for which we have waited a long time. Russian Television opens tomorrow. I believe that the efforts and in general the actions of Russia and the republic for the well-being of its sovereignty and its independence were reflected in miniature in the fight for television—and there are no exaggerations here—I believe that you were at the epicenter of this struggle from the very first moments. Everyone calls the mass propaganda media the fourth estate and my first question to you, therefore, on this day is this: How are your relations developing with the fourth estate, and how do you assess its activity regarding Russia and without regarding Russia?

[Yeltsin] First and foremost, I would like to congratulate all Russians, the staff and creative workers of the Russian Television and Radio Company, those who have invested a great deal of labor in the establishment of Russian Television, and all our television viewers and viewers of the future on the fact that Russian Television has at last been launched. The process itself of the struggle for its opening has indeed shown how difficult it is for the Russian Federation to gain its own sovereignty which was declared at the First Congress of People's Deputies. Included in the elements of Russia's sovereignty which have been won from the center there is, of course, Russian television. It is indeed, as you put it, the fourth estate because much has been done over the 11 months of work by the Supreme Soviet in its new composition, its regular composition, and the goverment. You analyze it, and some goods laws have been adopted and some decent decisions are being adopted and analyses and specific actions, yet nevertheless our end result—making it possible for people to live better—we have not yet achieved. Much of this is because the laws are not gripping in the localities. Why are they not gripping? In the first place there is definite sabotage; that is the case. And the fact that people do not know—the information famine at this particular time has been of the very greatest dimension. It is surprising, but that is the case.

[Poptsov] In principle we were right to talk about an information blockade?

[Yeltsin] Yes.

[Poptsov] It was not a fabrication?

[Yeltsin] Yes, there was indeed a famine, even, and a proper blockade. It was conceived and it was implemented and that is why it took us so long to get to this day. It was a purposeful position and policy on the part of certain leaders from the center.

We felt at once a lack of precisely the mass media—that is when we felt it especially. Prior to this, we had somehow not felt it. We felt ourselves to be in a common space. Well, we thought, that is fine; somewhere Russia will get a mention and somewhere it will not get a mention. Basically, on the whole, somewhere it will be subjected to minor criticism. But each republic has had, and has, its television, but we have not. That is why we have this attitude, an attitude which proceeds of course very much from the point of view, well, of the value of television for information—for, so to speak, contacts with people, so that one's own work, what we are conceiving here, what decisions we are making here, can be pushed through as quickly as possible. To help people who have landed in trouble, or on the contrary to help very talented, very talented and interesting people, to show their experience. That is entertainment as well. This is a vast Russian spectrum—immense—of both the national and the intellectual culture of all our republics, which today falls outside the field of vision altogether. It is not seen. This, too, is Russian television. On the whole it is difficult to assess, with a single word or even with a few phrases, the immense significance that I, personally, attach to Russian television. I see its vast reserves. I very much hope that a very strong, creative staff has been picked here at Russian television, and that this will provide a great stimulus, satisfying the hunger for information. I think that in general there is somehow even a possibility of raising television to a quite different level.

[Poptsov] Let us speak frankly. A mirror is appearing. Russia is being given a mirror in which you can see your own reflection.

[Yeltsin] Yes. That is in the first place. Second, it would be easy for you and for all of us to criticize Union television, central television; this would be easy. But it is now necessary to compete with it.

[Poptsov] Yes, that is what is for us most important, Boris Nikolayevich, most important.

[Yeltsin] Yes. You see, one needs to prove that Russian television, with all its possibilities, with such a very rich spectrum, with such a rich.... [changes thought] Russia, a territory with 150 million people. These are most interesting people, people to whom television viewers can listen to every day, and admire, and draw conclusions for themselves. That is very interesting.

[Poptsov] Boris Nikolayevich, in principle we talk a lot about the problem of sovereignty, of self-reliance, independence. I think that on the whole sovereignty is also a fact of the political dignity of a republic. But the independence of the mass media and the independence of television is of course also a feature of independence. What, as you see it, is the independence of the mass media, the independence of radio, the independence of television? Independence of whom, and of what?

[Yeltsin] Above all independence of political aims, of one single orientation. Here one also needs to bear in mind that if we again pursue only a single course, then it will again turn into a monopoly, but from the other side. This independence presupposes that it is nevertheless necessary to listen to various points of view. There must be a diversity of thought in television. Not only what we want: not only what the democrats said, and this is all, not permitting the others to come near. That would again be a monopoly. That is why it seems to me that Russian television must set an example, that.... [changes thought] Our attitude is similar. Here in Russia there are parties: such a one, and such another. On the Russian screen they are welcome; there is room and there is time for them. This is the first thing. Second, look at what a national spectrum there is: they, too, must in turn somehow be represented there.

[Poptsov] Tied in.

[Yeltsin] Furthermore, the truth. Well, it seems to me that perhaps it was necessary to put that first, inasmuch as television viewers' distrust of television starts with the distortion of facts. Or the authors start fantasizing, and hence distrust of the mass media begins. Of course I do not permit the idea that Russian television may somehow present things in a lopsided way.

[Poptsov] Slant things?

[Yeltsin] Yes. The truth and only the truth. It is difficult for us to tell this truth. It is difficult for the people, difficult for us, difficult for the leadership of the Russian Federation. But television is a body that all the same must tell the truth. If Yeltsin made a mistake, the truth about this must be told without fail. If he does not want to, someone must tell it for him. If he does not want to or does not have the time—it sometimes happens.

[Poptsov] I will bear it in mind, Boris Nikolayevich.

[Yeltsin] Yes, please do. Furthermore, it must be independent. You will have programs of your own—your own structures, so to speak, which you originate.

[Poptsov] Yes.

[Yeltsin] Originating from you, you see. Just as is the case with regard to Kravchenko, here it must be independent of you. I understand; you are the head. You decide organizational, economic, and creative issues. You can suggest something on the creative side to them, but not dictate. Not dictate. Because this diktat, say, in Union television has resulted in the fact that they destroyed one program—it did not meet the interests of someone there in the CPSU Central Committee. Another program was destroyed. And these were the most interesting programs. There must be independence in the broad sense. But at the same time we should inculcate universal human values in people—awareness of intellectual values, morals and culture. There must be a certain degree of dependence here, dependence on human universal principles, in the best sense of this word.

[Poptsov] Apart from Yeltsin the politician there is Yeltsin the head of the family. He is a family man, and I am sure that his family also watches [television] and reads newspapers....

[Yeltsin] I see it is your favorite topic.

[Poptsov] Yes. And that sometimes you just do not have enough time, and that, probably, some information you learn from your wife. It is interesting to know how things are arranged in your family. Does Yeltsin senior have the last say in the family, or are there any other points of view with regard to programs and articles? Is there any kind of disagreement, the very disagreement you welcome, or do you always share the same opinion? What, do you think, would your family, as part of the audience, like to see on the screen?

[Yeltsin] It happens that because of the lack of time I cannot watch most television programs and I cannot listen to most broadcasts of Radio Rossii. But I will tell you the following interesting fact. My wife does not work and she never stops listening to Radio Rossii between 1400-1700 and from 2200-0000. You see, first she likes it. It has very interesting programs. Second, it means a lot to her. She knows some of the people there and the circumstances. Third, she knows that I need it. She will tell me without fail what was of interest in these programs, even at 0130 in the morning. So, it is a source of additional information for me. I think that your television must also have a rival.

[Poptsov] We have got one.

[Yeltsin] I do not mean Union [television], but within Russia. It should happen gradually, but I think that there should not be only one television and radio company.

[Poptsov] Yes, yes....

[Yeltsin] Furthermore, there should be a commercial television. All this is in our plans, as you know. We are working on this. It will not happen overnight. Then there will be the end to monopoly in Russia. Presently you have the monopoly on television in Russia, so to speak.

[Poptsov] Well, we have got nothing, so far.

[Yeltsin] Well, you are going to have it. During the first months, let us say a year, this will not show but then, gradually, it will show, if you continue to have no rivals. It is necessary that there are such rivals. This is first. The second thing is that work should be carried out jointly with republican television, I mean within the RSFSR, as well as with oblast, kray television....

[Poptsov] Yes, it goes without saying.

[Yeltsin] ...Since their programs are shown on Russian Television, some of their material could be used and I think that this will only enrich you.

[Poptsov] Yes, we would like Moscow and Leningrad to feel that someone is breathing down their neck.

[Yeltsin] The history of setting up the Russian television is very interesting and unusual. The fact that there were four major conversations with the country's president regarding it, shows what a difficult birth this television had. I think that this fact obliges those who are involved in it to do their utmost to make it useful, necessary and interesting. I congratulate all Russian citizens on the birth of Russian television.

[Poptsov] Thank you.

[Yeltsin] Bon voyage and success to you.

Silayev Toasts Opening

LD1305192791 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1740 GMT 13 May 91

[Interview with Ivan Stepanovich Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR council of Minister, by unidentified announcer in Moscow, date not given; from the "Happy Birthday" program—live or recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] Ivan Stepanovich, you are no doubt also one of those among us who have been waiting for Russian television to make its appearance?

[Silayev] Absolutely. I'm certainly not the last person to have an interest.

[Announcer] What are your wishes for us, and your expectations from the coming into being of Russian television?

[Silayev] Well, we've not only been waiting for this day, as far as we've been able we've facilitated it, for there are many problems today arising from the fact that our citizens, supporting us and inspiring us, do not always have the opportunity to communicate with us. We are therefore acquiring a tongue, we are acquiring a voice. This is extremely necessary for us in the complex situation of carrying out some very serious and very complicated economic reforms.

[Announcer] Then I will propose a toast, and invite you to drink with me to the joy of contacts!

[Silayev] With pleasure.

Director Views News Service

LD1205181491 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1530 GMT 12 May 91

[Interview with O.B. Dobrodeyev, identified as general director of the information service, by correspondent P. Orlov, from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Orlov] News is the pivot of any program. In our country, according to the experience of Central Television, or the Leningrad program, it also determines the prestige, the face of the whole channel. In the case of Russia's Television and Radio Company, we know these faces very well from their previous jobs. I have named them already. Their principles in the new job have remained similar to those in their previous ones.

[O.B. Dobrodeyev] That is complete objectivity, impartiality, and the main thing—what is happening today. Every piece of news which will be in our news bulletins will be accompanied by the word, today, without fail.

[Orlov] The news will go out three times on Russia's channel, on the second channel, in brief at 1700 [1400 GMT] and more broadly at 2000 [1700 GMT] and 2300 [2000 GMT]. The newscasts will be introduced by an anchorman. The following are points of heightened interest:

[Dobrodeyev] Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and of course the mining regions of our country.

[Orlov] The professional experience of Russia's News Service may be assessed in advance. It is quite considerable, despite the youth of the staff. However, that editorial board is springing to life at great cost. On the plus side, there is a noticeable spiritual high before the beginning of the broadcast, which sometimes turns into physical fatigue when working on location. On the minus side, there is the obvious problem with equipment upon which 60 percent of the success of the news depends. But that is news.

[Dobrodeyev] Russia does not live in isolation in this world. Of course, there will be news from around our country, there will be international news. That is, we will proceed from these three levels of information.

[Orlov] How many hours before you go on air do you think you will have the first materials for the news programs?

[Dobrodeyev] I think in the morning of that day, Monday, the 13th, when we go on the air.

[Orlov] Apart from news, there will also be thematic programs on Russia's channel, original ones such as, for instance, Around Laughter [Vokrug Smekha], which has gone over to the jurisdiction of Russia from Central Television. However, it is namely the creation of its own news service which is the first sign of independence. But that is not yet real competition because only an independent television can compete against state television. But there is state and state here, or more precisely, Union and republican. However, we have recently seen that these are very uneasy models of mutual relations, but we are working alongside each other and maybe we will work together, as was the case already when we all worked in the same editorial office. We hope Russia's Television launch goes well. [video shows television set with Vesti (news) logo on it]

Gorbachev, Yeltsin Meet Autonomous Leaders

LD1405053391 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 0000 GMT 14 May 91

[Interview with Boris Oleynik, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities, by correspondent Vladimir Perfilyev, place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] As we have already reported, the USSR president and the chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet met the chairmen of the Supreme Soviets of the Russian Federation's autonomous republics. What problems where tackled at the meeting? Boris Ilyich Oleynik, deputy chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the country's Supreme Soviet, answers this question asked by our correspondent Vladimir Perfilyev.

[Perfilyev] Boris Ilyich, we have already told our listeners about the meeting that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, the country's president, and Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin had with leaders of autonomous republics. You attended that meeting; therefore I would ask you to tell us in greater detail about what took place there.

[Oleynik] Naturally, that meeting was not caused by something—for example, it was not caused by the statement of the sixteen, although you are aware of that statement. I think that statement was prompted by the fact that during the first meeting, in the one-plus-nine statement, there was an imprecise formulation to the effet that the Union is being built on the basis of those nine republics. Within the microclimate of that meeting it was correct to mention nine republics, but this does not stipulate that nobody else was taken into consideration. Perhaps that vague phrase caused the understandable alarm of the former autonomies, which have now declared their sovereignty and raised themselves to the status of Union republics. At this meeting precisely all the i's were dotted.

Representatives of all the national republics that are members of the Russian Federation unequivocally spoke in favor of signing a Union treaty. It is possible that the term Union treaty itself still frightens off our citizens, as the name of unitary union has stuck to it. But this will be a completely different union, and an increasingly growing number of republics understand that this will be an absolutely new formation. Subjects will be sovereign and have full rights: they will be sovereign states or republics that unite in accordance with expediency, because they help one another to attain sovereignty not only in words but in reality.

There were no differences on this issue. There was only the problem of how to sign—by individual delegations or within the composition of Russian Federation. I think that a solution was found, except perhaps Tatarstan, which has a special stance of its own. It was agreed to sign on the basis of equality in order to stress that the Russian Federation is not falling apart, as each chairman of the republican supreme soviets said he does not imagine himself outside the community that has taken shape over decades.

[Perfilyev] Boris Ilyich, I think that after listening to information about that meeting, our listeners and perhaps all of us, have the following question, after all: What about relations between the president and the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, as seen from that situation?

[Oleynik] Well, those were working relations, official and clearcut, I would say—tolerant and calm as befits people who have come together for business purposes and not for sorting out personal relations.

Tatarstan To Not Agree to Union Treaty

LD1305180191 Moscow TASS in English 1745 GMT 13 May 91

[By TASS legislative correspondents Yuriy Kozmin and Andrey Surzhanskiy]

[Text] Moscow May 13 TASS—Except for Tatarstan, all autonomous republics within the Soviet Union have agreed to sign a new treaty of Union as members of the delegation from the Russian Federation, which will include their authorized representatives, Chairman of the Russian parliament's Council of Nationalities Ramazan Abdulatipov told TASS today.

Abdulatipov took part in the meeting between President Mikhail Gorbachev, the chairman of the Russian parliament Boris Yeltsin and chairmen of the Supreme Soviets of the autonomous republics within the Russian Federation and commented on the results of their exchange of views.

"The meeting was prompted by the concern of the leaders of some autonomous republics over the recent statement by nine, which was regarded by them as restricting their rights and sovereignty as subjects of the USSR".

The Russian parliamentarian stressed that the statement, signed in late April by the Soviet president and the

leaders of nine Soviet republics, had no aim of this kind. According to Abdulatipov, "member-republics of the Russian Federation will participate in the signing of the treaty of Union as equal subjects of both the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation".

"Nobody is seeking to call into question the statehood of each member republic of the Russian Federation," Abdulatipov stressed. "However, republics in seeking to assert their sovereignty should not seek to break away from the Russian Federation, as Tatarstan has done".

The Tatar Republic intends to join the Soviet Union as a Union Republic.

Abdulatipov noted that problems of interrelation between Russia and its member-republics will be considered at the May 16 session of the Russian Parliament which will meet to discuss the draft treaty of federation.

"The state of inter-ethnic relations depends on the signing of this important document," Abdulatipov said.

Yeltsin Says He, Gorbachev 'Can Work Together'

PM1305151591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 May 91 Union Edition p 1

[INTERFAX report from news agencies roundup: "B. Yeltsin: Gorbachev and I Can Work Together"]

[Text] Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, stated at a meeting with a group of journalists that he was prepared to go "along with any republic and the center" in continuing democratic reforms. Yeltsin noted that currently "Gorbachev is adopting a resolute position in terms of continuing these reforms. This means that we can work together, and this is a very serious and important point in the present stage of development," an INTERFAX correspondent reported.

Yeltsin noted that his personal relations with President Mikhail Gorbachev had gone through various stages, but nevertheless he said that it is necessary to take account of the fact that "personal relations are personal, but we are the two leaders of two state entities: the Russian Federation state and the Union." "This means that, if we do not work together, the Union will simply collapse. I think that the compromise we reached as a result of the 'Statement of the Ten' gives us the chance to work together," Yeltsin said.

Yeltsin Holds News Conference in Prague

LD1305165991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1602 GMT 13 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Anatoliy Shapovalov]

[Text] Prague, 13 May (TASS)—Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet, arrived here today on an official visit at the invitation of CSFR Federal Assembly chairman Alexander Dubcek.

He is accompanied by Vladimir Kukin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Internatioal Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations; Yuriy Skokov, first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers; Andrey Kozyrev, RSFSR minister of foreign affairs; and other officials.

Yeltsin was met at the airport by Rudolf Battek, deputy chairman of the CSFR Federal Assembly, and CSFR deputy Foreign Minister Zdenek Matejka. Among the welcoming party was Boris Pankin, USSR ambassador to the CSFR.

Replying to journalists' questions as to why he chose the CSFR for his first official visit abroad, Yeltsin said, among other things: I have come here at the invitation of Alexander Dubcek. President Vaclav Havel, when we met in Moscow, also expressed the opinion that such a visit would be desirable. There were no problems with organizing the visit from either side. Russia is a sovereign state. In accordance with its declarations, laws, and its Constitution, it conducts an independent policy and, itself, decides with whom and how to build its relations.

I have been to Czechoslovakia six or seven times before. Sverdlovsk Oblast, where I was working, was twinned with the West Bohemian region. So, I have a special attitude toward Czechoslovakia. In answering your question, I explain that the interference in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia perpetrated in 1968 was a gross error, were actions which broke off the democratic process. Russia has also suffered from totalitarianism. We will get rid of it together. Russia has a good undertaking for cooperation with the Czech republic. Now, we must set about establishing direct contacts.

Describing yesterday's meeting with the USSR president and the chairman of the RSFSR with the chairmen of the Supreme Soviets of the autonomous republics of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin noted: On the whole, we have reached agreements, and that is, as you understand, no simple matter. The CSFR is also a federative state. Just like us, you have your own problems. We have come to an agreement that the autonomous republics will sign a Union treaty as subjects of Union and Russian federations. They will also sign a treaty within the federation itself. A compromise will, thereby, be reached.

I do not link my arrival in Czechoslovakia with the forthcoming elections, Yeltsin pointed out. One should not be self-confident. I want to participate in and to fight in the election campaign. I do not link this with whether they will give me a better or a worse welcome in Prague.

Further on Status of Presidential Election

Soyuz Supports Ryzhkov

LD1305121391 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1000 GMT 13 May 91

[Text] The Soyuz deputy's group has supported the candidacy of Ryzhkov, former head of the USSR Government, for the post of president of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. It intends to lend him assistance through the structure of Soyuz, an all-voluntary association of deputies and voters, and the decision to this effect was made after a meeting with the candidate which took place on the initiative of that faction of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

In the opinion of Blokhin, cochairman of the Soyuz group, Ryzhkov is the most well-known political figure among the candidates who can offer some kind of opposition to Boris Yeltsin in the dispute for the highest post of the Russian state.

At the meeting, Ryzhkov presented some of the positions of his pre-electoral campaign. He stressed, however, that work on it is not finished. In reply to a question about the possible candidacy for vice president, Nikolay Ryzhkov said that he does not yet have a specific candidate in mind.

It is expected that he will carry out his first pre-electoral tour on 14-15 May.

Sokolov Backs Ryzhkov Candidacy

LD1305123991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1125 GMT 13 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[Text] Moscow, 13 May (TASS)—During the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Communist Party Central Committee and Central Control Commission plenum, which opened here today, the RSFSR Communist Party leadership came out in favor of supporting the candidacy of Nikolay Ryzhkov, former head of the Soviet Government, in the upcoming election for the president of Russia on 12 June. That proposal was presented in a report by Aleksandr Sokolov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

At the same time, the report contained criticism of the recently adopted laws "on the RSFSR president " and "on the election of RSFSR president. " According to Sokolov, the first shortcoming was the haste in setting the election deadline. He proposed heeding the opinion of the electorate who proposed that the election be postponed for two to three months.

Sokolov also criticized the procedure for counting votes. The law states that a candidate has only to obtain a majority vote to be elected president. The Russian Communist Party believes that the president should be elected by obtaining "a majority of all registered vote in most krays, oblasts, republics, and autonomous entities."

Finally, the Russian Communists objected to the clause in the "Law On the RSFSR President," which states that the president of Russia must suspend his party membership upon being elected.

The Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party is proposing that RSFSR Communist deputies put forth these amendments during the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies which opens on 21 May.

The plenum debate began after the report was delivered; it is expected that the plenum should conclude its work this evening.

Gen Makashov Announces Candidacy

LD1405085591 Moscow TASS in English 0822 GMT 14 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow May 14 TASS—"I have always been and continue to be an advocate of an integral and renovated Soviet Union and sufficiently powerful armed forces," Soviet People's deputy, Colonel-General Albert Makashov told TASS after he agreed to run for the Russian presidency.

Several military units nominated him as their candidate for the post of Russian president. Elections are scheduled for June 12, 1991.

Makashov is currently attending the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee's plenary meeting in Moscow.

He is a professional military man. He entered a military school at the age of 12 and made his way up the ladder from a platoon commander to commander of the Privolzhsko-Uralsky Military district.

He became known after he criticised the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee at the Russian Party conference last year.

He said that "Army and Navy communists are outraged by the passivity of the Central Committee, the Politburo and the government as regards their defenders and those who persecute servicemen".

The press responded to this statement differently. Some newspapers even demanded that the general resign.

Makashov believes that his speech at the conference drew ire from those who wants the Armed Forces to be "in a pocket" and have "no rights and only fulfil their duty".

He said he drew fire upon himself intentionally and "reached his goal". He believes it is clear now "who defames the Army and wants it to disintegrate".

Makashov says the Army's ideological opponents are doing everything possible to drive a wedge between privates, junior officers, officers and generals.

Makashov says some periodicals "are engaged in open anti-Army and anti-patriotic feelings propaganda" and considers it his duty to rebuff such moves.

"There is not and cannot be any alliance between military bureaucrats and the country's conservative forces, as some journalists assert. The Army has always been and continues to be the defender of the interests of the working people," Makashov said.

Zhirinovskiy Registers

LD1305125691 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1148 GMT 13 May 91

[Text] Moscow, 13 May (TASS)—The first registration application for a Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic [RSFSR] presidential candidate has been submitted to the Russian Central Electoral Commission. The name of the candidate is Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, which was registered with the USSR Ministry of Justice recently.

In accordance with the law on the election of the RSFSR president, a candidate nominated by a registered party does not need to gather 100,000 signatures from voters. However, V. Zhirinovskiy, like the other candidates, needs to enlist the support of at least one-fifth of the votes of RSFSR people's deputies who assemble at their congress on 21 May.

Candidate Outlines Platform

LD1305162591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0935 GMT 13 May 91

[By TASS Correspondent Natalya Kupriy]

[Text] Moscow, 13 May (TASS)—Aleksey Sergeyev, a doctor of economic sciences, professor at the Academy of Labor and Social Relations, and member of the CPSU Central Committee, wants the Communist Party to sharply dissociate itself from its existing policy. He has been nominated as a candidate for the Russian presidency by the united front of working people, with the support of the initiative Congress of Russian Communists.

In an interview with a TASS correspondent, Aleksey Sergeyev stated that he has a "profound and extensive" program for improving the life of society, and that Communists must engage in implementing it. "The Russian people cannot manage without the Communists today," Sergeyev said.

He considers that the development of Soviet society is now "on the wrong track." The worst problem, said the presidential candidate, is that the authorities have moved the center of gravity of their economic and social policy from defending the basic mass of the people to defending the interests of a small group of people.

The program of Aleksey Sergeyev envisages carrying out urgent monetary reform and withdrawing between 200 and 250 million rubles which, according to him, is in the hands of sharp operators in the "black economy" and which they use for routine servicing of black economy deals. His program also envisages the introduction of a progressive tax on inheritance and the introduction of a single savings book for every adult. It also proposes restoring the currency monopoly of the ruble, which would mean "an end to the removal of rubles abroad on a massive scale" as well as a ban on enterprises independently dealing in hard currency on the external market.

Aleksey Sergeyev stated the need to increase incentives in agricultural production, formulate a new five-year plan, and restore the State Planning Committee.

Noting that "he is not the last economist in the USSR," the presidential candidate stated that should he be elected to the post he will prevent unemployment and price rises in the country. "I am giving guarantees to improve the people's lives if my program is implemented," said Aleksey Sergeyev.

Election Postponement Urged

PM1405085591 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 12 May 91 First Edition p 3

["Appeal to RSFSR People's Deputies" from the Coordination Council of Patriotic Forces of Russia: "About Respect for Voters"]

[Text] Esteemed elected representatives of the people! At your third (extraordinary) congress you set the date of the election of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] president for 12 June 1991 and entrusted the RSFSR Supreme Soviet with adopting the Law "On the Election of the RSFSR President." This law was adopted and came into force 27 April 1991, in other words some six weeks before the date of the election scheduled by you. In accordance with this law, 20 days are set aside for the whole procedure of nominating candidates, since it must be completed 25 days before the election.

Esteemed people's deputies, the Coordination Council of the Patriotic Forces of Russia urgently entreats you to postpone the date of the presidential election because, in the space of 20 days, labor collectives and citizens cannot exercise, in keeping with the procedure laid down by law, the right to nominate a presidential candidate granted them by the Law "On the Election of the RSFSR President." This right becomes a fiction—which casts doubt on the very process of electing the president.

In accordance with the Law "On the Election of the RSFSR President," a presidential candidate may be nominated by labor collectives and citizens at their place of residence "on the condition that at least 100,000

RSFSR citizens support the nominated candidacy" (Article 7). Signatures in support of the nominated candidate are "collected in accordance with the RSFSR Law 'On than RSFSR Referendum' within the times laid down by the Central Electoral Commission for Election of the RSFSR President" (Article 7). Thus, the law "On the RSFSR Referendum" provides for signatures to be collected by a registered action group. For the creation of such a group the law "On the RSFSR Referendum" requires that "the soviet of people's deputies be notified no later than 10 days in advance of the venue and time of the meeting" (Article 13) to nominate the action group. After the meeting has been held, the law "On the RSFSR Referendum" allocates two weeks for the presidium or executive committee of the rayon or city soviet to pass a decision to register the action group (Article 14). (In this case two weeks is a perfectly warranted time, as the soviet presidium or executive committee meet for their sessions once every two weeks). The Law "On the RSFSR Referendum" goes on to provide for three months to collect signatures after the action group has been set up (Article 15) and reserves a minimum of two weeks to check the documents received.

Thus, the total time to set up an action group and to collect and check signatures provided for in the Law "On the RSFSR Referendum" amounts to almost five months, of which 24 days are allocated just to creating and registering the action group. Meanwhile, the Law "On the Election of the RSFSR President" has allocated just 20 days to nominate RSFSR presidential candidates.

Obviously, on realizing this absurdity, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium issued a resolution 5 May reducing the time for the prior notification of a soviet of people's deputies of an upcoming nomination of an action group from 10 days to one day. But this resolution was belated, since even an action group to nominate a presidential candidate can be set up only after the expiry of the time for submitting documents on his nomination to the Central Electoral Commission, and as regards time to collect signatures, none is set aside at all.

Having established the norm of the right that the collecting of signatures is governed by the Law "On the RSFSR Referendum," the Law "On the Election of the RSFSR President" at once flouted this by adding "within the times laid down by the Central Electoral Commission for Election of the RSFSR President" (Article 7). But what times has the Central Electoral Commission laid down? None.

Esteemed RSFSR people's deputies, the Coordination Council of the Patriotic Forces of Russia appeals directly to you because, in the present situation, you alone can prevent obvious lawlessness at your next congress. We urgently beg you to show respect for Russia's working people and for the laws which you yourselves promulgate and to defer the election of the president so that the right of labor collectives and of citizens at their place of residence to nominate their own candidates ceases to be fictitious and becomes real.

[Signed] The Coordination Council of the Patriotic Forces of Russia.

Silayev Presents Economic Program to Presidium

LD1305134691 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1300 GMT 13 May 91

[Text] Russian Prime Minister Silayev today presented a program on stabilization of the economy and transition to market relations. He presented this program to the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium. Market-orientated transformation of the economy must be decisive and irreversible, he pointed out. It has been decided to take into consideration the remarks made by members of the presidium, and the final version of the program will probably be published in a week's time.

Silayev Comments on Anticrisis Program

LD1305191891 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1700 GMT 13 May 91

[From the "Vesti" news program]

[Text] A meeting of the Russian Supreme Soviet Presidium today examined the program proposed by Ivan Silayev. Our correspondent now reports on this:

[Correspondent S. Milyanchikov] What distinguishes your program for the transition to market relations and overcoming the crisis from earlier ones? could you tell us briefly about the program itself?

[Silayev] The program is not something that is set in concrete—it is a living organism. Work will continue on it, even in the process of implementation. We have set the task of putting into effect what has transpired over the period since the program was presented at the end of April—extremely important events like the joint statement. The USSR Cabinet of Ministers and the republican governments are working on a plan of joint actions. We once again confirm our determination to act energetically as far as market relations are concerned. We have naturally analyzed the cabinet's program, which contains interesting aspects. To our satisfaction, we can see that certain elements from our program have found quite a clear echo in it. Also, Prime Minister Pavlov frankly stated in his report at the joint session of the USSR chambers that the Russian program had helped them, and that a number of its basic provisions were reflected in their proposed cabinet program.

Russian Communist Party Plenum Previewed

LD1205120591 Moscow TASS in English 1139 GMT 12 May 91

[By TASS World Service news analyst Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[Text] Moscow May 12 TASS—A plenary meeting of the Russian Federation Communist Party (RCP) Central Committee will begin here on Monday. It will discuss

items concerning the social protection of the population under conditions when the anti-crisis programme of the central government is being implemented, and the state of affairs in agriculture.

The nomination of a candidate for Russia's presidency for the forthcoming June 12 election will hold a special place on the plenum's agenda. It is so far unknown who will be chosen for nomination by Russian Communists.

There are many indications that the forthcoming plenum will be a stormy one. The RCP was founded last summer, immediately getting the reputation of the most orthodox segment in the CPSU. This is accounted for in many respects by the stance of a number of figures who stood at the rise of the party—first of all RCP leader Ivan Polozkov who won notoriety as a conservative and an opponent of radical economic reforms.

The RCP leadership repeatedly criticised the policy of Mikhail Gorbachev whom they blamed first of all for "insufficient resoluteness in upholding the ideals of socialism".

Accusations levelled at the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) leader were particularly keen on the eve of the April plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee. The results of the plenum, at which the question of Gorbachev's resignation from the post of the party leader was turned down by an overwhelming majority of votes did not embarrass his critics within the RCP.

Gennady Zyuganov, Politburo member and secretary of the RCP Central Committee, commenting on the plenum results in a TASS interview, was strongly critical of Gorbachev's activities, stating that, in his view, the general secretary in "this difficult period of time should have tackled party affairs more intently".

Several days later Zyuganov published an "open letter to Alexander Yakovlev" in the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. The letter contained very serious accusations against the presidential adviser and was striking by the extreme sharpness of expressions. "There is discord, disintegration, break-up and demoralization in this country," Zyuganov wrote. "What we witness now is called a national disaster comparable to a civil war or a Nazi invasion".

Vitaly Ignatenko, head of the presidential press service, at a briefing at the Soviet Foreign Ministry's press centre, voiced regret over the fact that such an article was published. He believes that it will serve to step up confrontation at a time when there is a visible trend towards the stabilisation of the situation in the country.

The publication of the "letter to Yakovlev" on the eve of the plenum of the RCP Central Committee was not fortuitous, of course. It cannot be said, however, that the letter reflects the viewpoint of the entire RCP leadership.

Nikolay Stolyarov, chairman of the RCP Central Control Commission, in an interview published in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA on the same day, May 7, stated that "the consolidation of Gorbachev's position at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee is very important" because he is a person "who actively upholds the idea of centrism".

According to Stolyarov, there are various trends within the RCP, just as within the CPSU—"There are trends towards confrontation, orthodoxy and intolerance. But the democratic tradition is also beginning to declare itself effectively enough".

The forthcoming RCP Central Committee plenum will show which of the trends will prevail in the Russian Communist Party.

Western Republics

Belorussian Government, TU's Sign Agreement

LD1305193791 Moscow TASS in English 1830 GMT 13 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Valentina Manshikova]

[Text] Minsk May 13 TASS—The Belorussian Government and Republican Trade Union [TU] Council signed a labour, social and economic agreement for 1991, proving the possibility to resolve even the most complex problems through constructive dialogue.

For the first time in Belorussian history, the cabinet and trade unions were able to come to terms on the most burning problems such as the need to raise living standards and ensure full employment, taxation, and labour and nature protection.

Speakers at the signing ceremony stressed that one indispensable condition of the agreement's fulfilment is stable work by enterprises and organisations in every economic sector.

"The agreement gives trade unions the right to supervise government activities," Belorussian Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich told TASS. "Trade unions, for their part, undertake not to resort to strikes as a means of exerting pressure on executive authorities."

Belorussian Parties, Movements Urge 'Roundtable'

PM1305142191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 May 91 Union Edition p 2

["Direct Line" report by Mikhail Shimanskiy: " 'Roundtable' Needed"]

[Text] Minsk—NARODNAYA GAZETA [People's Newspaper], the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet organ, has published a statement issued by Belorussia's political parties and movements.

It directly concerns recent statements made by the republic's workers collectives.

From the very outset, the document says, the authorities' tactics were designed to meet economic demands and to totally disregard political ones. The apparatus is willing to make material concessions in order to salvage the existing system. The policy of separating the demands is designed to split the workers' movement and isolate its leaders. That is the position on which the activity of the Belorussian Communist Party (CPSU) is founded. Society cannot be extricated from the crisis without real steps to change the political and economic system.

The statement goes on to say that, in the prevailing situation, the rigid standpoint held by the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, which has refused to convene an extraordinary session and examine political demands, will increase tension in society.

The statement's authors voice solidarity with the labor collectives' position and share their demands. They believe that a "roundtable" involving the republic leadership and representatives of the strike committees and political parties must be held urgently to extricate the republic from the crisis and peacefully dismantle the totalitarian system.

Ukraine Cabinet of Ministers Structure Approved

LD1305180791 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1600 GMT 13 May 91

[Text] The final structure of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers was approved today at the plenary sitting of the republican Supreme Soviet. Some ministries have been abolished, others were amalgamated. For example, Gosagroprom was turned into the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Motor Transport and the River Fleet were amalgamated into the Ministry of Transport. Deputies supported the proposal by Prime Minister Fokin on setting up ministries of environmental protection and foreign economic ties, a state committee for geology and utilization of resources, a Ukrainian state broadcasting company, and others. According to the declaration on Ukrainian state sovereignty the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic state security committee remains subordinate to the republican Supreme Soviet, and its chairman is to join the cabinet with the rights of a minister. The Ministry of Internal Affairs remains subordinate to the government. The issue of the National Bank of the Ukraine was a stumbling block. Deputies decided it should remain accountable to parliament in spite of the fact that the prime minister insisted the bank be included in the cabinet for the period of the transfer to a market system.

Ukrainian Strike Association Congress Slated

PM1305153791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 May 91 Union Edition p 1

["Direct Line" repoort by Nikolay Lisovenko: "Strike Committees Unite"]

[Text] Pavlograd—A conference of representatives of strike and workers' committees has been held in Pavlograd, at which a decision was adopted to set up an All-Ukrainian Association of Strike Committees.

A series of documents was adopted at the conference, which include an appeal to the USSR Supreme Soviet demanding social protection for working people.

The delegates stated that they are demanding the immediate release of Ukrainian People's Deputy Stepan Khmara from prison, as well as the release of other political detainees. If this is not done, the delegates have appealed for acts of civil disobedience to be carried out in the Ukraine.

It has been decided to hold a congress of participants in the strike movement in Kiev at the end of June, at which the charter of the republic Association of Strike Committees will be adopted.

Ukrainian Leaders, Veterans Mark VE Day

PM1305141191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 May 91 First Edition p 1

[TASS report under the general heading "The Country Solemnly Marks the 46th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War"]

[Text] Kiev—War, labor, and Armed Forces veterans, republic leaders, members of the Kiev Military District and Western Border District Military Councils, and representatives of the public assembled in the Ukrainian capital's Park of Eternal Glory on 9 May. Wreaths were placed on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Bouquets of flowers were laid on the graves of soldiers in Glory Avenue.

L.M. Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, and S.I. Gurenko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, took part in the ceremony.

Ukrainians in Romania Threaten Exodus

LD1105225891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1535 GMT 11 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Vasiliy Arbekov]

[Text] Bucharest, 11 May (TASS)—Representatives of the Union of the Ukrainians in Romania spoke on behalf of the almost 18,000 individuals of the Ukrainian nationality who densely populate the two border villages of Poiana-de-sub-Munte [name as received] and Repedea, in the province of Maramures, threatening a mass crossing of the Romanian-Soviet border if the demands forwarded by them are not carried out. As the ROMPRES agency reports, a tense situation which arose due to the conflict with the provincial authorities has already been in existence for three days in these localities, the residents of which are holding mass rallies daily.

One of the reasons for the conflict, as was reported to the TASS correspondent in the Union of Ukrainians in Romania, was the unfair—in the opinion of local residents—redistribution of land plots, as a result of which the population of these villages was deprived of the opportunity of using most of the nearby pasture land.

Moreover, a critical situation has taken shape in this region with providing the population with food and medicine. For a month already, many essential products have not been arriving in the shops: flour, salt, sunflower oil, and interruptions in the delivery of bread are being experienced. The unemployment which has arisen during recent times has also added to the problems. According to ROMPRES data, there are today around 3,000 unemployed here.

Peasants who addressed their complaints to one of the representatives of the local authorities received from him the "recommendation" to seek help in the USSR. After this, on 9 and 10 May, several hundred people left for the Romanian-Soviet border, demanding Soviet help. In the USSR Embassy in Romania, numerous calls began to be heard with the request that crossing the border be permitted, about which representatives of the Soviet Embassy informed the Romanian leadership.

The leaders of the Union of Ukrainians in Romania demanded that the prefect of the province of Maramures adopt urgent measures to resolve the conflict which had arisen. In the words of the representatives of the union, the prefect stated that he would not revoke the decision on redistributing land. However, he intended to address the country's government with the proposal that a special governnment commission on this issue be appointed. As ROMPRES reports, the province's leadership is studying possibilities for resolving the problem which has arisen and is undertaking urgent measures to improve the supply of food to the population in these regions.

Today, the situation remains tense in the two Ukrainian villages in the province of Maramures.

Lvov Chairman on Local Problems, Prospects

91UN1443A Moscow TRUD in Russian 6 May 91 p 2

[Interview with Stepan Davymuka, first deputy chairman of the Lvov Oblast Soviet Executive Committee, by TRUD correspondent G. Klyucherov; place and date not given: "We Lived Through a Difficult Year"]

[Text] *Over a year has passed since new people came to power in Galicia. What changes have taken place in the Lvov area, in the heart of Galicia? What practical steps have been taken by the Democratic Bloc to revive the socioeconomic life of the region? Many people are concerned with these issues, no doubt. These questions encompass many subjects for discussion.*

Let us start with a question of some local importance. We asked Stepan Davymuka, first deputy chairman of the Lvov Oblispolkom [Oblast Soviet Executive Committee], *what he thought about the 2 April price hike?*

[Davymuka] My attitude toward this measure is totally negative. I think of it as a kind of a bomb that could blow up our society, unstable as it is. I do not think that any government so far has ever increased prices for all kinds of goods simultaneously while pay everywhere is almost beggarly.

Our "true" propaganda experts wasted so much paper trying to prove that it was only over there, in the West, that the working people were being robbed of everything. But in practice it was our people who were being treated in such a cruel and inhuman way. This is a very dangerous thing because a person with no hope of a better future is capable of any unpredictable action. The old totalitarian system could undertake such a measure because it was capable of engendering administrative command models only, whatever their democratic packaging could be. V. Pavlov can beat his breast as much as he wants to in expressing his concern for the good of the country, but the ears of the old system are still showing.

The echo of this extortionate measure was immediately reflected, like a seismograph, in all the republics. Whether our prime minister desired it or not, his actions ignited the powerful engine of the republic parliaments in their confrontation with the center. The parliaments saw for themselves that they had to expedite the establishment of reliable systems to provide socioeconomic protection for their people.

It is not even the price increase in itself that is frightening, but the absence of food and other commodities. But where would they appear from if we partially democratized the national economy but did not even touch basic economic relations? Privatization in the city and the village has so far been nothing but talk; the old system has already tilted out of balance, and all the appeals for better discipline, therefore, are correct in principle but cannot bring the people back even to the old productivity level, low as it was.

[Klyucherov] Is this your explanation of the sad fact that no particular success has been observed during the year under the Democratic Bloc's rule?

[Davymuka] I do not want to justify our mistakes—they are inevitable in any work. But at the same time I am convinced that no power, whatever political trends it may represent, can do anything at present if the very principle of our life in the country remains unchanged. The point of the matter is that the Union still represents a centralized form of political, economic, and social administration. This form has outlived itself, and in my view it is the main impediment. That means we need decentralization. But we should not do this artificially like the British did when they offered state independence to their colonies and dominions; we need to have it

carried out in a natural way. Here is my conclusion: The creation of sovereign republics is the only way to save the present multiethnic state.

Many people who are used to thinking in the old categories view such things as something verging on an apocalypse. How can we split such a powerful country into separate states? They assume that the common economic sphere will disappear right away, that every republic will lock itself up in its national shell. But life itself will not allow this. The problem is different: What forms will the new relations among the sovereign states assume? What basis and what principles will they use for their union? Only time can give us the complete answer...

[Klyucherov] But the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet has already passed a declaration on political and economic sovereignty.

[Davymuka] Exactly: It is a declaration. As recently as several months ago, when this document had just appeared, members of the republic parliament did not have a clear understanding of what sovereignty really meant. Let us remember the "battles" in our parliament that took place last year between the so-called majority and the democratic forces. Honestly speaking, we thought staunchly that L. Kravchuk, Supreme Soviet chairman, was one of our "enemies." But recently he came to Lvov and spoke to our activists, and we saw a different Kravchuk. He himself admitted that he wanted to unite all public movements around one goal—the creation of a Ukrainian state.

This very issue is on our agenda, and the last session was proof of that. Instead of fruitless arguments the parliament got busy with concrete work. I mean discussion of such problems as organizing a national pool of stock exchanges, issuing our own securities and currencies, issuing Ukrainian money, etc.

[Klyucherov] I agree that the parliament has ceased to be a place of fierce confrontation. When the deputies from Galicia speak they are listened to with attention. The audience also stays silent when the representatives of the "big" Ukraine take the floor. Is this a temporary ceasefire or the end of ideological intolerance?

[Davymuka] In my view, the crisis in the parliament has not yet passed, but this does not mean that their perception of the problems has become one-sided. Moreover, the diversity of opinions has served as a constant source of nourishment for the understanding, still far from complete, of the sociopolitical processes in Galicia shown by the eastern and southern regions of the Ukraine. Reaction to our actions is often expressed in the standard denunciation: "What else can you expect from these Bandera fans?" But one should understand the history and psychology of our area before pronouncing superficial judgments or putting labels on us.

We spent quite a long time in a totally different atmosphere, under the liberal monarchy of Austria-Hungary. The totalitarian regime was accepted in our area differently from other parts of the country; it was much more painful and traumatic for us. I think that a special part was played by the national movement, born in the depth of old Poland and especially strengthened after the Second World War. For that reason tumultuous processes started in our area with the first breath of freedom. The main emphasis was put on denial of the party and state regime that emerged after 1917. That explains the perception of it as the beginning of a tragic period in the life of the Ukrainian people, who found themselves far removed from civilization. As a result they took the first opportunity to give up the "red symbols" and return to their own ones on that date far in the past.

I understand that doctrinaires and the extreme right will take my explanation as heresy. But we have to learn to look the truth in the eye. I, for instance, being one of the ispolkom [executive committee] leaders in Lvov Oblast, meet with understanding, if not acceptance, in the republic structures. As for other regions, their attitude toward Galicia was one of intolerance until very recently. But the tide of legends about our alleged separatism and extremism and our persecution of Communist Party members has subsided now. I cannot deny though that the new organs might have tried too hard in some places, which unfortunately happens at any crucial moment in the history of society. Personally I support the depoliticization of the Army, the KGB, the militia, and parliament leaders; and I also think that the Ukrainian Communist Party, which has yet to become equal to other parties in the legal sense, is still retaining, in one way or another, visible and invisible privileges and the administrative command system.

[Klyucherov] I would like to descend from sociopolitical problems to our mortal earth. We know what the past year has brought us. But what is in store for us this year, how are we going to continue living and working given the present situation and literally desperate needs of our people?

[Davymuka] In this I am a pessimist rather than an optimist. Lvov Oblast is not Lithuania or Latvia. It exists within the financial limits set for it by the republic. We used this as a basis to make up our plan and budget for this year.

At present we are not in the position to resolve our problems independently like the federal territories of Germany. Our reality is that production is in a recession. That holds true for both the republic and the country. With such instability it is not worth even trying to do a prognosis. However, we do not have the right to sit and wait, either. This leads to choosing priorities for our directions. For instance, they used to allocate 30 percent of all construction materials to the villages, but at our session we decided to increase this to 40 percent.

Speaking of ecology, for instance. We have sulfur production industry in our oblast. According to experts,

damage to the environment from it may be estimated at over a billion rubles. There is no hope that the government will refund this money. What is there to do? If we create a Sulfur regional association now we will be able to offer this product at a totally different price. The price will change to make the industry profitable and recover the money for the restoration of the environment.

We have also designed certain concepts on housing, the transfer to market relations, and industry and agriculture. Here I want to emphasize that the land, its wealth and basic funds—they all belong to the region. Finally, we are going to start closing all unprofitable farms even before the republic laws are adopted. But...

I have already said that even recently we felt apprehensive about the inability of the republic parliament to do any constructive work that could seriously affect our society. Today this lack of understanding has shifted to other layers of our sociopolitical life—to the workers collectives, which is not a lesser evil.

[Klyucherov] Do you mean strikes?

[Davymuka] Exactly. It is not that they are unnecessary in our area, but they are harmful and dangerous from the social point of view. Unfortunately, "revolutionary" radicals from the Ukrainian Republican Party and the interparty assembly, strike committees, and representatives of other movements adhere to the naive concept that the sooner we start destroying our economic mechanism the nearer we will be to the new life. But there will be nothing but a new collapse and big trouble.

We are trying to explain to these radicals that strikes will not only lead to another twist in social tensions but will also bring about destruction of our embryonic statehood. But the spirit of neo-Bolshevism prevents them from being broad-minded and, what is more, from being sober-minded.

Here is a recent example. The Lvov council of the oblast federation of independent trade unions decided to organize a protest rally against the price hike announced by the central government. This is quite a normal action aimed at protecting the interests of the working people. But what did our "uncompromising ones" do? They gathered in front of the opera theater before the set time and did not give the rally organizers any opportunity to speak. They gave the floor to "their own" only, mainly to those who were calling for strikes.

I support civilized pluralism, parliamentary forms of confrontation, and the search for compromise with all political forces. In the long run I support elementary tolerance and respect for other human beings. We cannot go far with fanaticism, lawlessness, and the inability to understand and respect the interests of all ethnic and social groups.

I would like to add another thing: Our bloc is not a group of extremists and separatists who have usurped power. The Democratic Bloc came to power through the trust extended to it by local population. We do not strive to destroy but to create a new, civilized society with a normally functioning economy and a prosperous people...

Caucasus

Armenian Party Chief, Politburo Member Resigns

PM1305212791 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 May 91 p 1

[From the "Have You Heard? Have You Read?" feature attributed to RIA, IMA-Press and own correspondents]

[Text] It has become known that Stepan Pogosyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, has resigned. It is thought here that one of the reasons was the fact that for several days Stepan Pogosyan has been unable to secure a meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Supreme Soviet Official Fired on in Armenia

LD1405135491 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1230 GMT 14 may 91

[Text] Again, worrying news from the Armenian-Azerbaijan border areas. On 13 May at around 2000 in Tauzskiy Rayon in Armenia, on the road from Paravan to Sakhkovan, several military helicopters fired on a motor vehicle in which Nazarov, an officer in the apparatus of the USSR Supreme Soviet, was traveling, along with deputies of the Armenian Supreme Soviet. A warning missile was fired in front of the first car in the convoy, but when the people began to run away from the cars, rifle fire was opened up on them.

When the deputies managed to get to the nearby village of Sakhkovan, a military force landed and searched the houses but failed to find them because of the lateness of the hour. This information was given to the editorial office by People's Deputy Katayev, to whom Nazarov, the man who was involved in the incident, has spoken on the telephone.

Ter-Petrosyan, Mutalibov Interviewed on NKAO

91US0501A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 18, May 91 p 2

[Interview with Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders L. Ter-Petrosyan and A. Mutalibov by unidentified ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent; place and date not given; published under the rubric "Nagornyy Karabakh: Two Views of One Problem: Positions of the Leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan"]

[Text] [ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Does the Nagornyy Karabakh problem exhaust the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan?

[Ter-Petrosyan] Following the collapse of the idea of permanent revolution in Europe in 1920-1921, Soviet Russia turned its gaze eastward, endeavoring to win the sympathies of the Muslim peoples, primarily Turkey. It was for the achievement of this purpose that Armenia was dismembered. Russia ceded Kars Oblast to Turkey, and Nagornyy Karabakh and Nakhichevan to Azerbaijan. Armenians in Kars Oblast and Nakhichevan were forcibly deported. Whence arose the well-known conflict, echoes of which are shaking our two republics still. The protest meetings that rocked Nagornyy Karabakh in 1988 and the decision adopted by the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] Council on secession from Azerbaijan were aimed at preventing a repetition of the fate of Nakhichevan.

[Mutalibov] Karabakh is the central link of the conflict. But there are also other problems which derive from this.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] People are of the opinion that from the very outset the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict was inspired by mafia structures. How justified is this claim from your viewpoint?

[Mutalibov] This opinion exists, and it is not without foundation, but this conflict has a complex history, and for this reason it is difficult to reduce it to one cause.

[Ter-Petrosyan] Such a claim could be considered laughable were it not so dangerous. Throughout its history the Soviet system has explained its own mistakes and failures by intrigues of the enemy—both internal and external. The investigation instituted against members of the "Karabakh" Committee was guided by the customary ideas also. One may see for oneself the absurdity of the version to the effect that the conflict was inspired by corrupt elements, mafia structures, or enemies of perestroyka by studying the more than 60 volumes of material of this investigation.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Who benefits from the conflict? Are there such forces in Armenia and Azerbaijan?

[Ter-Petrosyan] It is my profound conviction that the conflict is profitable to neither the Armenian nor the Azerbaijani peoples. To all appearances, it is profitable to certain forces in the center and ruling circles of Azerbaijan, representing for them a serious argument for discrediting the policy of perestroyka being pursued by Gorbachev and for the accrual of dividends in the political power struggle. The conflict is profitable to Azerbaijan's present authorities for the added reason that it is affording an opportunity for distracting the Azerbaijani people's attention from sociopolitical problems within the republic.

[Mutalibov] The conflict did not begin because it was profitable to some people. It was, rather, provoked because there were people who hoped with the aid of the fuss they had kicked up to shirk responsibility for the crimes they had committed. I recall in connection with your question an article published some time back in the magazine DER STERN. The author, from Armenia, incidentally, writes that tension in the NKAO arose after K. Demirchyan, then leader of Armenia, had been severely criticized at a CPSU Central Committee plenum, in 1987. Several months went by, and initially in Yerevan in the fall of 1987, and then in February 1988 the well-known events in Stepanakert began.

The problem in Karabakh became profitable in Armenia to those who were endeavoring to come to power in this republic and who therefore stoked it in every possible way. It was on the crest of this problem that the leaders of the "Karabakh" movement came to lead Armenia.

There are undoubtedly in Azerbaijan also people unhappy with the incapacity of the authorities for putting an end to Armenia's interference in Azerbaijan's affairs. Naturally, the Karabakh problem is being blown up for the same purpose as in Armenia by the opposition, which maintains that it could solve the problem if it were in power, although it is obvious to everyone, in my opinion, that what we have is an impasse situation.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Was there a moment in the history of the conflict when all could have been resolved peacefully?

[Mutalibov] There was such a moment right at the start. Having predicted serious consequences, the experts should have gotten to work, and the center should have had its say. The conflict could have been cut off at its roots. Compromise should not have been sought at that time, it simply does not exist on such issues. Our republic, incidentally, warned the center repeatedly of the inevitable destructive consequences of a growth of the conflict. Unfortunately, reality confirmed our forecasts.

[Ter-Petrosyan] Yes, there was such a moment in March 1988, immediately following the Sumgait tragedy. The center could then have displayed resolve and could have withdrawn the NKAO from Azerbaijan inasmuch as it was obvious that the Armenian population of Azerbaijan was threatened with genocide. I believe that at that moment the feeling of guilt both among the Azerbaijani authorities and among the people of the republic was so profound that they would hardly have resisted such a decision on the part of the center. I would like to also mention here the fault of the Armenian leadership at that time, which, instead of supporting the Armenian people's just demands, began, on the contrary, to impede our democratic movement in every possible way.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] There have in history been many conflicts between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Do you believe that these two peoples are altogether unable to coexist peacefully with one another?

[Ter-Petrosyan] Only from the standpoint of formal historical statistics can the neighborhood of our two peoples be seen as a chain of constant conflict. In reality the periods of conflict from the temporal angle are quite negligible against the background of the long peaceful coexistence. Nor have the past 70 years, throughout

which, despite the political contradictions, both peoples have found diverse mutually profitable forms of cooperation, been any exception. I am convinced that, in the event of a just solution of the Karabakh problem, our peoples would once again quickly find ways to maintain the traditions of peaceful coexistence.

[Mutalibov] No, I do not believe so. Throughout the 70 years of Soviet power Armenians and Azerbaijanis have not simply coexisted, they have been friends.

In addition, the religion of Islam, like Christianity also, preaches a tolerant attitude toward all peoples believing in one God.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Do you believe that the religious factor is influencing the conflict?

[Mutalibov] There are no antagonisms between the Azerbaijani and Armenian peoples, however much attempts are made to impose them on us, religious antagonisms included. We would not otherwise have thousands of mixed families. The Karabakh conflict has brought them dual misfortune because they can now obtain refuge neither in Armenia nor Azerbaijan.

[Ter-Petrosyan] This subject is quite often blown up by the Western media. Claims that ethnic antagonisms between our nations are at the basis of the conflict may be encountered in a number of publications. I wish to refute all these versions and declare that neither the ethnic nor the racial nor the national nor, even less, the religious factor is the basis of the conflict. The Armenian people cooperate closely with Muslim peoples both in the Soviet Union and throughout the world. Specifically, there are Armenian colonies in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Jordan, Kuwait, and Egypt whose inhabitants enjoy all the rights accorded the national minorities. And our people do not have anti-Islamic prejudices generally. As far, however, as the Karabakh problem is concerned, it amounts to the right of the population of the NKAO to self-determination.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Do you see certain blame attached to the center in the emergence and development of the conflict?

[Ter-Petrosyan] I believe that the center has primordially been to blame for this conflict inasmuch as, like I have already said, it was in 1920-1921 that it "tied" the Karabakh knot. Today the center occupies a position according to which the conflict concerns only the Armenian and Azerbaijani peoples and is calling on us to solve the problem by way of dialogue. Outwardly such an approach seems just and objective, but the center is thereby absolving itself of any responsibility. In this situation, however, it simply does not have the moral right to evade its responsibility. While calling us to dialogue, the center is simultaneously by its crude intervention and occupation of the NKAO by Soviet forces in fact frustrating this dialogue. I am sure that without this intervention Armenians and Azerbaijanis could even today very quickly reach a mutually acceptable solution.

[Mutalibov] Judge for yourselves. Can the leadership's indecisiveness in putting a stop to the confrontation right at the start be considered a simple mistake? I fear that it was a question here of premeditation and an endeavor to create some balance of equal blame of both parties. If from the very outset Armenia had been aware of the futility of attempts to detach the NKAO from Azerbaijan, the separatists would never have gone so far. Consequently, some people in Moscow promised them their influential support.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Do you require anyone's mediation in a solution of this problem, and if so, who might play the part of mediator?

[Mutalibov] Mediators here are ruled out. The problem should be solved by the Armenian and Azerbaijani communities of the NKAO without any outside interference. Both communities are tired of the war and have long wanted reconciliation, but cannot achieve it due to pressure from outside. The movement toward reconciliation is being impeded by fighters sent from Armenia, who have dug in on oblast territory and have terrorist bases and many weapons there, and the ordinary people cannot come out with a peace initiative because they are afraid of retribution. This is what is in the way. Although under cover of night Azerbaijanis and Armenians of the NKAO socialize with one another as before. I know this inasmuch as I was recently in Karabakh. The old ties have not been lost. This is a guarantee that peace could be restored were people not being impeded.

[Ter-Petrosyan] I am convinced that were there a democratic government capable of dialogue in Azerbaijan, there would be no need for any mediation. But inasmuch as a communist regime fully supported by the center's administrative command system is in power in Azerbaijan, constructive dialogue is impossible.

As far as international bodies are concerned, appealing to them makes sense, evidently, only in connection with the numerous instances of human rights violations, after all, the most elementary human rights: to life, to inviolability of one's dwelling and so forth, have long been flouted in Artsakh. From the political viewpoint I am skeptical of international bodies. We have seen for ourselves their ineffectiveness repeatedly: the unsolved nature of the Palestinian problem, the continuing crisis in Ulster, the oppression of the Kurds in Iraq—these are eloquent confirmation.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] If you were in your opponent's shoes, what would be your first step to normalize the situation? What first step in this direction are you, in your own shoes, prepared to take?

[Ter-Petrosyan] There is no need for me to put myself in A. Mutalibov's shoes to take the first step toward a normalization of the situation since I have already taken this step in my own shoes: this is readiness for dialogue, which I expressed immediately upon taking office. A. Mutalibov also pays lip service to dialogue, but the past eight months have shown that he has embarked on the

path of delaying dialogue, which is in fact leading to the frustration of it. Occupation of the oblast by Soviet forces, with the aid of which A. Mutalibov is pursuing his policy, is evidently more profitable to the communist leadership of Azerbaijan.

[Mutalibov] We are awaiting the cancellation of the anticonstitutional decision of the Armenian Supreme Soviet on the incorporation of the NKAO within Armenia. This decision is not legally valid, but its formal abrogation is important to us, as a signal of reconciliation.

We have already taken many steps. Our main goal is that there should be no terrorists in Karabakh. If this is secured, we will withdraw the OMON [Special-Purpose Militia Force], begin negotiations, and form a conciliation commission to resolve contentious issues. We will also begin to think about to how to conduct elections in the NKAO, initially to the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet and then vertically to other structures, and will restore the party authorities. All these measures will be implemented together with those who live in Karabakh, and only with them, without the interference of outside forces.

As far as relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan directly are concerned, it would do both republics no harm to study somewhat the ethics of conducting the relations of the two neighboring sovereign states. It is necessary to stop the flow of mutual insults, which are being poured on one another by the media, curtail the endless digging into history, which leads nowhere, and finally recognize that Azerbaijanis and Armenians both have been and will remain neighbors.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Azerbaijan sees as the key to a solution of the problem the deportation of the Armenian population which disagrees with the policy of Azerbaijan and, to judge by recent events, has already embarked on realization of this concept. What, in your view, might the consequences of this step be?

[Ter-Petrosyan] Indeed, according to information available to us, the leadership of Azerbaijan adheres precisely to such a path of a solution: If there are no Armenians, there is no problem. At a meeting on 16 April A. Mutalibov called on the law enforcement authorities—the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the procuracy—to deport inhabitants of the NKAO, Shaumyanskiy Rayon, and the Getashenskiy Subrayon in the event of their refusing to submit to the Azerbaijan Constitution. He said practically the same thing when speaking on Azerbaijan television on 27 April. And, as of 19 April, deportation has been practiced with the direct participation of Soviet forces. To what might this policy lead? It has to be said that a certain status quo has become established in the region in the past year. And any attempts to stabilize the situation today will remain futile if this status quo is disturbed—I refer primarily to the fate of Armenian Shaumyanskiy Rayon, the Getashenskiy Subrayon, and the village of Berdadzor.

[Mutalibov] We have not posed and do not pose any question of any forcible deportation. Such assertions are insinuations of the first water, although, truthfully speaking, we have a moral right to put the issue precisely in this way. Do not forget that approximately 200,000 Azerbaijanis who had lived in Armenia for more than one generation were deported from there in a short space of time. There are practically none there now. Although even at the present time approximately 200,000 Armenians live in Azerbaijan.

We seek one thing: liberation of Azerbaijan territory from the armed terrorist groups and the illegal weapons sent against us. Nothing more. Armenians living in Azerbaijan should submit to the Azerbaijan Constitution and the USSR Constitution. There are no other conditions.

It is a different matter if certain Armenian families have decided to leave our republic voluntarily. We will put no obstacles in their way. We will assist them with transport, what is more.

I am sure that such a solution of the question would help merely the onset of tranquillity in the region.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Do you think that the conflict could be resolved militarily?

[Mutalibov] Any war ultimately ends at the negotiating table. Understanding the utter senselessness of bloodshed, we are exerting every effort to extinguish the conflict by peaceful means.

[Ter-Petrosyan] I rule out the military path of a solution of the conflict. We are convinced supporters of political dialogue. But I do not rule out attempts at mass violence in respect of the Armenian population of the NKAO on the part of uncontrollable elements, as was the case in Sumgait and Baku.

Armenia-Azerbaijan Fighting at 'Usual' Level

PM1305133791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 May 91 Union Edition p 2

[S. Mostovshchikov report: "For the Moment It Is Quiet on the Armenian-Azerbaijani Border"]

[Text] USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] situation reports have not noted any serious complication in the situation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border over the last three days. Individual clashes occur during the evenings, and at night there are firefights.... But according to specialists, this state of affairs is fairly usual in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations in recent times.

The USSR MVD possesses new information about livestock rustling, which both one and the other side often engage in. There is also information that two helicopters containing people armed with submachine guns landed at about 1800 on 10 May in the area of the Armenian village of Karmiravan, located on Azerbaijan territory. They opened fire, and as a result a local inhabitant called

Arakelyan was killed. We are informed that on the night of 11 May there was a firefight between the Azerbaijani village of Nobelyar and the Armenian village of Dashlety.

The republics' authorities, as well as political organizations, are continuing to make statements and send telegrams to the center. TASS reports that in particular the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee sent a telegram to the CPSU Central Committee, in which it demanded that an extraordinary session of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo be convened to look at the situation which has developed in the region. The telegram reads: "...an extremely alarming and tragic situation has developed in Armenia. As a result of combat operations which have taken place the peaceful population, all the Armenian people, are suffering. A wave of anti-Russian and anti-army sentiment is rising in the republic. The Armenian Communist Party Central Committee considers it necessary to take emergency measures to halt the bloodshed...."

IZVESTIYA correspondent Sergey Bablumyan sent the following report to the editorial office 12 May:

Armenian Council of Ministers Chairman Vazgen Manukyan spoke on republic television. The Armenian Government head said that the republic leadership's main task continues to be the return of Armenian hostages and prisoners in the shortest possible time. He informed viewers of his telephone conversation with the Azerbaijan Council of Ministers chairman, during which in particular the question of talks was discussed. Tbilisi or Sochi could be the venue for the meeting.

Replying to the IZVESTIYA correspondent's question about the Azerbaijan Government head's stance in this matter, Vazgen Manukyan explained: They have made similar proposals more than once. However, to date we have not succeeded in reaching agreement.

Sergey Bablumyan singles out from the latest news the visit of a group of Ukrainian deputies to Armenia. The deputies intend to stay on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, meet with people, and form their own ideas about the events taking place in order to try to find ways to approach the task of stabilizing the situation. As delegation leader Valeriy Cherep, a member of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium, declared, the Ukraine has an interest in stabilizing the situation. He also emphasized that young Ukrainians on active service should not have to participate in such conflicts.

Armenian Attacks on Azerbaijani Towns Reported

NC1305124891 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 10 May 19

[Text] The combined units of military forces have maintained their intensive operations to carry out the USSR president's decree on the arms' surrender. The artillery units of the internal forces operations group silenced a position close to [name indistinct] in Armenia's Gorisskiy Rayon, from which missiles were launched against the neighboring border rayons in Azerbaijan. The military servicemen discovered hand-made missile launchers, a number of automatic weapons, and military equipment.

In the last three days, law enforcement units have arrested 50 armed men and impounded 26 automatic weapons; three [word indistinct]; a hail gun; communications units, including a number of field radios mounted on vehicles; mines; portable receivers; and a large number of military equipment from armed Armenians. Regrettably, the servicemen are meeting with stiff resistance in their operations.

Militia Lieutenant Colonel Bunyad Nasimov, chief of the Kazakhskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Department, informed our editorial office of the situation in the rayon by telephone today. An incident occurred on 8 May. The (?Akchapa) and the Askipara towns were fired on. No one was hurt in the Askipara town. However, [words indistinct]. Several members of the military troops, who serve with the internal units which defend Azerbaijan, were wounded. [Passage indistinct]

Our correspondent contacted the Khanlarskiy Rayon today. No Armenians remain in the towns of Chaykend and Martunashen. The employees of the [words indistinct] headquarters and the veterinary department have completed their work in checking the houses and [words indistinct] and examining the cattle. Azerbaijanis will be settled in the recently evacuated houses. A government commission headed by Firuz Mustafayev, deputy chairman of the Azerbaijan Council of Ministers, will begin work on the matter.

Armed men opened fire on the town of Alibeyli in the Tauzskiy Rayon from Armenia with hail guns and automatic weapons today. No one was hurt in the incident.

Efforts To Disarm NKAO Guerrillas Described

PM1305103591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 May 91 First Edition p 3

[Special correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Semenyaka report; first four paragraphs are editorial introduction: "Reportage from the Armenian-Azerbaijani Border: Border Post Goes Into Action"]

[Text] The forces of law and order are continuing to carry out energetic operations to seize weapons from illegal armed formations in the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] and adjoining regions.

In the last three days alone 26 assault rifles, three anti-aircraft guns, four hail guns, communications equipment including mobile units, mines and explosives, portable radio sets, and a large quantity of ammunition

have been seized from Armenian militants. Fifty militants have been detained. Servicemen are succeeding in overcoming stubborn resistance in the course of the operations.

According to a statement issued on 9 May by A. Manucharyan, Armenian acting minister of internal affairs, combat operations in the rayons of Armenia bordering Azerbaijan have been suspended since 2200 hours, 8 May. However, the situation on the border remains tense.

This report by our special correspondent in Azerbaijan's Lachinskiy Rayon describes this.

The Internal Troops' outpost is located on a commanding height. You find shallow foxholes in the rocky ground, communications trenches.... On one side of the outpost is the Armenian village of Tekh; on the other, the Azerbaijani village of Dzhagazur.

Until last June, before the outpost was set up here, the local authorities regarded this promontory and its slopes with apprehension. Misfortune descended on them from it. Misfortune brought by Armenian militants, who killed shepherds and drove off livestock. Fifty-three people have been killed in Lachinskiy Rayon during the period of interethnic hostility, a representative of the law-enforcement organs informed me. These have included children, women, and old people. Forty-four criminal investigations have been launched into these incidents. But this is poor consolation for the relatives of the deceased. None of them is able to say whether the murderers will come to court.

The fact that the leadership of Armenia's neighboring Gorisskiy Rayon is making no constructive attempt to resolve the deadlocked situation is bound to cause alarm. It makes constant unjustified claims on its neighbors and refuses to take measures to stop the bandit attacks.

The military outposts along the border with Armenia have come under fire virtually every day in the last two months. The attackers have been repulsed on every occasion.

"We will not allow militants, no matter whom they represent, to go on the rampage," Lieutenant Colonel K. Zverev, military commander of the rayon, stated. "I think that this is understood not only by those actually fighting us, but by those who send them."

Nevertheless, armed resistance to the country's forces of law and order is growing. Extremists have recently begun to act outrageously. On the night of 1-2 May they rolled into the village of Tekh in trucks, got out, and as darkness fell attacked the Dzhagazur outpost, firing around 20 rockets and using machine guns and assault rifles. The fighting lasted around five hours. No servicemen were hurt.

At another spot around 30 Armenian militants tried to destroy a settlement being built for refugees from Armenia. A checkpoint was fired on in broad daylight. Internal Troops were forced to take countermeasures. They set about seizing weapons and disarming bandit formations in Armenia' s Gorisskiy Rayon. These resolute actions by the forces of law and order came—and I saw this for myself—as a complete surprise to the bandits. Nevertheless they put up stiff resistance and opened up with hail guns, rocket launchers, mortars, amd machine guns. On approaching the village of Kornidzor, for example, Internal Troops came first under mortar fire and then machine gun fire. They were being shot at from a dairy farm building Return fire from the soldiers destroyed the machine gun positions. Despite this not a single house was destroyed or civilian hurt.

I was in the convoy and saw everything, but later learned that L. Ter-Petrosyan, chairman of of the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet, had stated that the servicemen had destroyed and burned down a... peaceful village. Such a charge is, to put it mildly, very wide of the mark. Incidentally, the republic leader said not a word about the fact that personnel of the Yerevan OMOR [Rapid-Response Militia Detachment] were among those detained in the dairy farm building. Nor did he mention that assault rifles, various kinds of radio sets, pistols, eight boxes of ammunition, plus special equipment were seized from them.

On the same day Internal Troops came under fire from two hail rocket launchers, which were destroyed by return fire. Homemade cannons were also seized—their crews having fled in panic.

...And in the evening rockets were again fired at the Dzhagazur outpost from the direction of the Armenian village. I was on the spot in 30 minutes. I saw fresh craters not far from the trenches. An exhausted young soldier was asleep alongside his bulletproof vest.

Bombing of Baku Office Blamed on Armenians

PM1305090191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 91 Second Edition p 2

[Z. Kadymbekov report: "Direct Attack"]

[Text] Baku—In the center of Stepanakert, a direct mortar attack was made from a public garden adjacent to the square in front of the building housing the commandant's office and the republic organizational committee for the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO].

The projectile, which was launched from a distance of 150 meters, hit the office of V. Polyanichko, chairman of the republic organizational committee for the NKAO and second secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Central Committee, where there happened to be a conference going on between representatives of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the leadership of the oblast's law enforcement organs. It was only thanks to good fortune that there were no casualties, but

everyone in the room received slight injuries and a concussion. The building was seriously damaged.

This incident occurred 10 May at 2105 hours local time. The following morning we spoke to Viktor Petrovich Polyanichko over the telephone.

"As a former artilleryman, I can say for sure that this shot was fired by a professional and, what is more, by one who was aware that there was a conference going on in my office," Polyanichko said. "Incidentally, this is the fourth attack on the republic organizational committee leadership by Armenian terrorists since the beginning of this year. Last night the hotel where members of the organizational committee and the leadership of the military commandant's office are staying was fired at for the sixth time. Armenian militants have become more active in recent days as a result of the fury caused by the measures designed to disarm the bandit formations sent into NKAO territory from Armenia, now being implemented in accordance with the USSR presidential decree. They are hoping to intimidate us by means of attacks and terrorist acts. These hopes are in vain. We will continue to do all that is necessary in order to establish order in the autonomous oblast and the whole region. This is being done in the interests of the whole population of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is being terrorized by the Armenian militants' criminal actions.

Azerbaijan Official Urges Armenia To Negotiate

LD1305185791 Moscow TASS in English 1829 GMT 13 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Ruben Shirinyan]

[Text] Moscow May 13 TASS—Vice chairman of Azerbaijan's Supreme Soviet Tamerlan Karayev today urged the Armenian leadership to sit down at the negotiating table to solve the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict by political means. Speaking at a news conference here, he said that "the Armenian side must renounce its territorial pretensions to Nagorno-Karabakh".

"Foreign observers can be invited to the negotiations," he added.

Karayev said elections to the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet must be conducted in Nagorno-Karabakh where bodies of power were abolished early last year following the imposition of the state of emergency.

"It must be under Azerbaijani authority," he said. Karayev refused to comment on how the predominantly Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh would receive that proposal.

On Sunday permanent representative of the Armenian government in Moscow Felix Mamikonyan reaffirmed his republic's desire to find a political solution of the conflict. He stressed the need to restore bodies of power in Nagorno-Karabakh and begin talks in Azerbaijan.

Airlift of Armenians From Getashen Continues

PM1305091791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 May 91 Union Edition p 1

[Sergey Bablumyan report: "Sheltering Refugees"]

[Text] Yerevan—The Armenian Supreme Soviet Presidium has been forced to postpone the routine legislative session scheduled for 13 May owing to the situation on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border.

Deputies dispersed to all areas of the republic in order to monitor the situation. Vagan Shirkhanyan, chairman of the Armenian Council of Ministers Defense Committee, reported that the past 24 hours had passed peacefully. Three Armenian hostages seized the previous day in Paravakar Village, Taushskiy Rayon had been returned.

The intensive transfer of refugees from Getashen to Yerevan via Stepanakert continues. Military helicopter pilots have been giving Armenian fliers a great deal of help in this operation. People who arrive virtually without anything are met at Yerevan's Erebuni Airport by teams of medics and representatives of the public and charities. They are issued with field rations as soon as they deplane—the Yerevan City Soviet Executive Committee Public Catering Association has arranged this. Despite the great difficulties with fuel supplies, transport workers have managed to organize a continuous shuttle service between Yerevan and Razdanskiy Rayon, where the new arrivals are given temporary accommodation.

On 10 May Levon Ter-Petrosyan, head of the Armenian legislature, received in Yerevan Archbishop [as published] Francesco Colasuonno, the Pope's envoy.

Armenian Supreme Soviet, Cabinet Issue Condolences

NC1305124691 Yerevan Radio Yerevan Network in Armenian 1730 GMT 12 May 91

[Statement issued by the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers Presidiums]

[Text] Twenty-four of our compatriots, 14 of whom were [word indistinct] (?officers) of the Internal Affairs Ministry, fell victim to the armed (?state) terrorism committed by the USSR in the republic's border regions. Today, all Armenian people are grieving for their loss, and are anguished and embittered because of what happened. They were (?dedicated people) who fell while defending their homes and honor [words indistinct].

While deeply sharing the grief of the families and kin of our compatriots who fell victim to [words indistinct] the organized aggression, we all must help them. We must face the trials being imposed on us by giving support to each other.

The republic's Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers are also deeply concerned about the fate of our 104 compatriots abducted by the army and the subunits of

the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry. Every effort is being made to ensure their security and obtain their speedy release.

We are convinced that the work being carried out by the leadership of the republic and our people's legitimate protest would force the highest leadership of the USSR to act prudently and release the doctors, law enforcement officers, local soviet deputies and other citizens of the republic taken prisoner.

Armenian Minister Favors Executive Presidency

LD1305081591 Moscow TASS in English 0724 GMT 13 May 91

[Text] Yerevan May 13 TASS—In an interview with local television on Sunday, Armenian Prime Minister Vazgen Manukyan favoured the executive presidency in Armenia.

He said that Armenia should have "the executive presidency to manoeuvre and take correct decisions in the present difficult situation". In the prime minister's opinion, "the present structure of power inherited from Soviet Armenia does not conform to the tasks put forth before the nation".

Armenian Youths in Moscow Demonstration

LD1205153591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1430 GMT 12 May 91

[By TASS correspondents Galina Vinitskaya and Nikolay Palagichev]

[Text] Moscow, 12 May (TASS)—Moscovites' attention was attracted today by a red, blue, and orange flag blowing in the wind and a group of young people on Manezhnaya Square in the center of the Soviet capital. The Central Council of the Union of Armenian Youth [UAY] has organized pickets here. Taking part in it are 20 people who are members of this youth union who are protesting against the activities of subdivisions of the Soviet Army and troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in the zone of the Armenian-Azerbaijan interethnic conflict.

As Aleksandr Kazaryan, member of the Central Council of the UAY, said in an interview to TASS correspondents, the action began this afternoon when students went out onto the square with the slogans "Cease the genocide of the Armenian people!" and "Withdraw the special purpose units from Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh!" In the words of Artashes Bakhshyan, one of its organizers, the delegation of pickets received approval for picketing from Yuriy Luzhkov, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Moscow Soviet.

Those participating in the action brought with them an appeal by the UAY to the USSR Supreme Soviet and social and political organizations which they intend to hand over to the Union legislature. In it members of the UAY demand "the withdrawal of punitive forces from the territory of the Republic of Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the villages of Getashen and Martunashen in the Khanlar Rayon of Azerbaijan, the freeing of hostages, and a political evaluation of the actions of the central authorities." It is planned to end the action on 19 May.

The UAY set up in September 1990, has proclaimed itself the successor of the Komsomol of the republic. The new organization is part of Komsomol. The UAY sees its main task as the protection of the socio-economic interests of young people.

'Vremya' Notes Armenian Death Toll Since 1 May

LD1105223191 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 11 May 91

[Report by correspondent V. Nazaryan in Yerevan; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The events around Armenia have recently attracted many foreign guests to the republic, especially journalists. Today, the Holy Echmiadzin and the Catholicos of all Armenians Vazgen II was visited by the papal nuncio in Moscow, Archbishop Francesco Colasuonno. The purpose of the visit is one and the same: to get to know the situation on the spot. Unfortunately, it was not as yet changing for the better. Here are the facts: According to information from the republican Internal Affairs Ministry, from 1 May to the present, on Armenian territory alone 31 people have died, 13 of them militia staff. Over the same period, during a disarming operation, a total of 166 firearms were seized, 124 of which were standard issue weapons for staff of the law enforcement bodies. Such arithmetic—31 lives and 42 shotguns removed from the population—such a price, not counting the millions spent on conducting the operation which, incidentally, is still going on. [sentence as heard]

And another pain: 144 Armenian citizens have been taken hostage.

[Announcer] You understand, comrades, that our correspondent in Yerevan was using information from local law enforcement bodies. We have not yet received, by official TASS channels, reports from the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry about the situation in Armenia.

Reporter Witnesses 'Absurdity' of NKAO

PM1305154191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 91 Second Edition pp 1,2

[Yu. Shabanov report under the rubric "Report on a Visit to the Zone of Combat Actions:" "In a Land Black with Grief and Anger"]

[Text] Gyandzha-Kazakh-Khanlar—We, nine correspondents from central newspapers, flew out of Moscow into the rain. They say that if it is raining when you

leave, you will have a good trip, but we did not expect anything good from our official trip.

In three hours, our aircraft was to land in the Azerbaijani city of Gyandzha, and from there the Armenian border is a stone's throw away, so to speak. Once a border of friendship, it has now become the border of intransigent hostility, blood, and death. Pieces of news as black as smoldering wood on burnt ground are flying around the country from here. Everyone probably knows by now the names of those villages from newspapers and television broadcasts: Chaykend, Martunashen, and Voskepar. The first two are in Khanlarskiy Rayon in Azerbaijan, and the third in Noyemberyanskiy Rayon in Armenia. Your hair stands on end when you read what certain publications say about the fires blazing there as a result of shelling, ears and noses being cut off, people being scalped, and the bestiality of the Azerbaijani special purpose militia detachment [OMON], the Internal Troops, and the Soviet Army toward the Armenian population of these villages. Such reports come from anonymous eyewitnesses, as a rule.

But what is really happening there? How fair are the accusations made by the Armenian side?

"Fly out there and find out what all that is happening on the spot," the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] told us. "We have made arrangements for our Azerbaijani colleagues to show us all the 'hotspots.' Operating there now are Internal Troops which come under two authorities—ours and the republic MVD; they come under the authority of the latter in terms of operational procedure; and also the local OMON, which only comes under the authority of the Azerbaijani MVD. You will be met there and they will assist you...."

Imagine the journalists' professional impatience to see everything with their own eyes, conduct interviews with the participants in these, alas, sad events, and tell the truth about them. But no one met us at the military airfield near Gyandzha. We wandered about the airfield and the various airport buildings for six hours. We are grateful to the military pilots—they gave us something to eat and, with great difficulty, using their Army communications (the city telephone system was disconnected from the military airfield on the day of our arrival) helped us get in touch with representatives of the local authorities. After all, they were up to their necks in trouble even without us. Planes were taking off and landing, transporting freight and refugees, and transportation documents were being drawn up. And the faces of the military men clouded over when the documents said "freight 200," which in ordinary language means a coffin. The planes were leaving with their terrible load, taking boys in military uniform—officers and men—on their last journey home. These have also included the casualties of accidental disasters, but recently there have been increasing numbers of people who had stood in the way of the extremists' bullets, who had saved the lives of civilians by their own lives. And you felt a painful twinge in your heart at this.

A memorial plaque in honor of the Lieutenant Colonel O. Larionov was put up in one of the Gyandzha military installations. As newspapers reported, one day last January he was accompanying a journalist working for the Azerbaijani youth newspaper and an officer from the Internal Troops from Lachin to Stepanakert. A burst of automatic fire broke out unexpectedly on both sides of the road simultaneously. The lieutenant colonel, bleeding to death, defended his companions and himself until his bullets ran out. But the fight was so unequal that everyone in the vehicle was killed. Now a memorial plaque recalls his courage. But no memorial plaque or military honors will alleviate the grief of Lt. Col. Larionov's wife and children. It would have been better if there were no plaques and the people had stayed alive. We happened to see a relatively young woman—the mother of an officer who had died—fall down on her knees and raise her hands to the heavens in prayer in the same military installation. What words of solace could be found for her? And would they help?

We journalists are having a hard time now; this is not for people with weak nerves. The things you see! However, it is absolutely necessary to see everything for yourself and remember it in order to tell people the truth, even if it is as bitter as quinine. But only the truth, not repeating idle conjectures and pieces of scandal, or making hasty conclusions that serve as a devilish brew that kindles blind anger. We honestly tried to find this truth, but we did not always manage to....

It was evening by the time we met Militia Colonel E. Gasanov, chief of the Gyandzha Internal Affairs Administration, and some representatives of the city authorities. We tried to clarify the operational situation right away. The colonel spread out his hands:

"You know yourselves, there is a system of seniority. There are important representatives of the USSR Defense Ministry and MVD Internal Troops here: They will tell you what is going on. But I cannot, although I do have some information. Tomorrow I am organizing a meeting with them. We will meet at 1000 hours...."

We did not set eyes on him again. The official on duty at the city internal affairs administration answered all calls by saying that the colonel was not there and that he did not know his whereabouts. No one at all knew anything about the whereabouts of the supreme military leadership from Moscow. Admittedly, employees of the rayon internal affairs department accompanied us, but what could they do? And we were trying to visit Chaykend, from where we were receiving the most incredible rumors: The village, like the neighboring Martunashen, too, had been reduced to rubble by artillery, there were hundreds of casualties, forced deportation, and pillaging on the part of the Azerbaijani OMON.

"These are just wicked fabrications," our companions affirmed, but we wanted to make sure for ourselves.

After all, reports from Armenia said that it was true. Yes, our companions wanted to help us, but they did not manage to.

Sometime in the afternoon on the second day of our official trip, Soviet Army Lieutenant Colonel A. Zakharchuk, a political worker, got into the bus together with the militia workers. Right away we threw questions at him.

[PRAVDA] Have you met with the Armenian militants?

[Zakharchuk] Yes, frequently.

[PRAVDA] Which social group are they from?

[Zakharchuk] Students, adventurers, criminals who have been let out of prison, even workers from the law enforcement organs.... [Zakharchuk ends]

The pages of PRAVDA have shown photocopies of militia identification taken from people who were in the militant detachments. Incidentally, many of them were issued in March-April of this year, that is, literally just before the beginning of the militants' terrorist actions in the Azerbaijani border settlements and in Nagorno-Karabakh. Once again this makes you reflect on the organized nature of the extremist formations' actions. Who is behind them?

"And have detachments of militants been forming in Azerbaijan too?" We then asked the lieutenant colonel.

"Here, too, in reaction, attempts were made to form similar informal military detachments. Some plants even started up the production of primitive weapons. Primitive grenades, you know...."

His words were confirmed by quite a high official from the USSR MVD Internal Troops operating in a five-kilometer security zone on both sides of the border. I will not give his name, as the militants have set a very high price on the head of every line officer. Remember the fate of Lieutenant Colonel Blakhotin, who was killed outside his house in Rostov. The military believe that that was no accident. Officers really are being persecuted.

So he told us about the occasion when over 100 armed Azerbaijani militants arrived at one of his posts saying they wanted to help.

The officer ordered them to stand in formation, placed his own officers around them and told them to give up their weapons. They grumbled a bit, but gave them up. They were sent back home.

"And now," Lt. Col. Zakharchuk concluded, "since the Soviet Army has arrived in the border area, there is no need for such detachments of militants in Azerbaijan...."

"So what about the Azerbaijani OMON members? It is said that they are no different from the militants."

"Yes, you could say that they are the same militants, but formed on a kind of official basis. We are trying to decrease their contacts with the Armenian population. All kinds of things have happened...."

Other officers with whom we managed to talk also spoke in an uncomplimentary way about the OMON members. We have not managed to receive any official reports about their actions....

This was not the end of our questioning.

"It is being written that the Soviet Army has supplied weapons to the Azerbaijani militants."

"This is a vile fabrication. Of course you always get some scoundrels. But, after all, this does not mean the Soviet Army supplying weapons. Some scoundrel or other stole a submachine gun and decided to earn something by selling it. But this is not happening on a mass scale, deliberately. And indeed, this is easy to verify: Look at the invoices and see how many weapons and arms and what kind have been received and how many are still there...."

The road took a steep turn up into the mountains. Militia posts flashed past, as did powerful dump trucks—these are used as barricades in the event of attacks by Armenian militants. After all, the latter even possess combat vehicles. Where from? The mass media have often reported on attacks on military subdivisions and the seizure of weapons. There have been instances when militants unhooked railroad flatcars, drove them into dead ends, and removed combat equipment from them....

We went higher and higher. All around was a kind of painful silence, which seemed to be sucked into our bus from outside and electrify it. We could see the small shapes of helicopters in a ravine. Nearby were people in military uniform. Their figures were tense. Something above us in the mountains started going off with crashing sounds. And suddenly we noticed some overwhelmingly beautiful poppies and we could even smell their attractive soporific smell. Life and possible death side by side. Then we suddenly began to perceive the whole penetrating and melancholy absurdity and ridiculousness of the misfortune that has occurred. And we fell silent....

Journalists Unable To Reach Troubled Border

PM1305121791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 May 91 Union Edition p 2

[Special correspondent V. Reshetnikov report: "A Conflict Which Has Grown into a War"]

[Text] Gyandzha, Kazakh, Nizhnyaya Aksipara—Correspondents of central newspapers are witnesses to the bloody fighting on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border.

...You simply cannot understand what is going on from the contradictory and conflicting information which is being given out by the official organs in Armenia and

Azerbaijan. Now the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] has decided to send journalists to the regions of the main events: Let everyone see things for themselves, talk with villagers on both sides of the border, and draw their own conclusions. But....

We boarded the plane in Moscow and it seemed that they forgot about us immediately. The "USSR MVD escort" we had been promised was not waiting for us in Gyandzha. This was a matter of no small importance—there is a state of emergency in operation in the so-called "five km zone" along the border. It is impossible to enter the conflict regions: The roads are closed by the militia. Later we had a sorry opportunity to see that for ourselves....

But for the help of the Gyandzha Internal Affairs Main Administration leadership and individual soldiers the trip would have ended in utter failure.

It was 7 May in Kazakh. A small Azerbaijani town which, we were told, has been subjected to rocket attacks at night from the neighboring republic. We saw bomb craters a meter deep in the courtyard of a house. The family living there lost two people that night....

It is a stone's throw from Kazakh to the three villages of Nizhnyaya and Verkhnyaya Aksipara in Azerbaijan and Voskepar in Armenia. Four years ago they celebrated weddings together here. Now the roads between the villages are anything but roads of peace. The day before, there had been fighting here. According to soldiers who were involved in the gunfire, people dressed as soldiers began firing from a convoy of vehicles. The answer was not the traditional one: The military, who have usually avoided the use of weapons, responded with a hail of bullets. The convoy surrendered immediately....

Eleven dead—that was the result of the shooting. More than 40 people were arrested. According to the Azerbaijani investigator, they carried no documents but were carrying automatic rifles, pistols, food, cigarettes, and medicine. We met with three of the investigators. We weren't allowed to ask questions. Some journalists asked them to explain their presence on the border.

"We have come to bring peace to this land," was the somewhat strange reply.

As soon as our bus climbed up the steep roads of Nizhnyaya Aksipara to a hilltop occupied by soldiers, the next round of fighting began.

For the assault troops clad in their bullet-proof vests, the situation was clearly so familiar that many of them had not even broken off from their field rations before the battle ended.

The commander's helicopter landed on a small plateau ringed by tanks and airborne fighting vehicles. The officer got out and immediately shouted to his zealous subordinate, who keenly urged the journalists to flee. We could look, but there was nowhere to take cover.

The latest battle began with shooting from the mountain road past the village of Voskepar. This was about three-four km from us. The outpost on the Verkhnyaya Aksipara road came under automatic gunfire. The post responded with fire, reported that there were three trucks full of armed men, and requested help. The commander ordered an artillery salvo. A shell exploded on a hillock beyond the Armenian village. Then two helicopters were summoned and they began circling the hills. They flew over the targets for a long time as though uncertain whether to carry out the commander's quite routine order, as though it were an exercise.

Gyandzha, I looked at the man who had given the order to "destroy," and it seemed to me that he knew simple solutions to all the most complex problems, including ethnic problems.

After a few target runs the helicopters fired some rounds of free-flight rockets. The hilltop where the trucks stood was ringed in flame.

The helicopters reported that the targets had been destroyed: Both the vehicles and the people had been wiped out....

Then the artillery observer called out some information and the gun fired again. When the salvo was over, a missile launcher rained down its thunderbolts on the hills. To be frank, I wasn't sure what was going on....

When it was all over, the thunder and the falling rain seemed peaceful.

An airborne fighting vehicle took three of the journalists to the village of Voskepar. On the whole, you could see from our elevated position that there was no destruction. Newcomers confirmed that the village, near which initially a conflict and then a battle broke out and which has repeatedly been described as "wiped off the face of the earth," was in fact absolutely undamaged.

The armored vehicles set off and headed toward their displacement location. Our bus fell in line behind them. I spent the whole time looking back to the where the helicopters were "operating" and where now columns of black smoke rose high into the air....

On 8 May we tried unsuccessfully to reach the mountain village of Getashen (Chaykend), which is inhabited by Armenians. The Internal Troops unit at Gyandzha gave us a UAZ jeep and, as escort, a young officer with an automatic rifle. But one km from the village we were turned back by the reinforced militia post. Some time later it seemed that fate had nonetheless smiled on us and that we would be able to manage without the help promised us in Moscow. We were met by a major of the Internal Troops, a tanned and imposing man, who refused to give his name but who introduced himself as director of evacuation work and began by hurling abuse at us. According to him, everything that had been said in the press about Getashen was a lie. His interpretation of events was this: The evacuation began at the request of

the inhabitants, who first made a collective statement to the military and then individual requests to be taken from "this hell." Various cities in the USSR were mentioned. The village, the major claimed, was surrounded by an outer ring of Armenian militants who were not letting people through. On the first day (1 May) the military managed to ferry out 21 people by helicopter. Their homes were immediately burned down by those militants as a warning to the rest. In the past few days, hundreds of people had rushed up when the helicopters appeared. The soldiers helped to rescue them from their trap. He claims that this village, which once had more than 1,500 inhabitants, has now been completely evacuated. With the exception of the homes which have been burned down there is no destruction.

Unfortunately, we were unable to see that for ourselves. Despite the permission of the major, who went ahead of us in his UAZ jeep, we were stopped again. After heated discussions the submachine gunner escorting us was allowed to travel to Getashen to meet with Mamedov, the republic's deputy interior minister. He returned four hours later without consoling news. Access to the village was forbidden to journalists. The deputy minister explained his decision briefly: There was a danger of shelling....

Official representatives of the Internal Troops were, unfortunately, in no hurry to meet with us. Thus it was impossible to obtain a precise picture of the operational situation and the deployment of military units. Information often arrived by chance. For example, an internal troops colonel (who asked not to be named) reported that Internal Troops carried out a weapons-confiscation operation in the Armenian village of Artvashen, on Azerbaijani territory, on 8 May. As a result, some MTLBU's [expansion unknown] (a track-mounted command center), a large quantity of automatic weapons, home-made hand grenades, and antipersonnel mines were seized. The colonel reported that the military had recently disarmed around 500 Azerbaijanis who, in their own words, had gone to "help the army...."

.. The conflict has developed into a war between neighboring peoples. Virtually every day blood flows on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. How can the shooting be stopped? Has the best method been chosen for that? After all, it is well known that blood only leads to more blood, hatred to more hatred.

Central Asia

Kyrgyzstan Government, TU Reach Accord for 1991

LD1105122691 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 0900 GMT 11 May 91

[Text] The Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and the republican council of the federation of trade unions have signed an agreement on labor and socioeconomic issues for the current year. It lays out the necessary guarantees to prevent a sharp drop in the living standards of working people in connection with price hikes. The documents sets out solutions to the problems of housing, employment, and labor and health protection.

Kyrgyz 'Amnesty': Step Toward Market Relations

PM1405100591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 May 91 Union Edition p 1

["Direct Line" report by Aleksandr Ryabushkin: "Business Is Not Punishable"]

[Text] Bishkek—The Kyrgyzstan Republic Supreme Soviet has adopted a resolution on freeing certain persons from criminal proceedings.

The resolution says: Taking into account the fact that certain acts are not specified by criminal law as socially dangerous, persons convicted under Article 156 of the republic's criminal code (speculation, trading malpractice) are to be freed from criminal proceedings, with the exception of those prosecuted and convicted for cornering goods for which state retail prices have been set.

In essence an amnesty has been announced for petty profiteers and ordinary citizens who have taken a one-shot risk in doing a bit of business at secondhand markets.

In the juridical section of the Supreme Soviet Presidium it was explained that there are currently many goods in circulation for which state retail prices have not been set. For example, an artel knitted a consignment of sweaters and took them to the market, a man grew fruit and vegetables on his plot... A step has been made in the direction of market relations and enterprise.

General Staff, Uzbekistan on Draft Exemptions

PM1405103191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 May 91 Union Edition p 1

[INTERFAX report from news agencies roundup: "Concessions to Uzbekistan Draftees"]

[Text] An agreement signed by G. Krivosheyev, deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, and I. Dzhurabekov, first deputy chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers under the Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] president, is devoted to regulating the draft and improving the conditions under which citizens of the Uzbek SSR serve their compulsory military service. The agreement recognizes that it is inadmissible to draft young men in poor health. Young men whose brothers have been killed or who died while on military service are also exempted from the draft, INTERFAX reports.